


Enhancing Stewardship Over Weapon System Investments

Presentation by
Katherine Schinasi
Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office

NPS Acquisition Research Symposium May 17, 2007




A Case for Change – Total Cumulative Expenditures on Current MDAP Portfolio






A Case for Change – Projected Annual Investment in Procurement and RDT&E





A Case for Change – Problems in Mega Systems Produce Much Greater Fiscal Impact



Source: Program Manager, Future Combat Systems (BCT).

Future Combat Systems

New estimates--between \$203 billion and \$234 billion—place FCS significantly above the current estimate of \$163.7 billion



Source: THAAD Project Office.


Missile Defense

Costs for Block 2006 now at \$20 billion, but scope of work has been reduced. More deferments expected to offset growing contractor costs.




A Case for Change – Cost Growth for 27 Weapon Systems







A Case for Change – Schedule Growth for 27 Programs



■ Months (weighted average)

 23.5% change in weighted average cycle time.

Programs included in cost and schedule analysis: AEHF, MUOS, NPOESS, WGS, Patriot/MEADS, ARH, Excalibur, FCS, Warrior UAS, EA-18G, EFSS, V-22, AESA, E-2D, AHE, JTRS HMS, JTRS GMR, Land Warriior, WINT-T, ERM, CVN-21, C-5AMP, C-5 RERP, F-22A Mod, Global Hawk, JSF Reaper, P-8AMMA. We limited analysis to these because all data including cost, schedule, and quantities were available for comparison purposes.




A Case for Change – Reduced Buying Power

Program		Initial estimate	Initial quantity	Latest estimate	Latest quantity	Percentage of unit cost increase
Joint Strike Fighter	安	\$196. 5 billion	2,866 aircraft	\$223.3 billion	2,458 aircraft	32.8
Future Combat Systems		\$85.5 billion	15 systems	\$131.7 billion	15 systems	54.1
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft		\$36.9 billion	913 aircraft	\$50.0 billion	458 aircraft	170.2
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle		\$16.0 billion	181 vehicles	\$28.6 billion	138 vehicles	134.7
Space Based Infrared System High		\$4.2 billion	5 satellites	\$10.4 billion	3 satellites	311.6
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle		\$8.4 billion	1,025 vehicles	\$11.3 billion	1,025 vehicles	33.7

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Images sourced in their respective order: JSF Program Office; Program Manager, Future Combat Systems (BGT); V-22 Joint Program Office; (Left) © 2006 ILS/Lockheed Martin, (right) © 2003 The Boeing Company; Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company; General Dynamics Land Systems.




Federal Spending for Mandatory Programs Crowds Out Spending for Discretionary Programs





Discretionary Spending Grows with GDP After 2007 and All Expiring Tax Provisions Extended through 2017



Source: GAO's January 2007 analysis.




What Needs to Change

- □Decision-making
- **□**Support
- □ Accountability




Decision-making: New Starts Based on Promises Well Beyond the Strike Zone



OFFERINGS




Decision-making – Levels of Technology Knowledge Too Low at Key Junctures






Decision-making – Cost Increases for Programs That Did Not Obtain Knowledge





Decision-making – Other Knowledge Gaps





Support – Definition of Success



and two regin over



ин ин хори он



sine series operational artificial



Costs are underestimated and capability is over promised; approaches involving substantial leaps in desired capabilities are favored over incremental leaps


Too many programs competing for funding

Resulting problems require more money and time, increasing competition among programs; bad news is suppressed

Sponsors become more vested as more money and time are spent; customers cannot walk away; few cancellations of problematic efforts



Support – Program Managers Not Empowered to Execute





Support - Increased Reliance on Service Contractors

Why the trend

- Depletion of technical and business skills
- •Growth in complexity and interdependency of programs
- •FTE ceilings
- Flexibility
- Perception of costeffectiveness

What we don't know

- Numbers
- •Costs
- •Trends in usage
- •Impact/effects


Why we are concerned

- Contracting out of inherently government functions
- Loss of organic capability
- Conflicts of interest
- Cost inefficiencies
- •Inadequate oversight and management
- Applicability of laws and regulations

Proliferation of contractors



Accountability – Who Is Accountable





Accountability: What role the contractor?

- Greater responsibility in defining requirements and setting acquisition strategy
- Contract types and duration that are not aligned with risk
- Loss of government ability to establish and monitor performance
- Fees paid that are not aligned with outcomes
- No remedies for consequences