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Command Culture Impacts to Naval Reserve Readiness

December 2022

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Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943.

ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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ABSTRACT

In order to accomplish the Navy's mission, the Department of Defense equips the Navy with materiel like ships, submarines, and aircraft. All of this hardware requires manpower to operate, maintain, and supply. Some of this manpower is derived from Navy Reservists. Throughout our nation's history, men and women from the Navy Reserve have answered the call to support and defend our country. Now, more than ever, as technology advances rapidly and competitors prepare for a peer-to-peer conflict, our nation's Reservists must be adequately trained and ready to fight.

Navy Reservists throughout the country (including Guam and Puerto Rico) are attached to one of 118 Navy Reserve centers (NRC). The NRCs are manned by active-duty personnel responsible for supporting and training the Reservists, so they are ready to deploy at any given notice. This project aims to evaluate the command culture at several NRCs and correlate the findings to reserve readiness and retention. First, the culture will be measured using the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI). Next, the results will be evaluated to determine if a particular culture is more conducive to higher readiness. If a correlation is determined, the next step will provide senior leadership and individual commands with the results and literature regarding culture change, with the intention to improve reserve readiness.

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To the Naval Postgraduate School professors, your expertise in governmental and military affairs makes you an asset to our nation. In addition, your ability to teach complicated material and connect with a diverse group of students is encouraging. Thank you for all you have done for this country and great institution.

Dr. Edward H. Powley, thank you for your time, support, and patience. You always took time out of your busy life to meet up and advise on our project. If it were not for your passion for organizational behavior and leadership, we would have never found an advisor to sponsor our project. We know that your work with the U.S. Marine Corps has improved the quality of life and leadership within that great organization, and hopefully, our research will have that same effect on the U.S. Navy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CO	commanding officer
CVF	Competing Values Framework
FTS	full-time support
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
MOB	mobilization
NOSC	Navy Operational Support Center
NRC	Navy Reserve Center
NRU	Navy Reserve Units
RCC	Reserve Component Command
REDCOM	Readiness Command
SELRES	Selected Reserve
TAR	Training and Admin of the Reserves

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I. INTRODUCTION

"A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace."

—Theodore Roosevelt, December 2, 1902,
second annual message to Congress
(Naval Heritage and History Command [NHHC], 2021)

"The United States is a maritime nation, and the U.S. Navy protects America at sea. Alongside our allies and partners, we defend freedom, preserve economic prosperity, and keep the seas open and free. Our nation is engaged in long-term competition. To defend American interests around the globe, the U.S. Navy must remain prepared to execute our timeless role, as directed by Congress and the President" (Navy, 2022). In order to accomplish this mission, the Department of Defense equips the Navy with materiel like ships, submarines, and aircraft. All of this hardware requires manpower to operate, maintain, repair, and supply. Most personnel needed to accomplish this mission are either active duty or civilian contractors. However, some of this manpower is derived from Naval Reservists, called the Selected Reserve (SELRES). Throughout our nation's history, men and women from the Navy Reserve Force have answered the call to support and defend our country. Now, more than ever, as technology advances rapidly and competitors prepare for a peer-to-peer conflict, our nation's Reservists must be adequately trained and ready to fight.

Currently, there are roughly 60,000 Naval Reservists in the reserve force. These Reservists go about their civilian lives, training on average one weekend a month and two weeks a year (Kapp, 2021). Where Reservists complete their monthly and annual training depends on where the members live and what reserve unit they are affiliated with. There are currently 118 Navy Reserve Centers (NRC) throughout all fifty states and U.S. territories (Guam and Puerto Rico). These NRCs are the administrative support for the SELRES personnel and are manned by an active-duty component of the Navy Reserve. This group of active-duty personnel is called Training and Admin of Reserves (TAR), formerly called Full-time Support (FTS). TAR is the continuity between the navies active

and reserve forces, and is responsible for supporting, equipping, and training the Reservists so they are ready to deploy should their nation call upon them.

In 1999, Kim Cameron and Robert Quinn developed an approach to that is used to identify and assess the culture in an organization, called the Competing Values Framework. "The Competing Values Framework has been named as one of the 40 most important frameworks in the history of business" and is "Currently used by hundreds of firms around the world, the Competing Values Framework emerged from studies of the factors that account for highly effective organizational performance" (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 5). Corporate entities and high-ranking service members have realized its value and application in today's world. This framework helps leaders diagnose similarities, manage relationships, and identify contradictions among different aspects of organizations. Assembling data throughout an organization and viewing it through this framework will help improve any organization's performance and necessarily create value.

Across the country and U.S. territories, each one of these NRCs is unique in size, demographics, and culture. This research aims to evaluate the command culture at several NRCs and correlate the findings to reserve readiness and retention. First, the culture will be measured using a tool developed by Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn's called the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 26-28). Next, the results will be evaluated to determine if a particular culture is more conducive to higher readiness and retention. If a correlation is determined, the next step will provide commands with an analysis of its culture and offer suggestions on how each unit can change its culture to become more effective, positive, and dynamic.

A. AREAS OF INTEREST

Regardless of size, location, or accompanying reserve commands, each Navy Reserve Center across the country is unique. Consequently, every NRC has its challenges and its own culture. In his book *Organizational Leadership and Culture*, Edgar H. Schein defines culture as "both a dynamic phenomenon that surrounds us at all times, being constantly enacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership

behavior, and a set of structures, routines, rules, and norms that guide and constrain behavior" (Schein, 2004. p. 1). The primary mission of any NRC is to maintain the readiness of its associated Selected Reservists and to ensure the members are ready for mobilization. Therefore, having a culture that supports the mission can add value to a unit and is essential to accomplishing that goal. This research aims to look into command culture at several NRCs and answer the following questions:

Inquiry 1, Readiness: Within Navy Region Southwest, which units have the highest and which units have the lowest reserve mobilization readiness?

Inquiry 2, Higher readiness units: What was the dominant culture at the higher readiness NRCs?

Inquiry 3, Lower readiness units: What was the dominant culture at the lower readiness NRCs?

Inquiry 4, Differences: Identify any noticeable differences between the culture of high and low readiness NRCs?

Inquiry 5, Desires for higher readiness units: Do the higher performing NRCs desire a different culture?

Inquiry 6, Desires for lower readiness units: Do the lower performing NRCs desire a different culture?

B. HISTORY OF THE NAVY RESERVES

As America inches closer to a peer-to-peer altercation with China or Russia, the need for a proficient, trained, and ready force is more relevant than ever. However, the timeline for the next conflict is unknown; therefore, having a massive active-duty force will only increase the current deficit. While the founding fathers of the United States did not oppose a standing military, their preference was to establish smaller and temporary militias that could defend the nation when needed. These ideas were the birthplace of the modern Navy Reserve force that our nation enjoys today. However, before a federal Navy Reserve existed, state naval militias were relied upon; these militias were successfully used in the Spanish American War of 1898.

The magnitude and gravity of World War I demonstrated that modern warfare required a standing Navy with a large reserve force to be called upon when needed. As a result, prior to the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 "a campaign in Congress to appropriate funding for such a force brought passage of legislation on 3 March 1915 to establish the U.S. Naval Reserve" (Braun, 2015). At the end of World War I, the Navy Reserve Force encompassed more than 250,000 sailors that had been activated to defend the nation (Braun, 2015).

The years following World War I, the United States entered the sever economic trouble and the Great Depression, yet the Navy Reserve persisted. As war broke out in the European and Pacific theaters, the Navy Reserve force was ready. By the summer of 1941, most of its members were called to active duty to support the war effort (Cutler, 2015). Throughout World War II, over 3.4 million Americans served in the Navy, with the vast majority being Reservists (NHHC. 2022). Following the defeat of Japan and Germany, the United States entered a new conflict to prevent the spread of communism, the Cold War. For nearly 50 years, the Cold War took Navy Reservists, whether by air, land, or sea, around the globe to Europe, Asia, Africa, and Central and South America. As these conflicts drug on, many ships were pulled from the mothballs, and Navy Reservists filled the manning gaps in active personnel.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 led to decreased ship and manning requirements for the Navy. As a result, many reservists returned to civilian jobs and careers. However, these Navy Reservists would continue to support their nation's conflicts and provided over 21,000 personnel to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Cutler, 2015). In recent history, the Navy Reserve has proven its ability to respond to terrorism, conflicts, and humanitarian disasters across the globe. As a result, today's Navy Reserve is a means to large-scale mobilization and an integral part of carrying out the U.S. Navy's mission. Additionally, the Navy Reserve continues to bring a diverse, innovative, and flexible force that creates value in the United States Armed Forces.

C. NAVY RESERVE FORCES

Today's Navy Reserve force is comprised of three elements, which are the Active, Inactive, and Retired reserve forces. The Active component has roughly 60,000 service members and each of those service members are working towards retirement, promotion, and in the event of a major conflict, will be the first to mobilize. The Inactive force has prior military experience but is not engaged, proficient, or working toward retirement. Finally, the Retired component is those service members that have already received a military retirement and left the service. This research will focus only on the Active element, specifically the three most significant components, which are SELRES, TAR, formerly FTS, and the IRR. Each of these Active reserve units will now be discussed individually.

1. Selected Reserve (SELRES)

The primary and most significant component of the Navy Reserve is called the SELRES and comprises nearly 35,000 sailors (Kapp, 2021). SELRES members are paid, and drillings members of the reserves holding a billet are available for recall to active-duty status. Because SELRES are drilling members, they are the Navy Reserves primary source of manpower and must meet all of the requirements to deploy, referred to as mobilization readiness (Kapp, 2021). The "members of the Selected Reserve are generally required to perform one weekend of training each month and two weeks of training each year, although some may train more than this" (Kapp, 2021).

Every SELRES member, regardless of where they live geographically, is attached to one of 122 NRCs located across all 50 U.S. states and territories. In addition to an NRC, all SELRES are assigned, or billeted, to a reserve command that supports an active-duty unit. Also, many Navy Aviators, Navy Flight Officers, Navy SEALs, Naval Surface Warfare, Navy Medicine, Naval Aircrewmen, and many other essential jobs will fill active-duty billets to support an ongoing mission.

2. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

Although not essential for the research of this paper, another component of the Navy Reserve worth mentioning is the IRR. This group consists of service members, roughly 25,000, who have previously served in the Navy as either active duty or SELRES (Kapp, 2021). However, unlike SELRES personnel, IRR members do not typically drill, train, or meet the equivalent readiness requirements. For example, members have no requirement to meet the same medical or "one weekend a month, two weeks a year" requirement. In the event of a massive need for mobilization or presidential order, members of the IRR can be recalled to full mobilization. Members of the IRR are either in active or inactive status. Inactive members of the IRR do not drill, train, or mobilize and therefore receive no pay or medical benefits. Active members of the IRR may be eligible to receive pay and benefits for volunteering to perform with an Active-duty or reserve component. Most of the officers within the IRR are commissioned from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) and support the Navy's Strategic Sealift Command. Members of the IRR do utilize NRCs for support but are not required to meet the same readiness requirements as their SELRES colleagues.

3. Training and Readiness of Reserves (TAR)

The final component of the Active Reserve that this research will focus on is the continuity between the Navy Reserve and the active component of the Navy, called TAR, formerly known as Full-Time Support (FTS). "These employees, known as full-time support (FTS) personnel, are "assigned to organize; administer; instruct; recruit and train; maintain supplies, equipment and aircraft; and perform other functions required on a daily basis in the execution of operational missions and readiness" (Kapp, 2021). These members can be assigned to sea or shore activity, command, or operational units and receive similar benefits to active-duty service members, like retirement and healthcare upon completing 20 years of satisfactory service (Kapp, 2021). The primary mission of the TAR is the admin support of SELRES and IRR members at either the NRC or Readiness Command (REDCOM). In other words, TAR members are the personnel at the NRC during the week while the SELRES are conducting their civilian lives. Additionally,

many TAR personnel may be selected to fill empty active-duty billets in communities like Naval Aviation, Navy SEAL, and Naval Surface Warfare. This research will focus on the individuals working at the NRCs, providing essential support to the SELRES and IRR members via manpower, administration, mobilization, and training (Kapp, 2021).

D. MOBILIZATION

Recalling the purpose of the Navy Reserve is to support the nation in times of peace or war. Therefore, to accomplish its warfighting and mobilization readiness mission, the Navy Reserve must call SELRES or IRR service members to active-duty status. This process is called "mobilization" and is the number one priority for the Navy Reserve. Mobilization is used as a means to expand the Navy beyond its active component capacity. Once a sailor is mobilized, they will receive the same pay, allowances, and benefits as their active counterparts (Kapp, 2021). These entitlements will persist through the duration of the mobilization. A recent example of SELRES and IRR mobilization can be seen following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. In order to support the War on Terrorism, over 70,000 Navy Reservists were mobilized to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan (All Hands, 2019).

E. NAVAL RESERVE CENTER

The NRC's day-to-day responsibility is to provide training and administrative oversight to its attached reserve units and SELRES/IRR members. Additionally, anytime a reservist is recalled to active status, the NRC must support and expedite that mobilization. Since many of the NRCs are located far from a major fleet concentration area, like Norfolk or San Diego, the NRCs are also responsible for supporting the families of the deployed service members. The requirements for mobilization are designated in COMRESFORNOTE 3060, and these requirements must be tracked monthly by the NRCs. Once again, mobilization readiness is the bread and butter of the NRCs across the country. A significant factor regarding an NRCs performance is how many attached SELRES members are adequately trained and mobilization ready.

F. READINESS COMMAND (REDCOM)

The Navy Reserve is divided into six regions across the country: Navy Region Mid-Atlantic Great Lakes, Mid-Atlantic Norfolk, Southeast Jacksonville, Southeast Fort Worth, Southwest San Diego, and Northwest Everett. Each of these regions has a command responsible for the NRCs located within its region, referred to a REDCOM. There are six REDCOMs, located regionally in support of its associated NRCs. A REDCOM has many responsibilities, but for this research, it will be narrowed down to the tracking the training and mobilization readiness of each NRCs in the region.

G. SUMMARY

Unfortunately, escalation of conflict between nations is not a matter of if but when. History is destined to repeat itself, and the Navy will be forced to call upon its reserve forces. Whether those forces are called upon in times of peace or war, in support of conflict, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance, one thing is assured. Having a reserve force that is ready to mobilize in a rapid and orderly fashion is essential. Navy Reserve Centers across the nation have the tremendous task of supporting over 60,000 reservists, and those reservists have the heavy obligation of being ready when their nation calls. In order to accomplish this task, the NRCs must be efficient, professional, and accommodating to their attached reservists. This research will use the CVF to identify the culture at six separate NRCs. With the survey results, identify a culture that is more conducive to accomplishing the mission of an NRC—in turn, provide each NRC an analysis of its current culture and the possibility of increasing warfighting and mobilization readiness of its reservists.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A prominent discipline within the organizational culture field of study is oriented toward the pursuit of changing the culture of an organization. Cultural change is valued for many reasons, but the most obvious implication come through increased productivity and value added. The competing values framework is a tool that helps leaders understand where their organizations can create value from within and achieve a high level of performance from their team. The framework has been studied and tested on multiple organizations in business and academia (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 5). The framework provides a theory of how leaders can identify and manage the competing cultural aspects that make up their organization with the goal of increasing organizational effectiveness. Two primary dimensions are used in the framework. The first dimension is defined by a continuum ranging from discretion and flexibility on one end to stability and control on the other. The second dimension is defined by a continuum of an internal versus external focus (Maher, 2000).

The basic framework of the theory can be described through four quadrants created through these vertical and horizontal dimensions. These quadrants create the foundation of the competing values framework. These dimensions, "represent contradictory approaches to value creation" (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 31). The vertical dimension is based upon two opposing upper and lower categories. The upper half represents a continuum of versatility and flexibility to the opposing lower half, consisting of stability and control. The left and right sides of the quadrant deal with two additional opposing categories. Value creation to the left of center is focused on internal maintenance and improvements while value creation to the right of center is focused on external opportunities and positioning against outsiders. The resulting horizontal and vertical dimensions create quadrants that leaders of change can reference to classify their organization's culture type (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 31).

The quadrants are identified with an action verb suggesting the types of value creation characterized within the quadrant (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 31). Their labels are Collaborate, Create, Compete, and Control. The higher degree of competency an

organization has in a particular quadrant allows for a higher degree of value creation for that organization.

It is useful to understand each quadrant by the value-enhancing activities that are found in the quadrant. These activities characterize the competencies in the quadrant and aid in defining it. Collaborate or Clan is the top left quadrant of the model. This quadrant is focused on doing things together in a family type atmosphere. Value creation here is realized through long-term development. "Value-enhancing activities in the Collaborate quadrant deal with building human competencies, developing people and solidifying an organizational culture" (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 38). Specific activities in this quadrant include implementing programs to improve employee or member retention; strengthening organizational values, standards, and expectations; development of organizational members; and cross functional teams (Cameron et al., 2006), p. 38).

Create is the top right quadrant of the model. This quadrant is focused on doing things first with in an industry. Value creation here is realized through breakthrough developments. Value-enhancing activities deal with innovation in the organization's products and services. Specific, "activities in this quadrant include innovative product-line extensions, radical new process breakthroughs, innovations in distribution and logistics that redefine entire industries, and developing new technologies" (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 36).

Control is the bottom left quadrant of the model. This quadrant is focused on doing things right. Value creation in this quadrant is realized through incremental progress or development. Value-enhancing activities include procedural compliance and pursuing advancements in efficiency by employing improved processes. Specific activities in this quadrant include statistical process controls, process analysis, productivity advancements, reduction in manufacturing and process cycle time, human resources restructuring, costs reductions and methods taken to enhance efficiency (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 162).

Compete is the bottom right quadrant of the model. This quadrant is focused on results first with an emphasis on winning. Value creation in this quadrant is realized in

short-term achievements. Value-enhancing activities include being aggressive and forcefully pursuing competitiveness. Specific activities in this quadrant include implementing aggressive techniques, acquiring other businesses or firms, attacking a competitor's market position, and investing in customer acquisition and customer service (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 34).

The competition between these organizational values stems from limited resource pools and competing priorities, considerations and preferences that exist within an organization. These shifting priorities create internal tensions within organizations. Therefore, resource tradeoffs must be made between the value corners. The organizational value quadrant considered the most beneficial depends on the priority perspective of observer. An emphasis placed on one value corner diminishes the resources available for the diagonally opposite value corner. When resources are allocated in favor of one quadrant, the diagonally opposite quadrant perceives diminished value creation potential for the organization as a whole. Resources given to the Collaborate corner will be viewed as a loss from the perspective of the compete corner. The same is true for the opposing Create and Control corners (Cameron et al., 2006). The framework offers a diagnosis of what an organization as a whole values. From this diagnosis leaders can understand the point of departure to make change happen.

Another analytical tool that is complementary to the competing values framework is the three-layered iceberg model (Schein, 2010). This model uses the formal definition of culture is as follows, "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (Schein, 2010, p. 38). Within this model, organizational culture presents itself via three levels which include cultural artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions. This model is referred to as the iceberg model with the cultural artifacts level of analysis being the visible sections floating above the surface of the water. Schein's analysis model emphasizes that to truly understand organizational culture, "one must attempt to get at its shared basic assumptions, and one must understand the learning process by which such

basic assumptions come to be" (Schein, 2010, p. 36). Cultural artifacts and espoused beliefs are useful but can be misleading and difficult to understand. If we understand the culture's underlying assumptions, we then begin to understand the culture (Schein, 2010).

Schein suggests organizational culture first reveals itself first through its artifacts. These artifacts are the observable results of the organizational culture. Examples include visual objects such as a crest, logo, or design, but to Schein, artifacts are not limited to the tangible. Culture artifacts can be experienced through indefinite mediums as well. Schein's examples range from the organization's "artistic creations; its style, as embodied in clothing, manners of address, emotional displays, and myths and stories told about the organization; its published lists of values; its observable rituals and ceremonies; and so on." (Schein, 2010, p. 47). In short, the artifacts are the result of how the group represents itself to those in and outside the organization.

To Schein organizational cultural, "artifacts are easy to observe but difficult to decipher" (Schein, 2010, p. 36). The artifacts are just clues to what the culture might look like, but they offer little to help leaders of change understand the authentic culture of a particular organization. It is difficult to derive meaning from the artifacts alone as they only provide a surface level understanding of an organizational culture, and interpretation of these artifacts is left to the observer's biases. We can begin to understand what is behind the artifacts once we move deeper to the next level of analysis.

Espoused beliefs and values are an organization's shared understanding of what ought to be and what right looks like. These are the strategies, goals, and philosophies of the culture developed through shared experiences. The critical factor here is that the beliefs and values are a communal perception derived from shared experiences as a group. Espoused beliefs and values are not what a leader has pushed down and dictated what should be; rather they are what has been learned through the group's experience (Schein, 2010). From that shared experience, the group develops a unique knowledge of values and beliefs that they believe will lead to future success. Like cultural artifacts, the espoused beliefs and values of an organization can be challenging to interpret because they may only represent group desired end state or a rationalization process.

The foundational level of analysis for organizational culture according to Schein requires an understanding of the underlying assumptions held in the culture. This is where we can have the most complete understanding of the group culture. These underlying assumptions are the nonnegotiable values that the group has come to know to be true. These assumptions have become subconscious truths to the organization through repeated validation over time. Underlying assumptions are not questioned by the members in the culture. They are the subconscious guideposts that direct the espoused values (Schein, 2010). Schein describes this level of analysis as the group's DNA, their thought world, and their mental map for how they approach new problems. We bring Schein's model into our research because it also helps leaders usher in organizational change. His model provides change leaders indicators of where change efforts should be focused for the best effect. For example, changing cultural artifacts will have very little impact on changing the true culture of an organization.

In his 2007 article, "Leading Change," Michael Beer offers a formula to help leaders understand the elements required for change and their relationship to one another. The formula presents three elements of organizational culture that are driving forces and hold a multiplicative relationship between them. Additionally, Beer offers a element that is resistive to change and holds an inequality relationship to the driving forces. Beer's formula hypothesizes that the amount of change an organization achieves is based upon the following variables: Dissatisfaction, Model, Process and Cost. The formula simply stated is: Amount of Change = (Dissatisfaction x Model x Process) > Cost of Change (Beer, 2007, p. 1).

The relationship between the first three variables is multiplicative in nature. These variables are the driving forces that generate organizational change. The "Dissatisfaction" variable is the first of the three variables. Here, dissatisfaction refers to the amount of discontent the members of the organization feel with the status quo. This dissatisfaction originates from a loss of confidence in their individual performance or a loss of confidence in the organization. The "Model" variable in the equations is the second multiplicative variable. By "model," Beer means "a vision of the future state of the organization" (Beer, 2007). This vision should illustrate to the managers and employees a

standard of what the new systems and structure will look like. Model is the targeted end state of what the organization aims to become. Beer suggests the new model should include direction on the envisioned organizational, "design, strategy, structure, systems, skills and shared values" (Beer, 2007). The last multiplicative variable in determining amount of organizational change is "Process." For the purposes of the equation, process refers to the steps managers and employees must take to evolve the culture into the new model. Said another way, process is the sequence of events that leads to the desired end state.

Cost is the final variable in Beer's equation. Where the first three variables are driving forces, cost is the resistive force in the organizational change equation. Cost refers to individual cost of change to the proposed new model. It is the aggregate sum of specific sacrifices employees and managers will have to personally make to reach the new desired end state. These losses typically manifest themselves through diminished power, rewards, relationships, and identity within the organization. This cost variable is different than the first three variable in that it holds an inequality relationship to the three multiplicative variables. To achieve organizational change, the cost of change must be less than the driving forces that drive the change. If the costs are too large, no change will occur (Beer, 2007).

Beer also points out we need some positive value for all three driving forces to see any amount of change. If just one of the three multiplicative variables (Dissatisfaction, Model, Process) are not present, the cost of change will always be larger. Leaders of change need to have some value in each element of the driving forces to usher in a new culture. For example, if the current employees are satisfied with the current culture or there is not a clear process or clear model, organizational culture change will not occur. Therefore, leaders of change must strive to either maximize the three driving forces of organizational culture change or they must minimize the costs to the individuals implementing the change.

III. METHODOLOGY

When analyzing culture, a distinction must be made between the organizational climate and organizational culture. Cameron and Quinn provide a clear distinction between these two disciplines within organizational psychology. They describe climate as a more temporary state that is focused on individual attitudes, feelings, and perceptions. When referring to climate, we are focused on the more explicit, observable traits of organizations. Because climate is based on individual perspectives, an organization's climate is often much more dynamic because its source is from individual perspectives that frequently change. On the other hand, an organization's culture is much more stable and persistent. Cameron and Quinn state, "Culture refers to implicit, often indiscernible aspects of organizations. It includes core values and consensual interpretations about how things are" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 147). For the purposes of this paper, we will be diagnosing organizational culture.

When analyzing culture at the organizational level, Cameron and Quinn point to three methods available to the researcher. The first is the "holistic approach" in which a researcher immerses themselves within the culture and makes observations from experiencing the culture firsthand. The investigator comes to know the culture by living in as a nonparticipating member. This method is often viewed as the best approach as the researcher can fully understand organizational culture through Immersion

The next method available to a researcher is the "metaphorical or language approaches." This approach involves the researcher deeply analyzing the language used by and in the organization. With this method, the researcher identifies patterns within the culture's communications. Here the researcher analyzes organizational reports, conversations, and official documents. The patterns identified by the researcher reflect the nature of the organizational culture. The final method offered by Cameron and Quinn is the "quantitative approach." This is probably the method that most people envision when considering analyzing organizational culture. This method focuses on interviews and questionnaires answered by members of the organization. Responses to these

questions are quantified to give the researcher a way to find emphasis within the culture of that particular organization.

There is much debate on the most effective way to research and diagnose organizational culture. Cameron and Quinn offer a succinct description of this dispute, "The basic issue is this: when assessing culture via questionnaires or interviews, is one really measuring superficial characteristics of an organization—namely, organizational climate—rather than in-depth cultural values?" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 148). Ultimately, Cameron and Quinn have settled on a quantitative approach and through their years of research developed the internationally recognized Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI). The OCAI allows for individual respondents to answer questions, based on their underlying archetypal framework, which identify characteristics that reflect the organization's underlying values and assumptions.

According to Cameron and Quinn (2011), the OCAI seeks to measure six distinct dimensions of organizational culture that underscore their underlying values and assumptions. These dimensions include:

1. "The dominant characteristics of the organization, or what the overall organization is like" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151).
2. "The leadership style and approach that permeate the organization" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151).
3. "The management of employees or the style that characterizes how employees are treated and what the working environment is like" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151).
4. "The organizational glue or bonding mechanisms that hold the organization together" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151).
5. "The strategic emphases that define what areas of emphasis drive the organization's strategy" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151).
6. "The criteria of success that determine how victory is defined and what gets rewarded and celebrated" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151).

OCAI question sets are designed to gather data on each of the six dimensions. Respondents are given six question sets in which they allocated 100 points among four questions within a particular dimension. These four questions emphasize either the clan, adhocracy, market, or hierarchy culture types from the competing values framework. The

resulting ratio created within each set of questions show which of the four culture types is strongest or weakest.

The results generated by the OCAI are useful in several ways. Change leaders can identify cultural discrepancies between their organization's culture and the culture type prominent in their industry. The results can be used to assess current cultural type compared to preferred cultural type. As Beer suggests, this will give an indication as to if there is a desire for change. Congruence is another useful aspect of OCAI results. By congruence we mean similarity between the six dimensions measured in the survey. Congruence among the aspects that make up the culture is indication of an efficient and homogenous organization (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 91).

Participants and Data Collection

The staff and leadership from six different Navy Reserve Centers (NRCs) within the Navy Reserve Region Southwest were asked to complete the survey. The participants consisted of all TAR personnel, the full-time component of Navy Reserves, and any SELRES on active-duty orders assigned to assist the NRCs. Additionally, the participants comprised service members of all ranks and leadership roles, from the commanding officer to the Petty Officer Third Class. All survey responses were voluntary, with participation levels at each unit averaging sixty percent. The survey utilized was called the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) tool, which can be seen in the Appendix, and is based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF) to determine the culture within an organization. Six content dimensions serve as the basis for the OCAI. These dimensions are the "dominant characteristics, leadership style, management of employees, organizational glue, strategic emphasis, and criteria of success" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151). Although "this list of six content dimensions is not comprehensive, of course, but it has proved in past research to provide an adequate picture of the type of culture that exists in an organization." (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, p. 151). The OCAI allowed these units to provide two separate elements of data. The first element of data was how the members currently view the organization's culture. The second portion of data provided was where the members would like to see change in the unit's culture. The

results will be shown using the core dimensions of the CVF, developed by Robert Quinn and Kim Cameron discussed earlier in Chapters II and III (Figure 1).



Figure 1. Adaptation of Competing Values Framework. Adapted from Cameron and Quinn (2011).

IV. RESULTS

Overall, the results from the survey produced some expected and unexpected outcomes. For example, our team predicted that the results would produce evidence of a dominant hierarchical culture embedded in the military but found something different. The results will be discussed in four different sections. First, the readiness data provided by Readiness Command Navy Region Southwest (REDCOM SW) regarding its NRCs will be addressed. Second, the survey results from each command will be evaluated and compared. Third, the survey results from both the high and low performing NRCs will be put side by side to determine if there is a correlation between culture and readiness at the NRC. Fourth, the unit results will be evaluated to determine if, and how large, a change in the current culture is desired. Additionally, each unit commander will receive a packet with a brief synopsis of the project, literature, unit culture, and recommendation on affecting change.

A. AREAS OF INTEREST

1. Inquiry 1, Readiness: Within Navy Region Southwest, which units have the highest and which units have the lowest reserve mobilization readiness?

For this project, the readiness data (Table 1) was provided by REDCOM SW, which is responsible for nineteen NRCs within its region. The historical data provided by REDCOM SW is presumed to be accurate and no attempt was made to question or calculate readiness on any another basis. NRCs are categorized as either small, medium, or large, depending on the number of assigned Select Reservists (SELRES). Small NRCs generally have less than 300 SELRES attached, medium NRCs have between 350 and 500 SELRES, and large NRCs have between 550 and 1500. NRCs are evaluated for their mobilization readiness. The higher percentage of SELRES that are available to mobilize at any given time is what matters in the eyes of REDCOM. But being mobilization ready is complicated because it includes medical, dental, and a litany of other things like

training, security clearances, and other admin requirements. All of these scores are reported to REDCOM SW monthly, and a cumulative score is computed. In addition, REDCOM SW meets bi-monthly with all NRC leadership to discuss performance.

In the attempt to obtain a wide range of data, the full-time Training and Admin of Reserves (TAR) personnel at six NRCs were surveyed. Of the six NRCs surveyed, there were three high performing and three low performing, two in each size category. In some cases, the difference between the highest or lowest units was miniscule. For the sake of anonymity, the NRCs that were surveyed will not be identified. Instead, the NRCs will be labeled as such:

NRC-SH: Highest readiness in the small category

NRC-SL: Lowest readiness in the small category

NRC-MH: Highest readiness in the medium category

NRC-ML: Lowest readiness in the medium category

NRC-LH: Highest readiness in the large category

NRC-LL: Lowest readiness in the large category

Table 1. REDCOM SW Readiness Performance Dashboard

	1Q			2Q			3Q		Cumulative CY
	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Jul-22	Aug-22	
NRC-SH	7.65	8.55	8.50	8.10	8.80	8.40	8.20	7.75	8.24
NRC-SL	6.85	7.25	6.55	6.75	6.35	6.65	6.90	7.55	6.86
NRC-MH	7.85	8.50	8.75	8.40	6.85	7.60	7.40	6.55	7.74
NRC-ML	7.80	8.05	7.45	7.40	6.40	6.40	6.55	6.70	7.09
NRC-LH	7.50	7.70	8.80	7.90	7.20	7.80	7.45	7.60	7.74
NRC-LL	7.00	6.50	6.50	6.15	6.10	6.00	5.85	6.30	6.30

2. Inquiry 2, High readiness units: What was the dominant culture at the higher readiness NRCs?

Below are the results of the three higher performing NRCs, plotted using the CVF (Figure 2). The results displayed are from the data collected from the OCAI survey and reflect how the units currently view the culture within the organization. While there was no distinct profile that all three units share, all three units tended to foster a collaborative environment, particularly NRC-MH and NRC-HH. NRC-SH's most dominant trait was Control, with Collaborate and Compete tied for second. One unique feature that all three high performing NRCs shared was that they were all low in the Create component.



Figure 2. High Readiness Units

Overall, the culture profile for the highest performing NRCs shared several traits in common. The clearest results displayed that the highest performing units had a strong collaborate culture and a weak create culture. Figure 3 shows an OCAI chart, displaying the combined survey results of the three highest performing NRCs. It is important to note that a total of 100 points can be allocated on chart.



Figure 3. High Readiness Units (combined)

One striking result from the data is that the dominant culture within the higher performing NRCs is that of collaboration. Nearly 40% (37.8) of the 100 points were allocated to the Collaborate component. Cameron et al. also refer to this culture as a "Clan" mindset, and a unit that builds human competencies, develops people, and solidifies an organizational culture (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 32). The leadership from this quadrant tends to emphasize team building, mentoring, and value communication. This

was also seen in the lower performing results, but not as dominate as in the higher performing units. By and large, military units tend to have higher "clan" mindsets due to the nature of flexibility and internal relationships.

Conversely, the higher performing NRCs also shared lower results (13.4) in the create region of the OCAI charts. Also known as "Adhocracy," the create quadrant tends to "allow for freedom of thought and action among its employees, so that rule breaking and stretching beyond barriers are common characteristics of the organization's culture" (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 36). This was not surprising given the administrative duties and strict deadlines required for NRC staff.

The remaining two culture quadrants to mention are Control and Compete. Combined, these two elements made up nearly 50% (48.8) of the higher performing unit's culture. The control quadrant, otherwise known as "Hierarchy," relies on "processes, systems, and the use of standardized procedures and an emphasis on rule-reinforcement and uniformity predominate" (Cameron et al., 2006). The Compete quadrant, also known as the "Market," tends to be customer focused and short-term results driven (Cameron et al., 2006).

Overall, the higher performing NRCs did have a dominate culture. Over 60% of the culture was internally focused (61.2), where only 38.8% were externally focused. Additionally, of the four competing value components, the majority favored a collaborate culture (37.8). Compete and control components nearly tied at 23.4% and 25.4%. By far, the least dominate culture observed within the higher readiness NRCs was Create at 13.4%.

3. Inquiry 3, Low readiness units: What was the dominant culture at the lower readiness NRCs?

The results of the three lower performing NRCs, once again plotted using the CVF, can be seen in Figure 4. The results displayed are from the data collected from the OCAI survey and are regarding where the units currently view the culture within the organization. Again, while there was no distinct profile that all three units share, all three

units tended to foster a collaborative environment, particularly NRC-ML. Additional, all three low readiness units had lower numbers in the Create component.



Figure 4. Low Readiness Units

Overall, when the three lower performing NRCs, (NRCSL/ML/LL) data was combined, the culture profile became nearly symmetrical, with a slightly more internal focus. The most dominant culture was collaborative (32.9), and the least dominate was Create (18.2). The following figure (Figure 5) shows an OCAI chart, displaying the combined survey results of the three lowest performing NRCs. It is important to note that a total of 100 points can be allocated on the chart.

The most dominant culture within the lower performing NRCs is that of collaboration. Nearly 33% (32.9) of the 100 points were allocated to the collaborate component. This was also seen in the higher performing results, but it was not as

dominate as in the lower performing units. The lower performing NRCs also shared lower results (18.2) in the create region of the OCAI charts. The remainder of the points were evenly distributed among the Control and Compete components. Overall, the lower performing NRCs did have a dominate culture of collaborate, with compete and control nearly tying for second.



Figure 5. Low Readiness Units (combined)

4. Inquiry 4, Differences: Identify any noticeable differences between the culture of high and low readiness NRCs?

This portion will look at the combined results within the high and low performing NRCs and attempt to identify any distinction between the two. Figure 6 displays the results for a visual comparison. The blue numbers and figure refer to the high readiness units, and the red to the low readiness units.

When plotted next to one another, there are several distinct differences. First, both of the high and low units fall within the collaborate component, making it the dominant culture type within both groups. Second, the least dominant culture within both groups lies within the create component. Third, the culture of both groups is made up of equal parts control and compete. Lastly, the only identifiable feature between the two groups when comparing culture is a small difference between collaborate and create. The higher readiness units have slightly higher clan mindsets, meaning they foster teamwork, whereas the lower readiness units have a slightly higher adhocracy mindset, leaning more on innovation.



Figure 6. High vs. Low Readiness Units

5. Inquiry 5, Desires for higher readiness units: Do the higher performing NRCs desire a different culture?

This area will look at the combined results within the higher performing NRCs. From the data provided by REDCOM SW, it is unknown if the higher readiness NRCs know that they are the high performers. Referring to Figure 7, there is a noticeable desire to shift to a more flexible culture. Important to note, the NRCs current culture is displayed in blue, whereas the red shows where members desire their culture to be in the future. Additionally, individual unit results regarding culture and change will be made available to the units of the participating commands. .



Figure 7. High Readiness Units Desire for Change

Starting with the internal culture that is currently most prominent, Collaboration, there appears to be a desire for even more of this culture. The teamwork and leadership that was driving the high performance of these NRCs is in even more demand, from 37.8% to 42.9%. Additionally, the survey results showed a strong desire to have culture that embraced more innovation and allowed for more risk. But with these desires for more flexibility, comes less appeal for hierarchy and competition. This is the premise for Cameron and Quinn's "competing values." When value added in one dimension of the quadrant, value is lost on another.

Overall, the higher performing NRCs desire more flexibility, teamwork, and the opportunity to innovate and improve the current processes. Equally, the higher performing teams also desire less rigidity, control, and results driven procedures.

6. Inquiry 6, Desires for lower readiness units: Do the lower performing NRCs desire a different culture?

Once again, it is unknown if the NRCs know where they stand regarding performance. Referring to Figure 8, there is a small desire to change the current culture at the NRCs. It is important to note, the NRCs current culture is displayed in blue, whereas the red shows where members desire their culture to be in the future.

Starting with the most two most dominant cultures, there is a very small shift for less teamwork and collaboration, and a small desire for more internal control processes. The biggest shift in desired culture is from the Compete to the Create areas. This would allow the units to focus less on performance and results, and more on innovation and ingenuity.

The biggest takeaway from the lower performing NRCs is how little demand there is to change culture. The collaborate and control components stay relatively constant, with little desire to change. The only substantial shift is the desire for less compete in exchange for more create.



Figure 8. Low Readiness Units Desire for Change

B. RESULTS SUMMARY

This section attempted to identify if an NRC's culture impacts individual reservists' readiness. Each unit's culture was analyzed using the CVF and separated by high or low readiness. The limited data of our project pointed towards the following results: Higher readiness units tended to favor a stronger culture that encouraged teamwork and fostered long-term development through mentoring and nurturing leadership. Additionally, the results from the OCAI survey provided data expressing each unit's desire for changes in culture within the NRCs. Interestingly, the higher readiness units desired a more considerable culture change than the lower readiness units. However, due to the nature of the survey, it is unclear whether NRC members were dissatisfied with the unit's performance or the current culture. Our team assumes that the

desire for change reflects displeasure with the current status quo and job satisfaction; however, this may not be the case.

Furthermore, when comparing the differences between the higher and lower readiness units, both desired changes in the areas that made them each unique. For example, the higher readiness units that displayed a strong collaborative culture desired even more teamwork, mentorship, and unit cohesion. On the other hand, the units that fostered more innovation and creativity desired even more of it. The survey results show that the lower readiness units desire more change in the creative quadrant relative to the higher readiness NRC. This desire could suggest recognition of a need for change but not necessarily oriented toward the create quadrant. Instead, it could suggest that they desire innovative and novel approaches to implement culture change.

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V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY

A. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When examining the average culture type among the Navy Reserve Centers (NRCs) with high readiness compared with the average culture type among NRCs with low readiness, we found noticeable differences in the collaborate and create quadrants. On average, NRCs with higher readiness possess a stronger collaborative culture by 4.9 percentage points. Although the dominant culture within the lower readiness NRCs was collaborate, one distinction was the strong create culture exhibited. Additionally, insignificant differences were found in the control and compete quadrants among the higher and lower performance units.

When beginning our project, our team expected to find culture profiles at each NRC in line with strong control predispositions as this culture type is aligned with the governmental agency industry standard (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 122). Instead, our research found that almost every NRC surveyed had a culture type favoring the collaborate quadrant within the Competing Values Framework (CFV). While the culture type found was unexpected and not aligned with its industry standard, we are not suggesting that its leaders should seek to change their culture toward the industry standard. Instead, Cameron and Quinn's research has found that leaders are most effective when they have "well-developed competencies and skills represented by their organizations' dominate culture" (Cameron et al., 2006, p. 122).

Regardless of whether the units surveyed have demonstrated high or low readiness, their culture types all were found to favor a collaborative culture. Even though the higher readiness units have approximately five percentage points stronger collaborative culture, the tendency was the same for the lower readiness reserve centers. This similarity could be attributed to the culture type fostered by higher headquarters. The genesis of this could stem from either the senior leadership at REDCOM SW or the departmental staff leads at REDCOM SW. Additionally, this could reflect the TAR

community as a whole. Unlike Navy active-duty commands, the TAR community typically operates in smaller-sized units with fewer personnel. Small units rely less on regulatory structures and processes typical of cultures in the control quadrant. The small staff size is conducive to fostering closer personal relationships, teamwork, and unit cohesion. Often the workload of projects and task responsibilities are shared and overlap among NRC staff members. The group's small nature forces team members to pool resources to accomplish the task at hand. The distribution of labor tends to be more evenly spread across the members by necessity created from the limited resources available to the group.

When addressing the question of preferred culture, we found that the higher performing NRCs wanted to see the most change from their current culture type. This desired change is oriented in two ways. Higher performing NRCs would like to see a move away from the control quadrant toward the create quadrant and a change away from the compete quadrant toward the collaborate quadrant. We found this data interesting because the higher performing NRCs desire a change in the culture profile is typical of higher performing NRCs. Conversely, the lower performing NRCs wanted to see the least amount of overall change in any direction of the CVF.

What is worthy of notice here is how this applies to Beer's formula for leading change (Beer, 2007). Beer's formula suggests that leading change in the lower performing NRCs will be difficult because there is little dissatisfaction with their current culture. One of the formula's three required driving forces toward change is small enough that it would hinder change in these organizations. A recommendation for creating a desire for change in the low readiness units might be generated through leadership, providing the TAR staff members with a clear path and strategy to achieving higher readiness. Staff members clearly understand the shared goal of achieving high readiness, but what might not be clear is how to make the changes to foster the culture needed to change at their particular unit. If NRC leadership provided a clear strategy for implementing the change, the members might more readily desire and give their buy-in to the change process.

Our research suggests that the culture of the TAR staff at NRCs is much different from the typical culture found in government agencies. Rather than a control-oriented culture, our research found that high readiness is correlated with the collaborative culture type. Therefore, we suggest that leadership at the echelon four and five levels foster and facilitate collaborative culture practices at every opportunity. As Schein suggests, this should be reflected in the cultural artifacts but primarily oriented toward the deeper levels that define organizational culture. A best practice example for the echelon four level of leadership would be to review collaborative espoused values during in-person Commander's conferences and via all written correspondence. Language promoting teamwork, nurturing, long-term development, and unit cohesion is helpful when fostering this culture type. Language that is counterproductive to promoting this culture would include an emphasis on efficiency, deadlines, competition, and external pressures. Best practices for the echelon five level of leadership would include the same as the echelon four level and reviewing duties assigned to ensure an even distribution of labor, promoting cross-functional training for all hands, rotation of duties assigned at set intervals, and public recognition of individuals fostering a collaborative culture. Practices counterproductive would include rewards systems based on competition and measuring success based on results.

Because the collaborative culture type is counter to typical military culture, another recommendation is for Senior Enlisted Leaders and Commanding Officers at the echelon four level to receive training tailored to small unit leadership during their leadership training pipeline. This training should be oriented toward practices that promote collaborative cultures. Lastly, we recommend that leaders use the OCAI 90 days after entering their leadership role. Using this instrument would help leaders understand what they see as their preferred culture for their organization and provide an opportunity for self-reflection.

B. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY

There are many areas for further research. For example, while our team found the collaborate culture type to be dominant in higher performing Navy Reserve Centers, our

research was limited to the southwestern region under the command of REDCOM SD. As a result, we are unsure if this culture type is typical of all Navy Reserve Centers and if a collaborative culture profile is correlated with high readiness across all regions. Additionally, our research was limited to members of the TAR staff at the Navy Reserve Center and reflective of the culture within the administrative chain of command.

Unfortunately, our team could not survey the SELRES members in operational billets or commissioned units. Surveying these SELRES members would have reflected unit cultures in the Navy Reserve's operational chain of command. However, our research could be duplicated within the active-duty community to find correlations between many different measures of readiness. Additionally, within the Naval Aviation and Surface Warfare communities, aircraft and surface ship readiness scores are all areas that document readiness with high fidelity. Analyzing OCAI results against these readiness scores could offer fleet commanders insights into which culture types correlate with high readiness.

APPENDIX. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (OCAI)

Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument

A + B + C + D must total to 100.

1. Dominant Characteristics		Now	Preferred
A	The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.		
B	The organization is a very dynamic entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.		
C	The organization is very results oriented. A major concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.		
D	The organization is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.		
	A + B + C + D = 100?	/100	/100
2. Organizational Leadership		**Now**	**Preferred**
A	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing.		
B	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking.		
C	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus.		
D	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency.		
	A + B + C + D = 100?	/100	/100
3. Management of Employees		**Now**	**Preferred**
A	The management style in the organization is characterized by teamwork, consensus, and participation.		
B	The management style in the organization is characterized by individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness.		
C	The management style in the organization is characterized by hard- driving competitiveness, high demands, and achievement.		
D	The management style in the organization is characterized by security of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in relationships.		
	A + B + C + D = 100?	/100	/100

(SURVEY CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument

A + B + C + D must total to 100.

4. Organization Glue		Now	Preferred
A	The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and mutual trust. Commitment to this organization runs high.		
B	The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge.		
C	The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment. Aggressiveness and winning are common themes.		
D	The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important.		
	A + B + C + D = 100?	/100	/100
5. Strategic Emphases		**Now**	**Preferred**
A	The organization emphasizes human development. High trust, openness, and participation persist.		
B	The organization emphasizes acquiring new resources and creating new challenges. Trying new things and prospecting for opportunities are valued.		
C	The organization emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. Hitting stretch targets and winning in the marketplace are dominant.		
D	The organization emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important.		
	A + B + C + D = 100?	/100	/100
6. Criteria of Success		**Now**	**Preferred**
A	The organization defines success on the basis of the development of human resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and concern for people.		
B	The organization defines success on the basis of having the most unique or newest products. It is a product leader and innovator.		
C	The organization defines success on the basis of winning in the marketplace and outpacing the competition. Competitive market leadership is key.		
D	The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling and low-cost production are critical.		
	A + B + C + D = 100?	/100	/100

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