

ACQUISITION OF MINE-RESISTANT, AMBUSH-PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES: A CASE STUDY

Jacques S. Gansler, Ph.D.

Professor and Roger C. Lipitz Chair Director, Center of Public Policy and Private Enterprise *William Lucyshyn* Director of Research, Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise *William Varettoni*

Ph.D. Candidate and Graduate Research Assistant

School of Public Policy University of Maryland

NPS Acquisition Research Symposium May 12, 2010



<u>Overview</u>

- Introduction and Background
- Demand for MRAPs
- MRAP Description
- MRAP Procurement
- Lessons Learned and Recommendations



MRAP Vehicle Program

- The largest military industrial mobilization since WWII
- The most significant example of urgent governmentindustry cooperation on a massive scale since WWII
- DoD's #1 acquisition program (per SecDef Gates, May 07)

"The MRAP program was the first major defense procurement program to go from concept to full-scale production in less than a year since World War II." – Secretary of Defense Robert Gates



The Threat

- Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
 - Approximately 70 percent of troop casualties
 - Increasing frequency--"Beginning in June 2003, IED incidents targeting coalition forces began to escalate from <u>22 per month to over 600 per month</u> in June 2004. In June 2006, these incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006, coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day" – GAO, 2009
 - Evolving sophistication
 - Explosively-Formed Penetrators (EFPs)
 - Under-vehicle detonation
 - Bigger bombs









Video is courtesy of a combat-disabled US Army "Silent Professional"



Initial Two Prong Approach

Avoidance tactics and defeating insurgents' ability to make and detonate IEDs

- In October 2003, a small Army unit dedicated itself to studying IED avoidance tactics and defeating insurgents' ability to make and detonate IEDs.
 - Unit elevated the to a joint task force in 2004, became a permanent entity in February 2006.
 - In FY2007, JIEDDO employed hundreds of people and commanded a budget over **\$4** billion.

Adding armor to HMMWVs

- In the summer of 2003, DoD also began procuring up-armored HMMWVs (identified as the M1114), as well as adding armor kits to existing vehicles.
 - congressional pressure and media exposure spurred a significant ramp-up in production
 - Add-on kits or new, up-armored models
 - Already in production
 - Flat bottoms absorb a great deal of blast force
 - Marginal improvements in survivability over HMMWV, but, at the same time, insurgent attacks increase in
 - frequency and ferocity



<u>What are MRAPs?</u>

- MRAP vehicles:
 - a family of vehicles that incorporate a V-shaped, armored hull that directs blast away from crew
 - High ground clearance dissipates blast intensity
 - Heavily armored
- Not a new Concept
 - South Africa deployed the first major contingent of MRAPs in the 1970s





Early MRAP Use

➡ U.S. began testing MRAP vehicles in FY 2000

- A few dozen were in service in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to the MRAP program
- Viewed as a niche capability for EOD teams, rather than as replacement for the HMMWV
- Demonstrated superior survivability

Vehicle Loss Rates Attributable to Mines

Conflict	Loss rate (%)
World War II	23
Korea	56
Vietnam	70
Operation Desert Storm	59
Operation Restore Hope	
(Somalia)	60



Demand for MRAPs

- Field demand for better-armored vehicles began, as IEDs emerged as a major threats, shortly drive into Baghdad 2003
 - Interest beyond EOD teams, from regular combat forces to replace HMMWVs on certain missions
 - For example, a Military Police Commander issued an urgent request for armored security vehicles in June 2003, to better protect U.S. convoys in Iraq
 - Also, latter that summer 101st Army Airborne Division issued a report citing IED injuries and seeking more vehicle armor



<u>Formal Request</u>

- First formal field request Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) from Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force came February 17, 2005
 - Request for 1,169 MRAPs routed to the USMC in-house rapid acquisition process
- MCCDC stops processing request in light of Commandant's decision to replace all HMMWVs with up-armored HMMWVs
- Demand continued, and manifested as a Joint Universal Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) in joint-service channels
 - May 2006: Commanding General, Multi-National Force West issues a Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing Request for 185 MRAPs
 - July 2006: An additional 1000 MRAPs requested
 - November 2006: First contract signed for MRAP production



<u>Why the 'Delay' in the Requirements Process</u>?

- Nearly two years (20 months) passed from the time of the first formal field request for MRAPs, until validated requirements were obtained
- Speculation on DoD's thinking:
 - Threatened programs of record, e.g. MRAPs would divert funding away from existing development programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
 - Enemy constantly adapting faster than MRAPs or other solutions (up armored HMMWVs) could be fielded and updated
 - Incongruent with envisioned light, expeditionary force structure
 - Counter to counter-insurgency strategy
 - Casualty rates not historically high
 - Belief in a short war
 - Would arrive to late to make a difference



MRAP Description

Category I

Category II



- Intended for urban combat environments and patrols
- Transports up to 6 personnel
- Curb weight 7 15 tons
- Estimated per unit cost range: \$300,000 to \$550,000*



- Intended for convoy escort, troop/cargo transport, explosive ordinance disposal and ambulance missions
- Transports up to 10 personnel
- Curb weight 15-25 tons
- Estimated per unit cost range: \$540,000 - \$644,000*



MRAP Description (cont.)

Category III

- Used primarily for route clearance and explosive ordinance disposal
- Transports up to 13 personnel
- Curb weight 25 tons
- Estimated unit cost: \$856,000*
- Only FPI's 6x6 Buffalo was awarded production in this category,
- And, only the USMC acquired Category III MRAPs through the MRAP program



*These estimates are for the base model. Modifications, to include armor upgrades, increased the costs. The accepted estimate is that average cost for MRAPs is approximately \$1 million per vehicle.



And we're off

- ➡ Aug 2006 RFI to industry
- ➡ Initial requirement validated Oct '06 for 1,185
 - Requirements would escalate to over 16,000 MRAPs and 6,600 M-ATVs by Oct '09
- ▶ Nov 2006 RFP released
 - Minimum set of performance standards
- Nov 2006 Sole Source production contract signed for Cat II and III
 - already in production by Force Protection Industries (FPI)
 - Goal to start procuring vehicles immediately




Industry Responds

- Ten manufacturers responded to the RFP
- The proposals were evaluated based on technical approach and proposed delivery schedule.
- ➡ Nine contractors were awarded firm-fixed-price IDIQ contracts
 - Up to 1500 Cat I, and 2600 Cat II MRAPs per year (one year and four option years)
- Also required the nine vendors to supply 2 vehicles in each category (I and II) for survivability and mobility testing.
 - These 36 test vehicles cost \$88 million.
- LRIP orders immediately to 5 manufacturers on the basis of risk in their proposals
 - Allowed industry to ramp-up
 - The entire program would essentially run on LRIPs
- Follow-on production orders based on subsequent rounds of testing and production capacity



Program Accelerates Quickly

MRAPs Accepted in 2007



Vobicies Accepted



Other Issues

Funding

- Congress gave the program everything it requested, it even appropriated funds in excess of requests
- Through FY2009, \$26.8B in wartime supplementals and reprogramming -to procure over 16,000 MRAP vehicles
- Supplemental funding had no "color."
 - A component critical was a transfer fund set up by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
 - Allowed the Joint Program Office to decide how to color money by type and service.

Priming the Industrial Pump

- DX rating
- Funded manufacturer facility upgrades
- Tire shortage
 - Paid for additional molds for Michelin
 - Certified Goodyear tires
- Steel shortage
 - Dropped import restrictions
 - Qualified more steel makers
 - Increased plant capacity



Other Issues

Testing

- Concurrent testing, production modification, and fielding
 - New orders placed after each round of testing
 - Continuous improvement
- Manufacturer reps on site at Aberdeen
 - Immediate feedback to production and design teams

GFE and Transport

- All GFE installed at SPAWAR
- Air-shipped until capacity reached
 - Roughly half of all MRAPs
 - Approximately \$160,000 per vehicle
- Surface (Sea) shipments
 - Approximately \$20,000
 - Afghanistan MRAPs still airshipped



Field Support

- With the initial requirement (below 1,700 vehicles), the program planned for contractor logistics support.
- As the requirements dramatically increased, the Army planned to transition to an organic approach
- Currently employing a hybrid strategy
- The program office also required the contractor's field service representatives to be able to maintain the other manufacturers' MRAPs


– This provided significant flexibility in-theater

As of November 2009, fleet readiness was 97% in Iraq and 90% in Afghanistan



MRAP Program Summary

MRAP Program Timeline






MRAP Limitations

- Poor maneuverability makes it difficult, sometimes impossible to use in an urban environment
- Poor off-road performance
- Prone to tipping
- ➡ 70% of world's bridges can't hold MRAPs
- ➡ Too wide for many roads
- High fuel consumption—approximately 3 mpg
- Can only be airlifted by U.S. Air Force's C-17 and C-5, and Russia's AN-124
- Do not fit on the Marine's pre-positioning ships



Not So Expeditionary

Vehicle Weight Comparison (lbs)






<u>The Most Survivable Vehicle</u>

"MRAPs have proven time and time again to save the lives and limbs of soldiers and Marines ... and I think they're worth every dime the taxpayers are spending on them" - Secretary of Defense Gates (Scully 2009)

- MRAPs can reduce IED casualties by 80%
 - Commandant of the Marine Corps
- ➡ 4 to 5 times safer than up-armored HMMWV
 - Asst. Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Casualty Rates:
 - MRAPs: 6%
 - Abrams tank: 15%
 - Up-armored HMMWV: 22%





Lessons Learned & Recommendations

Leadership

- Champions—enjoyed the unwavering support of the SECDEF and Congress
- MRAP Task Force—all relevant decision-makers met weekly to solve problem in real-time
- Unity of message/purpose—once the decision was made, there was clear agreement by all stakeholders that the goal was to field as many survivable vehicles as possible as quickly as possible.

Recommendations

- Assign senior-level champions to ensure that the program keeps moving through the acquisition process.
- Constantly reinforce the priorities of the project and expectations



Lessons Learned & Recommendations

Requirements and Acquisition Processes

- Rapid acquisitions need not be linear
 - Tailored acquisition approach
- ➡ Inadequacy of current acquisition system for rapid acquisitions
 - Ad hoc organizations
 - Must work within the deliberate acquisition system
- Supplemental Funding

Recommendations

- Allow flexibility in timing of paperwork and process
- Create a separate rapid acquisitions agency



Lessons Learned & Recommendations

Production

- Priming the industrial base
 - Industry leaned forward buying material at risk, in advance of orders at their own
 - DoD awarded LRIP contracts to all low-risk manufacturers even before testing was underway
 - DoD provided funding to upgrade facilities and equipment
- Securing scarce resources—steel and tires were the limiting factor
- ▶ Used existing technology, with continuous refinement and competition
- Manufacturers embedded at test center
- Open to outside solutions—minimum performance requirements were set
- ➡ Willingness to take reasonable risks

Recommendation

- Encourage the appropriate level of risk tolerance
- Embed manufacturer representatives at test facilities



Conclusion

- The level of effort and flexibility of everyone involved from the program office, to the manufacturers, to SPAWAR – made the rapid fielding of MRAPs possible and <u>absolutely saved</u> <u>lives</u>
- The program has also shown what is possible in scale and scope when enormous political will and (nearly unlimited) funding are brought to bear on the existing military procurement system
- Succeeded <u>despite</u> having to work within the existing acquisition system