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Blurred Boundaries Examining the Boundary Between Authorizations and Appropriations

June 2025

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Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943

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ABSTRACT

Congressional regulations delineate a distinction between defense authorization and appropriation bills, entrusting policy responsibilities to the Armed Services Committees and funding authority to the Appropriations Committees. However, overlapping jurisdictional boundaries often complicate this structure. This thesis explores whether the language used in legislation indicates jurisdictional overreach between these two committee systems. Employing a mixed-method approach, we conducted a Python-based keyword frequency analysis on the National Defense Authorization Acts and Defense Appropriations (NDAA) Bills from fiscal year (FY) 2020 through fiscal year 2024 to find instances of such overreach. This was followed by visual contextual verification and a third-party review to evaluate the frequency and type of provisions that are jurisdictionally non-conforming. The results revealed that FY2024 contained 15 instances of jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions out of 145 keyword occurrences, while the Appropriations Bill had 5 out of 96 indications of jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions. This suggests that authorizers may engage in jurisdictional overreach more frequently than appropriators. These findings challenge the conventional belief that fiscal committees are the primary source of overreach. The analysis demonstrates a method for analyzing congressional committee behavior.



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—Keshia and Britt

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—Keshia

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—Britt





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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|--|
| AHRQ | Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality |
| CBO | Congressional Budget Office |
| HAC | House Appropriations Committee |
| HAC-D | House Appropriations Committee-Defense |
| HASC | House Armed Service Committee |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GAO | Government Accountability Office |
| NDAA | National Defense Authorization Act |
| SAC | Senate Appropriations Committee |
| SAC-D | Senate Appropriations Committee-Defense |
| SASC | Senate Armed Service Committee |



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I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to present our research focused on evaluating whether the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) are effectively discharging their respective roles and responsibilities assigned. This study will analyze specific events that may exemplify these “blurred boundaries.” The research will examine De Jure (the law) and De Facto (current practices or reality) jurisdictional boundaries being violated by authorization and appropriation committees through textual analysis. This chapter provides an overview of the history and development of the issue, emphasizing the need to connect legislative processes concerning defense funding as encapsulated in the National Defense Authorizations Act (NDAA) and appropriations bills of fiscal year 2020 (FY20) through fiscal year 2024 (FY24). It will explore the research questions and address limitations associated with the terminology of authorizations and appropriations. The significance of this thesis is to provide policy relevance by defining clear procedural boundaries that will improve legislative accountability. The chapter concludes with a summary of the research methods employed and a clear outline of the report’s overall structure.

A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

The United States Government’s financial management system encompasses the authorization and allocation of defense finances. Annual appropriations and authorizations are not just procedural exercises: each includes the checks and balances proposed to safeguard fiscal responsibility and preserve legislative oversight. Previous research has shown that committees tend to exceed their limits, encroaching upon the rightful authority of another committee. Additionally, there are instances where some personnel hold dual roles. However, none of these investigations have examined the magnitude of the issue or documented the frequency of different types of such behaviors.

Formally, under de jure principles as established by legislative rules and traditional norms, “Authorizers” hold the responsibility for defining overarching policy objectives and frameworks, which include the creation or amendment of programs. In contrast, “Appropriators” are tasked with allocating funds to reinforce authorized



activities. Practically, under de facto principles are established by prevailing practice, “Appropriators” increasingly shape policy by incorporating authorizations or policy directives in appropriation bills. This is particularly evident in cases where authorizations have expired or where urgent needs emerge. When appropriations are used to sway policy, unintended consequences may result in programs not being fully vetted or authorized. This practice may restrict the capability of policymakers to engage in thorough discussion on the merits and longstanding implications proposed.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has reported that billions are allocated annually to programs with expired authorizations, raising concerns about the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms in employing procedural rules (2023). Although there is a theoretical distinction relating to the roles of “Appropriators and Authorizers”, the practice of appropriations often undermines the anticipated processes, risking the integrity of statutory oversight. The role of this project is to investigate whether patterns within authorization and appropriations bear an implicit, de facto boundary that impacts decision-making.

B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research questions developed in this study are essential for accomplishing the main objective of our research: We analyze unclear distinctions between authorizations and appropriations, with an emphasis on the legislative procedures related to defense funding as outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and appropriations acts from FY20 to FY24. This study answers the following research questions.

1. Primary Research Questions

- Accepting the literature’s claim that the de jure boundary between the authorizers and appropriators is violated, are there patterns in the provisions in the acts that reveal a de facto boundary?
- If so, what patterns have been prevalent throughout the past five fiscal years?
- If the patterns exist, how many provisions are conforming versus non-conforming during FY2024?



2. Secondary Research Questions

- What is the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Defense Subcommittees of Appropriations?
- In what ways could either committee exceed their jurisdiction or violate chamber rules?
- What keywords in the legislation would help identify such violations?
- For fiscal year 2024, what evidence exists of such behavior by appropriators and authorizers?

C. BACKGROUND

The Constitution granted Congress the power of the purse. Managing government spending is a twofold process. There are the authorizers and the appropriators. The authorization committees have legislative authority to authorize specified objects. These committees establish programs and policies. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 created the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. These committees are responsible for the National Defense Authorization Act; therefore, they are known as the Defense authorizers. On the other hand, there are the appropriations committees which are responsible for setting the specified levels of budget authority to most of the federal government programs.

House and Senate rules and committee jurisdiction limit what the authorizers and appropriators may do. The authorizers establish the purpose, maximum amount allowed and sometimes the length of a program. Whereas the appropriators can only include language that allocates the funds to the authorized purpose, amount and time as specified. The appropriators should not be adding new policy initiatives or changing the existing laws. This thesis will look at FY20 through FY24 NDAA and appropriations bills to catalog instances of such behavior to see if any deviations have become normalized and any patterns that exist.

D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH

This thesis provides insights into the authorization and appropriation processes for national defense. It demonstrates a methodology for assessing the presence of various



approaches by which committees can exceed their jurisdiction and provides evidence of such behavior for a specific year of defense funding legislation.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is structured into five chapters, each contributing to a comprehensive analysis of the de jure and de facto distinction between authorizations and appropriations. Chapter II, Literature Review, provides an in-depth examination of House and Senate rules governing appropriations and authorizations, including case studies and past research on Congressional boundary-crossing. This chapter also contextualizes how deviations from formal rules have historically manifested in legislative decision-making. Chapter III, Methodology, outlines the research design, detailing both qualitative and quantitative approaches to identifying jurisdictional boundary violations. It describes the process of collecting, processing, and analyzing legislative data from FY20 through FY24, incorporating keyword identification, rule-based text analysis, and data visualization. Chapter IV, Analysis and Results, presents findings from the dataset, revealing patterns in appropriations and authorizations that suggest jurisdictional overreach. This chapter includes visual representations of trends, a comparative analysis of key provisions, and a discussion of observed rule violations. Finally, Chapter V, Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations, synthesizes the findings, highlighting key insights into Congressional spending behaviors. It discusses the implications of observed patterns, identifies limitations of the study, and offers recommendations for future research on legislative rule adherence. This structured approach ensures a systematic exploration of the complexities within the authorization and appropriations process while leveraging both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.



II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter examines the relationship between authorizing and appropriating legislation, focusing on the evolving interaction between these two legislative processes within U.S. defense policy. Specifically, it analyzes the organization and structure of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D), and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (SAC-D) to establish a foundational understanding of their intended roles.

The chapter then explores scholarly assessments of rules and jurisdictional violations, highlighting historical instances where appropriators have encroached upon the policymaking domain traditionally reserved for authorizers. Through a review of relevant literature, this section identifies cases where appropriations committees have increasingly influenced policy decisions—thereby blurring the conventional boundaries between authorization and appropriation. This analysis contributes to the broader discussion of institutional power shifts within Congress, addressing implications for legislative oversight, defense budgeting, and democratic accountability.

A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTHORIZING AND APPROPRIATING

The legislative process in the United States is structured around two distinct yet interdependent mechanisms: authorizing and appropriating legislation. Authorizations establish federal programs, set policy parameters, and recommend funding levels, whereas appropriations provide the actual budgetary authority necessary for government operations. When analyzing the relationship between authorizations and appropriations, it is essential to recognize that Congress has established distinct guidelines for what may be included in each type of legislation. “The distinction between authorizations and appropriations is a construct of congressional rules, as there is no constitutional requirement that an appropriation must be preceded by a specific act that authorizes the appropriation” (Saturno, 2023, p. 11). These functions are governed by the procedural rules of the House and Senate; however, jurisdictional ambiguities can blur the



boundaries between them, rules can be waived, and rules can be violated if nobody objects during the federal budget process.

Authorization bills primarily serve to establish policies within federal programs and agencies by defining their scope and objectives. They also grant contract authority to agencies, allowing them to enter into obligations in anticipation of future appropriations. While there are no explicit rules prohibiting the inclusion of specified funding amounts in authorization bills, doing so poses a risk for agencies if appropriators do not approve the recommended funding levels. The risk being contradictory guidance that needs to be reconciled and slows budget execution.

In contrast, appropriation bills are constitutionally required; they provide the actual budget authority, including the specified funding amount, time limits on expenditures, and overall financial allocations. The power of appropriations is significant, as appropriators can effectively terminate a program by withholding funding. However, appropriations legislation is subject to restrictions; appropriators are not permitted to insert substantive policy or legislative language into appropriations bills. The interplay between authorizing and appropriating entities in congressional budgeting is a delicate balance of power with the potential for institutional conflict.

Within this framework, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) oversee the authorization of defense programs, while the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) determine funding allocations. Despite clearly defined committee jurisdictions and procedural rules outlined in House and Senate regulations, scholars and practitioners have raised concerns about potential rule violations and jurisdictional encroachments. Existing literature has examined these issues within other areas of government, but not around defense appropriations. Therefore, gaps remain in understanding the extent to which these committees adhere to established legislative procedures.

This thesis addresses these gaps by analyzing the relationship between authorization and appropriation in defense legislation, with a specific focus on potential rules or jurisdictional violations by authorizers and appropriators. This thesis contributes



to the broader discourse on congressional procedure, institutional constraints, and the balance of power within the legislative branch.

B. AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES

This section distinguishes between authorization and appropriation committees, which are designed to separate policy and funding. It examines the roles and interactions of authorization and appropriation committees, exploring how procedural complexities, legislative strategies, and political considerations have contributed to the evolving dynamics between these committees as they determine and fund defense policy.

1. Authorizations Committees.

The House of Representatives has 20 standing committees, while the Senate has 16 (see Table 1). Standing committees are permanent entities within Congress and remain in place across legislative sessions, distinguishing them from select and joint committees. Many standing committees have authorization authority, but each chamber has only one appropriations committee. Select committees are temporary and typically established to investigate specific incidents or address time-sensitive issues. Joint committees, composed of members from both the House and Senate, are often formed to facilitate coordination between the two chambers.

According to the United States House of Representatives, “Standing committees have legislative jurisdiction, giving them power over bills related to their jurisdiction and oversight responsibility over agencies” (United States House of Representatives, 2023). These committees play a critical role in the legislative process, including authorizing the size and scope of federal programs and agencies within their jurisdiction. However, some committees function outside this structure, such as the Rules committees, which do not have authority over agencies, policy, or government spending. Instead, their role is to “focus entirely on upholding the rules within Congress’s performance and legislative action” (Davis, 2022). This thesis focuses on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), examining their roles in determining policy and providing funding for national defense.



Table 1. Standing Committees. Adapted from Congress.gov (2019).

| In the House, standing committees include: | In the Senate, standing committees include: |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agriculture 2. Appropriations 3. Armed Services 4. The Budget 5. Education and the Workforce 6. Energy and Commerce 7. Ethics 8. Financial Services 9. Foreign Affairs 10. Homeland Security 11. House Administration 12. The Judiciary 13. Natural Resources 14. Oversight and Government Reform 15. Rules 16. Science, Space, and Technology 17. Small Business 18. Transportation and Infrastructure 19. Veterans' Affairs 20. Ways and Means | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agriculture 2. Appropriations 3. Armed Services 4. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 5. Commerce, Science, and Transportation 6. Energy and Natural Resources 7. Environment and Public Works 8. Finance 9. Foreign Relations 10. Governmental Affairs 11. Judiciary 12. Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 13. Budget 14. Rules and Administration 15. Small Business 16. Veterans' Affairs |

a. HASC and SASC structure and jurisdiction

These committees play a central role in shaping U.S. defense policy by establishing statutory authority for military programs, policies, and funding levels before appropriations committees allocate resources. As of 2025, the Senate Armed Service Committee consisted of 27 members: 14 majority and 13 minority members (United States Senate, n.d.). For comparison the House Armed Service Committee is comprised of 57 members: 30 majority and 27 minority (U.S. House of Representatives, 2025). The Senate's smaller size fosters greater overlap and influence between authorization and appropriation processes, as senators are more likely to serve on both policy and budgetary committees. This contrasts with the House's more fragmented structure, where authorization and appropriations functions are more distinct.

Both committees operate under rules established by their respective chambers, which define the scope of their legislative and oversight authority. According to the HASC website,

The committee retains jurisdiction of all subjects listed in clause 1(c) of rule X of the Rules of House of Representatives and retains exclusive



jurisdiction for: defense policy generally, ongoing military operations, the organization and reform of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy, counter-drug programs, acquisition and industrial base policy, technology transfer and export controls, joint interoperability, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, Department of Energy nonproliferation programs, and detainee affairs and policy. (House Armed Service Committee, 2025)

Similarly, SASC defines jurisdiction,

As specified in Rule XXV, 1(c)(1) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services has the following jurisdiction:

- Aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations
- Common defense
- Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, generally
- Maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, including administration, sanitation, and government of the Canal Zone
- Military research and development
- National security aspects of nuclear energy
- Naval petroleum reserves, except those in Alaska
- Pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the Armed Forces, including overseas education of civilian and military dependents
- Selective service system
- Strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense (Senate Armed Service Committee, 2019)

See Table 2 for a comparison between the two committees.



Table 2. Similarities of the House and Senate Armed Service Committees.
Adapted from Senate Armed Service Committee (2019) and House
Armed Service Committee (2025).

| Similarities of the House and Senate Armed Service Committees | | |
|--|--|--|
| Aspect | House Armed Service Committee (HASC) | Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) |
| Chamber | House of Representatives | Senate |
| Rule Location | Rule X, Clause 1(c) | Rule XXV, Clause 1(c)(1) |
| Primary Jurisdiction | Department of Defense, U.S. armed forces, military research and development, and national security aspects of nuclear energy | National defense, Department of Defense, armed forces, military operations, and national security issues |
| Oversight Areas | military personnel defense authorization bills acquisition and technology readiness emerging threats | military policy Defense budget and authorization military operations Department of Defense reorganization |
| Legislative Role | Prepares the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in House | Prepares the Senate NDAA |
| Subcommittees | Yes i.e. Tactical Air and Land Forces | Yes i.e. Airland and Emerging Threats |
| Confirmation Power | No confirmation powers, only legislative and oversight authority | Has confirmation powers for military appointments |
| Hearings and Investigations | Conducts oversight hearings and investigations, particularly related to defense programs and military readiness | Also conducts oversight but includes confirmation hearings for nominee and strategic military assessments |
| Relationship with DoD | Direct oversight over DoD programs and budget | Direct oversight over DoD programs and budget |

While HASC and SASC share core responsibilities, their structural, procedural, and jurisdictional differences reflect the distinct roles of the House and Senate. Beyond differences in size, their legislative focus and scope of authority also diverge. HASC maintains jurisdiction over defense policy and military reform, emphasizing oversight of military acquisition, industrial policy, and force structure (Jurisdiction and Rules | House Armed Services Committee, 2025). In contrast, SASC adopts a broader national security perspective, encompassing military operations and strategic defense considerations (History | United States Committee on Armed Services, 2019). This distinction is evident in SASC’s oversight of the maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal, an area with both military and geopolitical implications. Additionally, SASC’s national security approach integrates both domestic and international dimensions, reflecting the Senate’s constitutional role in treaty ratification and foreign policy oversight. Thus, while both committees play a critical role in shaping U.S. defense policy, their institutional differences influence their decision-making processes, legislative priorities, and overall impact on national security governance.



b. *HASC and SASC Rules*

The HASC operates under 24 rules established for the 119th Congress, which regulate its procedural processes, see Table 3. These rules define key terms. Specifically, Rule 4(a)(3)(B), “the term policy means statutes, regulations, directives and other institutional guidance.” When the HASC and SASC draft the NDAA they are authorizing funding levels and establishing policies for the DoD and other National Security programs. The NDAA may include the amount of funding being authorized for a specified program, create new policy directives, can approve or modify an existing program and require reporting for oversight.

In contrast, SASC functions under 15 rules, as outlined in Table 3. According to Rule 14, “except as otherwise specified herein, the Standing Rules of the Senate shall govern the actions of the Committee” (U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, n.d.). Additionally, each SASC subcommittee is considered part of the full committee and is therefore subject to its rules where applicable.

Table 3. HASC and SASC Rules. Adapted from U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (n.d.) and House of Representatives Armed Services Committee (n.d.).

| HASC Rules: | SASC Rules: |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. General Provisions2. Full Committee Meeting Date3. Subcommittee Meeting Dates4. Jurisdiction and Membership of Committee/Subcommittees5. Committee Panels and Task Forces6. Reference and Consideration of Legislation7. Public Announcement of Hearings and Meetings8. Broadcasting of Committee Hearings and Meetings9. Meetings and Hearings Open to the Public10. Quorum11. The Five-Minute Rule12. Power to Sit and Act; Subpoena Power13. Witness Statements14. Administering Oaths to Witnesses15. Questioning of Witnesses16. Publication of Committee Hearings and Markups17. Voting and Rollcalls | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Regular Meeting Day2. Additional Meetings3. Special Meetings4. Open Meetings5. Presiding Officer6. Quorum7. Proxy Voting8. Announcement of Votes9. Subpoenas10. Hearings11. Nominations12. Real Property Transactions13. Legislative Calendar14. Except as otherwise specified herein, the Standing Rules of the Senate shall govern the actions of the Committee. Each subcommittee of the Committee is part of the Committee and is therefore subject to the Committee’s rules so far as applicable.15. Powers and Duties of Subcommittees |



| HASC Rules: | SASC Rules: |
|---|-------------|
| 18. Committee Reports 19. Public Inspection of Committee Rollcalls 20. Protection of National Security and Other Information 21. Committee Staffing 22. Committee Records 23. Hearing Procedures 24. Committee Activity Reports | |

A comparative analysis of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) requires an examination of both chamber-wide legislative rules and the committees' specific procedural guidelines. Structurally, neither committee can directly allocate funds due to longstanding procedural constraints. House Rule XXI, Clause 4, explicitly prohibits authorization bills from including appropriations, while Senate Rule XVI bars general legislation or amendments within appropriations bills. This distinction underscores the fundamental separation between authorization and appropriations: while the NDAA establishes spending limits and policy directives, it does not provide actual funding. Finally, fiscal constraints impose additional limitations on NDAA provisions. Under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Sections 302 and 311), spending authorizations cannot exceed budget allocations without identifying corresponding offsets. Likewise, House Rule XXI, Clause 10, prohibits consideration of legislation that increases mandatory spending without appropriate budgetary offsets. These legislative constraints shape the deliberative and procedural processes of HASC and SASC, ensuring that defense authorization remains distinct from appropriations and operates within established fiscal and jurisdictional parameters.

2. Appropriations Committee.

Unlike the authorizing committees, which establish policy frameworks and programmatic authority, the appropriations committees function as the sole entities responsible for allocating federal funds across government agencies. It is important to note there is only one committee in each chamber with this power. This grants them significant discretion in determining whether to fund, reduce, or eliminate specific



programs, thereby influencing operations in critical policy domains such as defense, healthcare, and education.

a. Structure and jurisdiction

The Appropriations Committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate are among the most influential congressional assignments for members and staffers, as they wield substantial authority over federal spending decisions. The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) consists of 63 members (35 majority, 28 minority), whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) is composed of 29 members (15 majority, 14 minority), the largest committee in the Senate.

The defense appropriations are written by the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D) and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (SAC-D). The structure of congressional committees reflects the balance of political power within the legislative branch. In general, these committees are composed of members from both the majority and minority parties, with leadership roles, including committee chairs and subcommittee heads, typically assigned to members of the majority party. Senate Appropriations Committee-Defense entails 17 members: 9 majority and 8 minority members (U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, n.d.). The House Appropriations Committee-Defense is comprised of 17 members: 10 majority and 7 minority (House Committee on Appropriations, 2024).

The HAC jurisdiction is broad. Under Rule X of the Rules of the House, the Committee on Appropriations' jurisdiction is defined as,

1. Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the Government.
2. Rescissions of appropriations contained in appropriations bills.
3. Transfers of unexpended balances.
4. Bills and joint resolutions reported by other committees that provide new entitlement authority as defined in section 3(9) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and referred to the committee under clause 4(a)(2).
5. Bills and joint resolutions that provide new budget authority, limitation on the use of funds, or other authority relating to new direct loan obligations and new loan guarantee commitments referencing section 504(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. (Johnson, 2010, p. 10-11)



The SAC jurisdiction is outlined in Rule XXV, clause 1(b) “Standing Committees” of the Senate which declares,

1. Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the Government, except as provided in subparagraph (e).
2. Rescission of appropriations contained in appropriation Acts (referred to in section 105 of title 1, United States Code).
3. The amount of new spending authority described in section 401(c)(2) (A) and (B) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 which is to be effective for a fiscal year.
4. New spending authority described in section 401(c)(2)(C) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 provided in bills and resolutions referred to the committee under section 401(b)(2) of that Act (but subject to the provisions of section 401(b)(3) of that Act). (U.S. Senate, 2013, p. 19).

b. HAC and SAC Rules

The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (SAC-D) operates under Senate Rule XVI, “Appropriations and Amendments to General Appropriations Bills,” which establishes procedural guidelines for defense-related funding measures. This rule contains eight provisions that govern the introduction, amendment, and scope of appropriations within the Senate.

Similarly, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (HAC-D) is governed by House Rule XXI, “Restrictions on Certain Bills,” which outlines twelve specific restrictions on appropriations legislation. These provisions regulate the introduction of funding measures, enforce limitations on unauthorized appropriations, and maintain the procedural distinction between authorization and appropriation. The rule restricts repurposing unspent funds from prior authorizations. This rule includes the unauthorized appropriations which is an appropriation in general appropriations and amendment to a program that has not been previously authorized by law. In addition to the previously mentioned prohibitions, House Rule XXI, clause 2, prohibits the inclusion of legislation or policy directives in an appropriation bill and amendment.

These rules reflect broader institutional constraints on congressional spending authority, reinforcing the formal distinction between authorizing and appropriating legislation. However, in practice, these distinctions are often blurred, as appropriators



influence policy through funding decisions, and authorizers embed budgetary considerations within authorization bills. The interplay between Senate Rule XVI and House Rule XXI thus serves as a critical lens for analyzing jurisdictional tensions, procedural conflicts, and the shifting balance of power between authorizers and appropriators in defense policymaking.

Since the formation of Congress, the Appropriations Committee was developed to tangibly appropriate funds to agencies and the American people.

“The House (Rule XXI, clause 2) prohibits any appropriation, whether in a reported appropriations bill or offered as an amendment, for an expenditure not authorized by law.” (House of Representatives, 2023)

The Senate (Rule XVI, paragraph 1) prohibits floor amendments proposing appropriations for an agency or activity not authorized by law, with certain exceptions. (113th Congress Senate, 2013)

In contrast to the House, the Senate does not prohibit committee amendments or measures reported by the Appropriations Committee from including an appropriation for an agency or activity not authorized by law.

Second, the House (Rule XXI, clause 2) and Senate (Rule XVI, paragraphs 2 and 4) prohibit the inclusion of legislative language (such as an authorization) in an appropriations measure. Third, the House (Rule XXI, clause 4), but not the Senate, prohibits appropriations in authorizing legislation.” (House of Representatives, 2023)

The structural separation between authorization and appropriation dates to the 19th century, when legislative delays caused by frequent policy riders prompted procedural reforms. In response, the House adopted a rule in 1837 stating that “no appropriation shall be reported in such general appropriation bills, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law” (Champoux & Sullivan, 2006, p. 5). While authorizations are generally expected to precede appropriations, there is no constitutional or statutory requirement as previously mentioned.



C. EVIDENCE OF RULE VIOLATIONS

Chuzi (2020) highlights a critical turning point in 1959. He stated, “SASC Chairman Richard Russell inserted a provision into a 1959 military construction bill that required, for the first time, the prior authorization of any appropriation of funding for the procurement of military planes, missiles, or ships” (p. 1019). This legislative maneuver effectively established a new precedent for congressional defense budgeting, expanding the role of authorizing committees in shaping appropriations decisions. Over time, Congress broadened Russell’s technique beyond military procurement, embedding similar requirements across other areas of defense policy and funding. This shift represents a notable evolution in the balance of power between authorizers and appropriators, elevating the importance of the authorization bill.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has expanded in both scope and complexity since its inception. Between FY1962 and FY1980, no authorization exceeded 20 pages, reflecting a relatively streamlined legislative approach to defense policy (Candrea, 2024). However, by FY2023, the NDAA had grown to 1,772 pages, illustrating a broader trend of legislative expansion in defense governance. This growth could be attributed to several factors, including the increasing complexity of U.S. military operations, the bureaucratic evolution of the Department of Defense, and shifting geopolitical imperatives. See Figure 1 (Candrea, 2024).






Figure 1. Number of pages in the NDAA and conference report. Adapted from Candreva (2024, p. 156).

Over time, appropriators have steadily increased the number of provisions within the annual defense appropriations acts, reflecting a growing legislative emphasis on financial oversight and policy directives. Unlike the dramatic expansion of the NDAA’s page count, the number of general provisions in defense appropriations has exhibited a more measured trajectory, characterized by periods of rapid increase followed by relative stability. In 1970, the annual defense appropriations act contained 51 general provisions; by the 1980s, this number had more than doubled to 110. By FY2023, general provisions had risen to 140, marking a continued but more gradual increase (Candreva, 2024). This trend suggests that while the NDAA has expanded significantly in both content and complexity, the appropriations process has maintained a comparatively stable framework, likely due to established budgetary constraints and procedural norms. The work of Dr. Candreva, building on Isaak and Wheeler’s (2012) data, provides a crucial longitudinal perspective on this evolution (see Figure 2). This raises important questions regarding the functional implications of increased provisions—whether they enhance fiscal accountability and strategic flexibility or contribute to bureaucratic inefficiencies and legislative inertia within defense budgeting.




Figure 2. Number of general provisions in the Annual National Defense Appropriation Act. Adapted from Candreva (2024, p. 158).

The distinction between authorizations and appropriations remains a foundational principle of the congressional budget process. While appropriations are constitutionally mandated under Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, which says, “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law” (Constitution Annotated, 2024), the Constitution does not require an appropriation be preceded by an authorization. Rather, the authorization-appropriation structure is merely a product of congressional rules created to establish policymaking and budgetary control. Despite these formal distinctions, jurisdictional ambiguities and procedural adaptations have often blurred the boundaries between the two, leading to legislative conflicts and debates over congressional authority. The interaction between the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC/SASC) and the Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense (HAC-D/SAC-D) exemplifies these tensions, particularly in the realm of defense funding.

Researchers have examined whether authorizing and appropriations committees have violated established rules and jurisdictional boundaries in the legislative process. This section analyzes historical instances of such violations, drawing on scholarly assessments of jurisdictional conflicts, procedural breaches, and the evolving power

dynamics between authorizers and appropriators. By reviewing these cases, this discussion evaluates the extent to which these actions have influenced congressional decision-making, defense policy, and the balance of power within the legislative branch.

The legislative process is structured, yet procedural safeguards, such as points of order, are not always enforced. A point of order occurs when someone addresses a rules violation during a Congressional meeting or hearing. Champoux and Sullivan (2006) highlight the significance of points of order as mechanisms for upholding House and Senate rules, emphasizing that:

If no one raises such a point of order at the proper time during debate of the bill or amendment, or if the chair's ruling on a point of order is overturned by a majority vote, consideration of that legislation proceeds even though it is in violation of House or Senate rules. (Champoux & Sullivan, 2006, p. 7)

This observation underscores a factor contributing to the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries between authorizing and appropriations committees. In theory, procedural rules exist to prevent appropriators from legislating policy through funding measures and to ensure authorizers do not encroach upon budgetary decisions. However, if points of order are not raised—or are overridden—jurisdictional boundaries can be violated. The inconsistent enforcement of procedural rules presents an opportunity for analysis, particularly in how appropriations subcommittees exercise *de facto* policymaking authority. If a point of order is not raised, it can allow jurisdictional boundaries to be sidestepped. Likewise, lawmakers may use other legislative tactics—such as funding directives, policy riders, or restrictive conditions—to influence outcomes.

One such mechanism is the use of funding directives, which include Community Project Funding requests (House) and Congressionally Directed Spending Items (Senate). As Lynch and Saturno (2023) explain, these mechanisms enable legislators to allocate funds within specific programs or accounts to designated state or local governments, as well as nonprofit entities. These funding provisions are subject to House and Senate earmark disclosure rules, reinforcing transparency while simultaneously enabling legislators to advance targeted policy objectives. This can be seen today in Figure 3 and 4 per the FY2022 Congressionally Directed Spending, Defense Funded Projects. These



projects were in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117–103), which was signed into law on March 15, 2022 (United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, 2025). The remaining fiscal years between FY2020-FY2024 did not reflect Defense funded projects.

| Agency | Account | Recipient | Project Name | Amount | Requestor(s) | Origination |
|--------------|---------|--|--|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| Air Force | RDTE,AF | Texas A&M University—Central Texas, Killeen, TX | Development of Cybersecurity Methodologies | \$2,990,000 | Carter (TX) | H |
| Air Force | RDTE,AF | Central New York Defense Alliance, Rome, NY | Skydome: Trusted Smart-X Experimentation Environment | 200,000 | Tenney | H |
| Army | RDTE,A | Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA | Soldier Athlete Human Performance Optimization | 1,500,000 | Carter (GA) | H |
| Army | RDTE,A | Pennington Biomedical Research Center, Baton Rouge, LA | Center for Excellence in Military Health and Performance Enhancement | 3,566,666 | Graves (LA) | H |
| Army | RDTE,A | Coalition for National Trauma Research, San Antonio, TX | National Trauma Research Repository Data Population Project | 1,900,000 | Ruppersberger | H |
| Army | RDTE,A | APG Centennial Celebration Association, Belcamp, MD | The Discovery Center at Water's Edge | 250,000 | Ruppersberger | H |
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | Kansas City Kansas Community College, Kansas City, KS | Automation Engineering Technology Program | 1,981,000 | Dauids (KS) | H |
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | National Center for Defense Manufacturing and Machining, El Paso, TX | El Paso Makes Contract Support for El Paso Manufacturers | 964,000 | Escobar | H |
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | VA Tech University, Blacksburg, VA | Next Generation Explosives and Propellants | 1,000,000 | Griffith | H |
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | American Museum of Natural History, New York, NY | Novel Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Prediction and Monitoring of Disease Transmission | 1,500,000 | Nadler | H |
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC | Assessing and Tracking Tactical Forces Initiative | 4,000,000 | Price (NC) | H |
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX | Cybersecurity Manufacturing Innovation Park | 1,000,000 | Castro (TX) | H |

Figure 3. FY2022 Defense–Community Project Funding.
Source: United States Senate Committee on Appropriations (2025).

| Agency | Account | Recipient | Project Name | Amount | Requestor(s) | Origination |
|--------------|---------|---|---|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| Defense-Wide | RDTE,DW | Institute for Digital Enterprise Advancement, Huntsville, AL | Systems Engineering Technician Education Initiative | 550,000 | Aderholt | H |
| Navy | RDTE,N | Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ | Coastal adaptation research for improved coastal community and NWS Earle military installation resilience | 450,000 | Pallone | H |
| Space Force | RDTE,SF | The Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station, College Station, TX | Development of a Core Manipulator Joint | 1,665,000 | Sessions | H |

Figure 4. FY2022 Defense–Community Project Funding continued. Source: United States Senate Committee on Appropriations (2025).

In addition to direct funding allocations, policy riders serve as a strategic tool for embedding policy provisions within broader legislative vehicles. According to the Indivisible Project (n.d.), policy riders are often attached to must-pass bills, allowing legislators to implement policy changes that might otherwise struggle to pass as



standalone legislation. This tactic leverages the urgency and necessity of major legislative packages—such as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) or omnibus appropriations bills—to secure policy outcomes that may face opposition if introduced independently. Looking at provision 8133 in the FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, “Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (117th Congress, 2022). This is an instance where policy is inserted in an appropriation with no relation to budgetary authorization.

A third approach involves the imposition of restrictive conditions, which shape policy by controlling the use of appropriated funds. Saturno (2023) identifies two primary forms of restrictive conditions: funding prohibitions and spending limitations. Funding prohibitions prevent the allocation of federal resources to specific activities, recipients, or earmarked projects, thereby constraining executive discretion in policy implementation. Spending limitations, such as “not to exceed” provisions, establish funding ceilings for activities or programs, effectively limiting the scale or scope of federal initiatives. These constraints serve as a mechanism for Congress to exert fiscal discipline while directing policy priorities.

Taken together, these legislative tools underscore the significant role that congressional committees play in shaping policy beyond their formal jurisdictional boundaries. By utilizing funding directives, policy riders, and restrictive conditions, legislators can exert substantial influence over executive decision-making, program implementation, and budgetary priorities.

Advance appropriations represent another mechanism through which the traditional separation between authorization and appropriation becomes increasingly blurred. These appropriations provide budget authority for future fiscal years, sometimes for programs or policies that have not yet been authorized by the House or Senate Armed Services Committees. Champoux and Sullivan explained, “Defense procurement is facilitated when Congress enacts appropriations for budget authority of several years in the future in order to ensure payment on that specific procurement project” (Champoux & Sullivan, 2006, p. 14).



This further complicates the division of the authorizers and appropriators process, by having the approval of multi-year procurement contracts and contract authority by authorizing committees, such as HASC and SASC. The binding obligation by the authorizers influences appropriations in future years. Particularly for major weapons systems or shipbuilding—appropriators are placed in a position where they feel compelled to allocate future funds to honor contractual commitments, even if fiscal conditions or policy priorities shift. In this way, the authorizers’ decisions shape the constraints under which appropriators operate, limiting their discretion and blurring the procedural separation between the two functions.

Champoux and Sullivan (2006) argue that while congressional procedures traditionally require authorizations to precede appropriations, the enforcement of this distinction has weakened over time. They note that congressional budgetary rules lack statutory authority, granting legislators significant flexibility to bypass established norms. This erosion of procedural boundaries complicates budgetary oversight and accountability, as unclear distinctions between authorization and appropriation processes can result in inconsistent funding practices and diminish the role of authorizing legislation in shaping fiscal decisions. Dr. Candreva stated, “In 21 of those 50 years the process was inverted, and the appropriations bill was passed before the authorization” (Candreva, 2024, p. 161). Furthermore, the increasing reliance on advanced appropriations further obscures the separation between these functions, raising concerns about the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of current budgeting practices.

Thus, advance appropriations serve as a key example of how appropriators can exert de facto policy control, reinforcing concerns that the appropriations process is not merely a budgetary mechanism but a policymaking tool. This phenomenon highlights a critical tension within congressional governance: while appropriators justify advance appropriations as necessary for long-term fiscal planning and procurement stability, they simultaneously undermine the deliberate, policy-driven authorization process designed to shape defense priorities.

Wolf’s research examined the use of appropriations as a policymaking tool, focusing on how appropriators influence foreign policy through the budget process.



Notably, Wolf mentions, “Ironically, the House Committee Report justifies the Committee’s explicit venture into shaping foreign policy by claiming to be laying the groundwork for a return to a healthy separation of the authorizing and appropriations processes” (Wolf, 2009, p.14). The House Committee Report on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1994 while it was established in a framework that would return the authorizing and appropriation process back to their jurisdictional bounds Wolf argued the separation was opposite. Many of the temporary provisions became permanent in subsequent appropriations. Although appropriators primarily focus on budgetary decisions, appropriations legislation is often used as a mechanism to advance or restrict policy objectives. Through funding riders, limitations, and conditional appropriations, these committees can shape executive branch implementation, impose policy constraints, or bypass traditional authorization pathways. Consequently, the appropriations process serves not only as a fiscal mechanism but also as a tool for legislative influence, further blurring the conventional boundaries between authorization and appropriation.

The mechanisms listed above illustrate what Congress utilizes to control the allocation and use of federal funds including funding riders, restrictive conditions, and conditional appropriations. Funding riders are provisions that insert a specified funding amount for a particular purpose, often shaping policy by directing spending toward or away from certain initiatives. In contrast, restrictions impose limitations on appropriations, typically expressed as “not to exceed” provisions that cap spending levels or “no funds” clauses that prohibit the use of appropriations for certain activities. Lastly, conditional appropriations are contingent on specific legislative or executive actions, meaning that the allocated funds may only be expended upon the enactment of an authorization bill or fulfillment of a requirement set by the executive branch. These mechanisms illustrate the complex interplay between congressional authority, executive implementation, and budgetary constraints, reinforcing the procedural and policy-driven nature of the appropriations process.

Wolf’s (2009) research demonstrates how funding for foreign operations led to substantive changes in foreign relations law, effectively bypassing the traditional authorization process. A significant portion of this jurisdictional overreach occurred



through supplemental appropriations, which provide funding outside the regular budget cycle and often face less legislative scrutiny. Wolf expressed, “Without such a mechanism at its disposal, Congress has relied over the past twenty-five years on the appropriations process to reauthorize foreign assistance programs, condition funds, and even authorize new programs and agencies” (Wolf, 2009, p.12). While this study primarily focuses on regular defense appropriations, Wolf’s findings underscore the broader historical precedent of appropriators engaging in de facto policymaking via supplemental appropriations. While the appropriation and authorization processes are to be annual, foreign policy is a special case because they have gone more than 20 years without an authorization bill. Recognizing these violations across different policy areas strengthens the argument that the appropriation process has increasingly been leveraged as a mechanism for shaping substantive policy—blurring the intended boundaries between authorizing and appropriating entities.

Existing research suggests that appropriators are increasingly engaging in policymaking activities traditionally reserved for authorizing committees. Ginieckzi followed appropriators’ interactions with the executive branch, focusing on a federal health agency and found that the appropriators have more frequently been shaping policies and direction beyond just funding the agency.

In the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Appropriations Bill, passed by the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) under Republican leadership, a series of policy riders were included that extend beyond traditional defense funding considerations. According to a press release from HAC Democrats (2023), these provisions reflect partisan priorities unrelated to core national security functions and illustrate a growing trend of appropriators using defense spending bills to shape broader policy debates. The bill includes partisan riders that have nothing to do with national security:

Bans funding for travel expenses for reproductive healthcare needs for Service members and their families.

1. Includes legislative text which cuts funding for the Deputy Inspector General for Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility and any funds that may be used to implement, administer, apply, enforce, or carry out the Executive Orders on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility.



2. Bans funding for surgical procedures or hormone therapies for gender-affirming care.
3. Bans funding which “promote, host, facilitate, or support events on U.S. military installations or as part of military recruiting programs that violate the Department of Defense Joint Ethics Regulation or bring discredit upon the military, such as drag queen story hour for children or the use of drag queens as military recruiters.”
4. Bans funding for any activity that promotes or advances Critical Race Theory.
5. Bans funding that may be used to classify or facilitate classification of any communications by a U.S. person as “mis, dis, or mal-information” – this would permit the spread of falsehoods without the ability to present the facts.
6. Bans security clearances for any signatory to the “Public Statement on the Hunter Biden Emails” dated October 19, 2020; limiting the free speech of those expressing ideas the majority opposes.
7. Bans retribution against “any individual with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as a union of one man and one woman”—language that limits the diversity of our military. (House of Representatives, 2023).

As HAC Democrats (2023) point out, the inclusion of these policy mandates within an appropriations bill, rather than through traditional authorization mechanisms, reflects a significant blurring of legislative boundaries. Defense appropriations are traditionally intended to fund military operations, readiness, and procurement, yet the insertion of policy provisions suggests an increasing use of appropriations as a policymaking tool.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has examined current practices surrounding omnibus appropriations, highlighting both their intended efficiencies and unintended consequences. While the primary goal of omnibus appropriations is to streamline a complex legislative process, particularly during periods of urgency, this approach has also created opportunities for additional policy measures to be incorporated into must-pass legislation. According to Aherne,

Eleven of the 18 omnibus appropriations measures enacted from FY2012 through FY2024 included at least one additional division containing legislation unrelated to the appropriations process for that fiscal year (i.e., provisions unrelated to regular, supplemental, or continuing appropriations). These additional divisions have often included legislation related to the extension or amendment of existing authorizations, as well



as legislation establishing new programs, projects, or activities (for example, see Divisions M through MM of P.L. 117–328, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023). (Aherne, 2024, p. 4)

D. DEVELOPMENT OF KEYWORDS FROM THE LITERATURE

The existing literature reveals the challenges behind the authorizing and appropriating committees, with additional evidence that appropriators have encroached upon policy functions which by rule are the responsibility of the authorizers. Studies such as Wolf (2009) and Ginieczki (2010) demonstrate how appropriations bills have been used to shape policy. Similarly, Champoux and Sullivan (2006) highlights national defense as a policy area where expiring authorizations are consistently renewed, reinforcing appropriators' ability to influence long-term defense strategy. Additionally, historical analyses of House and Senate rules (Logan, 2009; Chuzi, 2020) illustrate how procedural mechanisms, such as points of order and advance appropriations, have been inconsistently enforced or overridden, further blurring the boundaries between legislative functions.

Despite this extensive body of research, several gaps remain. While prior studies have examined the appropriators' policymaking role in foreign policy and healthcare, none has systematically analyzed how this dynamic has evolved within defense appropriations—specifically within HAC-D and SAC-D.

This study seeks to address these gaps by focusing on the language in appropriations and defense policy, specifically evaluating whether HAC-D and SAC-D have increasingly assumed a policymaking role through legislative riders, funding restrictions, and policy conditions embedded in defense appropriations bills. As listed above in Table 3, the research will exam the keywords listed below in relation to the Congressional behaviors and tactics previously mentioned that resulted in the FY2024 Appropriations Act and FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act. By analyzing historical trends, case studies, and procedural rule changes, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of congressional power shifts and the broader implications for legislative governance in national security policymaking.



Examining the impact of statutory language on spending and legislative control, the following are the reasons for selecting the specified appropriations keywords:

- “Establish” frequently leads to new mechanisms that at times bypassed authorization committees by embedding policy directives within spending provisions (Aherne, 2024, p. 3).
- “Amend” previous funding allocations and policy conditions within the 2023 Omnibus appropriations bill, effectively altering legislative intent through financial mechanisms such as limiting funding for cybersecurity initiatives (Aherne, 2024, p. 3).
- “Repealing” occasionally appropriations acts as a toll to restrict conditions set in previous authorizations such as budget caps within military operations in the Middle East (Chuzi, 2020, p. 21).
- “Emerge” justified spending decisions by citing emerging needs, which allows funding projects outside regular authorization frameworks to enhance potential security threats; in turn, reallocating funds towards artificial intelligence driven warfare systems (Ginieczki, 2010, 48).
- “Urgent/Urgency” allows appropriators to bypass standard funding procedures and allocate resources without extensive legislative scrutiny such as emergency appropriations during the COVID-19 pandemic (Champoux & Sullivan, 2006, p. 11) (Logan, 2009, p. 12).
- “Earmark” entails spending on specific projects, sometimes preventing further policy discussions by incorporating financial obligations with appropriations bills (Aherne, 2024, p. 1).
- “Reprogramming” (shift) appropriations often include the shift of funds between programs in ways that may not align with initial authorizations such as not limited to border security into military operation or funds restriction, effectively acting as a policy tool within budgetary frameworks (Ginieczki, 2010, p. 82) (Metzger, 2021, p. 18).
- The “transfer” of authority allows appropriations to be moved between accounts within agencies, which can sometimes compromise the original purpose of authorizations. For instance, unspent disaster relief funds being redirected to defense operations raise concerns about accountability in the reallocation process (Chuzi, 2020, p. 8).
- “Subject to” is often referred in the appropriations language, allowing agencies to allocate funds under specific conditions, which are used to limit or expand spending discretion such as compliance with new cybersecurity standards before funds could be released. This is viewed as creating indirect regulatory influence within appropriations (Logan, 2009, p. 14).
- “Necessary” is often vague but invokes appropriations to justify flexible spending, allowing broad discretion in allocations to include provisions to maintain readiness (Champoux & Sullivan, 2006, p. 3).



Examining the impact of statutory language on spending and legislative control, the following are the reasons for selecting the specified NDAA keywords:

- “Prior authorization” historically is required within the NDAA for defense expenditures, particularly in procurement; however, appropriators occasionally allocate funds before formal authorization leveraging the NDAA’s language to justify budget such as the inserted provision for military procurement by SASC Chairman Richard Russell in 1959 (Chuzi, 2020, p. 25).
- “Statutory” requirements often act as a legislative check on appropriations has in some cases effectively made certain restrictions permanent such as the statutory riders extending beyond traditional concerns embedding partisan mandates into policy (Logan, 2009, p. 28).
- “Use of Funds” outlines how allocated resources can be utilized, often introducing compliance restrictions that limit flexibility in defense spending such as reproductive healthcare travel and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs (Ginieczki, 2010, p. 191) (Logan, 2009, p. 18).
- “Critical” spending is often referred to as emergency appropriations within the NDAA that bypasses standard legislative rules to address urgent national security needs, raising concerns over executive discretions during wartime, justifying allocations as necessary for immediate operational effectiveness (Aherne, 2024, p. 3).
- “Mandates” in defense spending are embedded in the NDAA condition sets on appropriations influence procurement decisions and military operations such as domestic production for U.S. made ship components (Champoux & Sullivan, 2006, p. 22).
- “Minimum” (p. 69) and “maximum” (p. 40) spending limits set the boundaries for defense programs, guaranteeing ongoing funding even amidst fluctuating budget priorities. For instance, the Civil Air Patrol maintained its budget despite changes in defense strategies (Metzger, 2021).



Table 4. Appropriations and Authorizations Behavior Table

| Appropriations and Authorizations Behavior Table | | |
|---|--|--|
| Behavior Category | Keywords | Examples |
| Funding Directives | Emerge Urgent Urgency Necessary Critical Mandate Statutory | Executive Order, Congressionally Directed Spending, SBIR/STTR Funding Directive |
| Policy Riders | Establish Amend Repeal Transfer Prior Authorization | Hyde Amendment, Limitation on transfer authority |
| Restrictive Conditions | Earmark Statutory Use of Funds Limitation of Funds | Earmarks, Prohibitions, Reporting requirements, 'not to exceed', 'no funds' |
| Funding Riders | Reprogramming Limitation of Funds Minimum (dollar amount) Maximum (dollar amount) | Insert a specified funding amount for a particular purpose |
| Conditional Appropriations | Subject to | Specific project milestones, reports, or performance indicators |
| Advance Appropriations | Expire Remain available | Funds made available for obligation beyond the fiscal year in which the appropriations act is passed |

By monitoring the occurrence and context of these keywords in legislation, this study facilitates a systematic evaluation of congressional actions and assesses whether authorizers and appropriators are fulfilling their assigned duties and responsibilities. Legislative Keyword Definitions are reflected in Table 5. These keywords, derived from the literature review, will be used in a quantitative and qualitative textual analysis of authorizations and appropriation bills.

Table 5. Keyword Definitions

| Keyword/Phrase | Legislative Meaning |
|----------------------------|---|
| Establish | To formally create a program, agency, or funding authority within legislation. |
| Amend | To change, revise, or modify an existing law or appropriation. |
| Repeal | To formally revoke or cancel an existing law, funding provision, or authorization. |
| Emerge | Often associated with emergency provisions, referring to unexpected needs requiring funding. |
| Urgent | Legislative language indicating immediate action or priority funding. |
| Urgency | Similar to urgent, used to justify immediate appropriations or authorizations. |
| Expire | Termination of budget authority indicated at end of fiscal year or specific period after funds are no longer legally available for obligation or expenditure. |
| Remain Available | Appropriated funds obligated or expended beyond a standard fiscal period. |
| Earmark | A legislative provision that directs approved funds to be spent on specific projects. |
| Reprogramming | The shifting of funds from one authorized purpose to another within the same fiscal period. |
| Limitation of funds | Restrictions placed on how appropriated funds may be used. |
| Transfer | The movement of funds between different budget accounts or programs. |
| Subject to | A clause making appropriations or authorizations contingent on another provision or requirement. |
| Necessary | A justification for funding decisions, implying essential or required spending. |
| Prior Authorization | Funds or actions requiring prior approval through an NDAA or other legislative act. |
| Statutory | A legal requirement established by formal law or statute. |
| Use of funds | How appropriated or authorized funds are legally allowed to be spent. |
| Critical | A designation indicating priority funding, often for national security or defense purposes. |
| Mandate | A legislative directive requiring specific actions or funding allocations. |
| Minimum | A lower threshold for funding, obligations, or resource allocation. |
| Maximum | An upper limit for funding, obligations, or resource allocation. |
| Statutory | Legally binding language enacted by Congress that imposes obligations or restrictions on how federal funds are used or governed. |

III. METHODOLOGY

This methodology examines the allocation of legislative authority between the U.S. Congressional committees that oversee national defense policy and those that manage funding. Specifically, the study focuses on the House and Senate Armed Service Committees, which are responsible for authorization, and the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senates Appropriations Committee, which manage defense appropriations. The aim was to determine if these committees adhere to their designated roles or if legislative language indicates that jurisdictional boundaries are often blurred or lapsed. To accomplish this, the methodology adopted a multi-phase hybrid design. This was followed by a comprehensive literature review to examine prior research on federal appropriation and authorization processes, with a focus on identifying areas where various techniques had been utilized to examine committee behavior and organizational norms. The latter phases integrated quantitative text analysis. Particularly utilizing Python-based scripting to extract, quantify, and visualize linguistic patterns within official legislative documentation such as the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) and the Defense Appropriations Bills enacted from fiscal years 2020 through 2024. To ensure accurate interpretation, the FY2024 keyword search results were manually reviewed to distinguish “conforming” or “non-conforming” uses of keywords from instances that reflected substantive jurisdictional overreach, thereby refining the analysis to include only violations aligned with the study’s criteria for boundary encroachment. This method provided two key advantages: it integrates traditional legislative insights such as intended functions of committees with data science methodologies that enable a systematic and objective evaluation of behavior across jurisdiction.

A. GUIDING QUESTIONS

The methodology is structured around a few primary research questions, each of which is broken into specific sub-questions. These questions shaped how the data was organized and what analytical tools were used:



Primary Research Questions:

- 1. Accepting the literature’s claim that the de jure boundary between the authorizers and appropriators is violated, are there patterns in the provisions in the acts that reveal a de facto boundary?
- 1a. If so, what patterns have been prevalent throughout the past five fiscal years?
- 1b. If the patterns exist how many provisions are conforming versus non-conforming during FY2024?

Secondary Research Questions:

- 2. What is the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Defense Subcommittees of Appropriations?
- 2a. In what ways could either committee exceed their jurisdiction or violate chamber rules?
- 2b. What keywords in the legislation would help identify such violations?
- 2c. For fiscal year 2024, what evidence exists of such behavior by appropriators and authorizers?

The methodology was designed to integrate both qualitative and quantitative approaches to address the full spectrum of primary and secondary research questions. To answer questions 1, 1a, and 1b, Python scripts were developed to extract and analyze keyword frequency patterns across the NDAA and Appropriations Bills from fiscal years 2020 to 2024. This enabled the identification of recurring legislative language and evaluation of whether such patterns suggested a de facto boundary between authorizers and appropriators. To ensure accurate interpretation, the FY2024 keyword search results were manually reviewed to distinguish conforming or non-conforming uses of keywords from instances that reflected substantive jurisdictional overreach, thereby refining the analysis to include only violations aligned with the study’s criteria for boundary encroachment.

To address question 2, the methodology mapped the statutory responsibilities of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittees on Appropriations by comparing formal jurisdiction authorities with how those roles were functionally represented in legislation. For question 2a, feeds off questions 1a and 1b, the findings ruled conforming vs. non-conforming were separated into charts/tables that are further analyzed in Chapter IV. Finally, to answer questions 2b, a co-occurrence detection table was generated with inputs from the prior research question, which explains why certain occurrences may be deemed as conforming vs. non-conforming.



B. COLLECTING AND PREPARING THE DATA

The NDAA was sourced from Congress.gov, serving as the official representation of defense policy developed by authorizing committees. The Defense Appropriation Bills were collected from the Pentagon Library, which archives finalized language regarding defense funding. After gathering the documentation per fiscal year, each was stored in a well-organized digital environment using SharePoint folders, with local backup copies maintained. Each document underwent a manual review for accuracy before being imported into the spreadsheet software (Excel), where contents were organized into thematic categories.

C. EXTRACTING AND NORMALIZING KEYWORD DATA

With the keywords defined, the next phase of the research involved extracting said words or phrases from the legislative texts and organizing the findings in a structured format. To achieve this, all legislative PDFs were transformed into machine-readable formats utilizing custom Python scripts. These scripts, also known as code, scanned the complete text of each bill and documented details for each keyword occurrence, including the frequency of the term, the surrounding sentence for context, the related fiscal year and the document type where it was located. Each set of results was then saved as a CSV file, resulting in distinct spreadsheets for NDAA and Appropriations data spanning all five years.

Due to the variation in the length of legislative documents, relying only on raw keyword frequency could lead to misleading results. A longer bill may naturally include more instances of certain keywords, not necessarily indicating greater emphasis on those concepts, but rather reflecting the greater volume of text. To tackle this challenge, the study employed a normalization process using Python, which adjusted keyword counts based on the length of each document. This approach ensured that comparisons across different fiscal years and bill types remained meaningful and equitable. By normalizing the data, the analysis could accurately identify true shifts in legislative language patterns over time, avoiding the confusion of document size and emphasis. The normalized merged files are reflected in Table 6 and Python scripts available in Appendix A.



Table 6. Summary of Python Script Used

| Python Script | Purpose | Dataset Used | Visualization Type |
|------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|--------------------|
| appropriations_bar_chart.py | Appropriations keyword distribution (bar) | merged_appropriations_counts.csv | Bar Chart |
| appropriations_line_chart.py | Appropriations keyword trend over time (line) | merged_appropriations_counts.csv | Line Chart |
| ndaa_bar_chart.py | NDAA keyword distribution (bar) | merged_ndaa_counts.csv | Bar Chart |
| ndaa_line_chart.py | NDAA keyword trend over time (line) | merged_ndaa_counts.csv | Line Chart |
| overlay_line_chart.py | Appropriations vs. NDAA keyword comparison | Both merged datasets | Overlay Line Chart |

D. VISUALIZING KEYWORD TREND

After generating the normalized keyword data, the next step was to visualize the results using basic charting techniques. The research team created a series of bar and line charts to display the frequency of specific keywords across fiscal years 2020 through 2024. Bar charts were used to represent the total keyword counts for each year, broken down by bill type (NDAA versus Appropriations), while line charts helped display changes in keyword use over time. In addition, a side-by-side line chart was generated to compare NDAA and Appropriations keyword usage across the same fiscal periods.

These visualizations were intended solely to represent the raw keyword frequency data in a clear and structured format over the entirety of each document. No analytical claims or causal inferences were drawn from the charts themselves. Instead, they served as reference tools for understanding when and how often key terms appeared in legislative documents. All frequency trends identified in the charts are discussed in Chapter IV within the context of the raw data output.

E. REASONING FOR METHOD SELECTION

The choice to combine qualitative legislative review and computational text analysis was both strategic and essential, given the intricacies of congressional behavior and the nuanced ways in which intent is woven into legislative language. Relying solely

on traditional review methods often falls short in detecting subtle patterns within extensive, evolving tests. By integrating modern data science techniques, specifically Python-based keyword analysis, the study efficiently extracted and analyzed terms that reflect congressional priorities.

This computational strategy could allow for the quantification of behavioral trends over fiscal years, uncovering shifts in language that might otherwise remain unnoticed during manual reviews. Furthermore, the use of automated scripting ensured objectivity and reproducibility, minimizing biases associated with more interpretive or selectively sampled approaches. Ultimately, these methods were chosen not only to meet academic standards but also to enhance practical application. The approach could be used by congressional staff, Department of Defense analysts, future researchers and oversight organizations looking to assess whether legislative intent is effectively translated into funded actions.

The research was conducted solely using publicly accessible legislative documents, eliminating any privacy or security issues. However, ethical standards were rigorously maintained throughout the study to uphold its integrity and transparency. All data sources, Python scripts, and document origins have been meticulously documented and can be independently verified. Keyword selection was based on scholarly literature, and contextual excerpts were carefully reviewed to ensure accurate and fair interpretations. To facilitate replicability, all analytical scripts are included in Appendix A, allowing future researchers to reproduce or evaluate the methodology. While the findings may indicate trends suggesting committee overreach or role blending, the research design aimed to objectively reveal patterns in legislative behavior rather than understanding of how congressional committees communicate through formal texts and how these communications might reflect changing jurisdiction dynamics.

F. REFINING PROCESS

It is important to note that the utilization of the data script resulted in 2,149 total occurrences of keywords being flagged over the five-year period for the NDAA and 20,577 for the Appropriations Bills. Due to time limitations, we concentrated on just FY2024 for proof of concept. This involved a thorough manual review of both the



FY2024 NDAA (413-pings) and Appropriations Bills (1900-pings), where each keyword occurrence was analyzed in context using the source PDFs. These instances were then compiled into a detailed Excel file, completed with relevant content excerpts. A secondary qualitative review was performed, categorizing each occurrence as either jurisdictionally “non-conforming” or “conforming” usage, depending on its alignment with committee authorities. An explanatory rationale was provided for each categorization.

To further strengthen the credibility and consistency of the results, an inter-rater reliability process was employed. An independent reviewer assessed the same dataset, verifying the initial classifications. Any discrepancies between the primary and secondary evaluations were reconciled through discussion to ensure that the final categorization reflected a consistent and validated interpretation of the data. This step not only bolstered methodological rigor but also enhanced the researcher’s application and understanding of the analysis framework. For added procedural clarity, the Appropriations Bill was further refined by focusing on keyword occurrences within Title VIII: General Provisions, specifically the 8000-series where statutory funding restrictions and directives are predominantly found. This two-step filtering facilitated a concentrated evaluation of which research questions, while recognizing that not all keyword occurrence indicated a jurisdictional issue. The resulting chart of flagged “non-conforming” occurrences across both bills was then utilized to compare how each jurisdiction depth discussion of this chart and its implications can be found in Chapter IV. The source excels files used for this analysis are included in the appendices.

G. LIMITING FACTORS

Like any research study, this approach has its limitations that should be recognized. First, simply finding a keyword in a legislative document does not necessarily indicate a specific behavior or intent from a committee; legislative language requires contextual interpretation, and true intent must be inferred rather than taken for granted. The keyword search ensured comprehensiveness, while reducing the number of provisions that had to be manually reviewed.



Second, variations in document length and detail may influence keyword counts, even when normalization techniques are applied. Especially since each document tends to repeat and continue to grow density wise. The keyword search ensured comprehensiveness, while reducing the number of provisions that had to be manually reviewed.

Third, while the keyword list is based on academic literature, there remains an element of subjectivity in the selection, grouping and interpretation of terms; different researchers might reasonably establish different boundaries.

Fourth, one limitation of the current methodology lies in the keyword selection, which may not have captured all instances of jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions. Some provisions may have exhibited overreach without triggering any of the pre-defined keywords used in the automated analysis. For example, while terms like “minimum” and “maximum” were included in the NDAA keyword set, the word “limitation” or “limitations” frequently associated with appropriation-based constraints was omitted from the initial query. This oversight became apparent during the manual review phase, indicating that additional or alternative keywords could have improved detection accuracy and yielded a more comprehensive dataset.

Fifth, the analysis concentrated on same year comparisons between NDAAAs and Appropriations Bills, limiting the ability to track long-term patterns, especially when a policy is authorized in one year and funded in the next fiscal cycle.

Lastly, all data collection and analysis for this project was conducted on a single consumer-grade computer. While this was adequate for the primary scope of the study, more advanced computational resources could have allowed for a greater volume and complexity of data analysis, potentially facilitating deeper text comparisons, and more detailed keyword clustering. Enhanced equipment would likely produce even more detailed and reliable results. Despite these limitations, the methodology provides a robust, transparent, and data-driven basis for assessing jurisdictional alignment and trends in congressional legislative behavior.



H. SUMMARY

This methodology combined qualitative design with computational analysis to investigate potential jurisdictional crossover between the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Appropriations Bills for fiscal years 2020 through 2024. This research introduces a clear and replicable method for assessing the jurisdictional boundaries between Congressional authorizers and appropriators by examining legislative texts. Although the initial design featured similarity scoring and matched excerpt analysis, these elements were ultimately discarded due to concerns from the team about data validity and output reliability. Upon manual inspection, neither the automated similarity scoring nor the jurisdiction crossover excerpts show any alignment between the NDAA and Appropriations texts, primarily due to the constraints of the generated content (screenshot). In response, the methodology pivoted to more reliable tools, such as keyword co-occurrence tracking, document level frequency comparison, which produced clear, replicable insights and manual contextual validation of automated results.

Even with the removal of said sections, the final methodology retains significant academic and practical value. This process started with the extraction of jurisdictionally important keywords and their surrounding phrases from the original PDF files using a custom Python script (`keyword_analysis.py`) found in Appendix A. The results were exported into organized CSV files, consolidated by fiscal year and bill type later normalized to account for variations in document length. Subsequently, visualization scripts including bar and line chart generators were utilized to identify changes in keyword usage over time. This study retained its power to detect linguistic patterns and explore where and when the language was used.

This study offers a scalable framework for evaluating whether legislative language reflects formal jurisdictional roles or suggests a de facto blurring of committee boundaries by the human interloop of post-processing. For legislative purposes, the methodology creates a usable tool for tracking whether authorizers and appropriators are reinforcing each other's priorities or working at cross purposes. Collectively, these steps created a transparent, reproducible analytical framework for identifying and visualizing



potential violations of jurisdiction and rule-based distinctions between Congressional Authorizers and Appropriators.



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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the findings derived from the analysis conducted to address the research questions outlined earlier. It begins with the results of the quantitative analysis, highlighting keyword frequency patterns observed in appropriations and authorizations from FY2020 to FY2024. This is followed by a discussion of the trends identified within the data. The chapter then narrows its focus to a detailed qualitative examination of the FY2024 authorizations and appropriations, generating complementary quantitative insights. Finally, the research questions are revisited and answered in light of the findings presented.

1. Appropriations Keyword Frequency

Table 7 presents the number of times each searched keyword appeared in the appropriations bills from FY20 through FY24. The least commonly used phrase was “limitation of funds” followed by “urgency.” Whereas the most used words were “transfer” and “amend.” During FY21 and FY23 in appropriations bills underscores periods of significant fiscal restructuring and emergency fund reallocation. In FY21 (BILLS-116hr133enr), the high occurrence of “Establish” and “Amend” suggests extensive legislative efforts to create new funding mechanisms and modify existing financial structures in response to post Covid-19 economic recovery requirements. Similarly, in FY23 (BILLS-117hr2617enr), there was another noticeable increase in “Amend” and “Transfer” activities, which corresponds with the Ukraine conflict and escalating defense expenditures. This situation requires budget adjustments and emergency appropriations to effectively support national security objectives. The presence of “Reprogramming” further reinforces the notion that funds were redirected towards new priorities, potentially highlighting shifts in global defense strategy and inflationary adjustments in military spending.



Table 7. Appropriations Keyword Frequencies

| APPROPRIATIONS KEYWORD FREQUENCIES | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| KEYWORDS | .\BILLS-116hr1158enr FY2020 | .\BILLS-116hr133enr FY2021 | .\BILLS-117hr2471enr FY2022 | .\BILLS-117hr2617enr FY2023 | .\BILLS-118hr2882eah FY2024 |
| Establish | 70 | 1120 | 452 | 814 | 125 |
| Amend | 52 | 2061 | 632 | 1814 | 106 |
| Repeal | 0 | 69 | 8 | 24 | 5 |
| Emerge | 158 | 1116 | 360 | 656 | 144 |
| Urgent | 3 | 10 | 11 | 8 | 3 |
| Urgency | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Earmark | 0 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 1 |
| Reprogramming | 50 | 108 | 105 | 108 | 47 |
| Limitation of funds | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Transfer | 366 | 1274 | 1079 | 1207 | 548 |
| Subject to | 33 | 616 | 280 | 515 | 136 |
| Necessary | 308 | 1163 | 912 | 1093 | 419 |

Key observations of the appropriations data in Figure 5 demonstrate a shift in FY21 and FY23. The line chart highlights trends in keyword use. This chart highlights patterns in keyword usage, showing increases, declines, or stability across fiscal years. The sharp peak aligns with Covid-19 response and Ukraine related defense spending. A sharp decline in FY24 shows potential stabilization or reduction in amendments and fund transfers. The goal of this chart was to emphasize year-to-year shifts in keywords emphasized to make it easier to detect in legislative focus.




Figure 5. Keyword Trend Over Fiscal Years (Line Chart)—Appropriations Data

2. NDAA Keyword Frequency

FY21 (PLAW-116-283 NDAA) trend analysis in Table 8 identifies “Critical,” “Minimum,” and “Maximum” in high counts, suggesting a funding threshold likely for pandemic related national security concerns. Also, in FY21 the increase usage of “Statutory” indicates a reliance on legal mandates to structure emergency funding. FY23 (PLAW-117-263 NDAA) reflects high usage of “Critical” (258 uses) and “Mandate” (58 uses), suggesting Ukraine military aid, supply chain issues, and restructuring military policy in response to geopolitical shifts. In addition to this this fiscal year contained consolidated authorization. Another increase during that year was the number of “Statutory” (42) and “Use of funds” (53) suggests strict oversight over allocated funds such as defense contracts and procurement limitations.

Table 8. NDAA Keyword Frequencies

| NDAA KEYWORD FREQUENCIES | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| KEYWORD | .\PLAW-116-92_NDAA FY2020 | .\PLAW-116-283_NDAA FY2021 | .\PLAW-117-81_NDAA FY2022 | .\PLAW-117-263_NDAA FY2023 | .\PLAW-118-31_NDAA FY2024 |
| Prior Authorization | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Statutory | 25 | 36 | 24 | 42 | 24 |
| Use of funds | 43 | 53 | 27 | 53 | 36 |
| Critical | 101 | 254 | 182 | 258 | 206 |
| Mandate | 7 | 6 | 4 | 58 | 10 |
| Minimum | 66 | 107 | 49 | 104 | 104 |
| Maximum | 40 | 52 | 43 | 101 | 33 |

Figure 6 traces keyword usage trends over time, emphasizing how certain terms fluctuate in significance within NDAA documents. “Mandate” and “Maximum” exhibit significant spikes in FY21 and FY23, while other terms such as “Use of funds” and “Statutory” show more consistent usage. The shaded areas surrounding each line indicate the variance, showcasing fiscal years with either concentrated or diverse language. FY23 displays the widest range across most keywords, suggesting a potentially more intricate legislative environment. Overall, the chart demonstrates yearly shifts in legislative focus.




Figure 6. Keyword Trend Over Fiscal Years (Line Chart)—NDAA Data

3. Jurisdiction Crossover

a. Narrowed Contextual Analysis

To refine the analysis and better assess jurisdictional behavior, the research team added two additional keywords, “expire” and “remain available” seen in Table 9, to the FY2024 Appropriations data search. These terms were selected based on their recurring presence in funding directives and their relevance to appropriations-specific statutory constraints, particularly in Title VIII: General Provisions. Their inclusion aimed to improve the sensitivity of the dataset by capturing language tied to time-limited appropriations and fund availability, which often signal fiscal control mechanisms. This adjustment followed the same rationale described at the end of Chapter II: to ensure that the keyword set adequately reflected both authorizing and appropriating functions as expressed in legislative text. Although the initial automated frequency analysis suggested broader overreach by the Appropriations Committee, subsequent refinement revealed that jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions were present in both the NDAA and Appropriations Bills, as shown in Appendix B. For example, while “expire” appeared 12

times across the full text, it was found only once in the more procedurally significant 8000-series, highlighting the importance of context in interpreting keyword frequencies.

Table 9. FY24 Appropriations Keyword Frequencies

| FY24 APPROPRIATIONS KEYWORD FREQUENCIES | |
|--|--------------|
| Keyword | Count |
| Establish | 125 |
| Expire | 12 |
| Amend | 106 |
| Repeal | 5 |
| Emerge | 144 |
| Urgent | 3 |
| Urgency | 2 |
| Earmark | 1 |
| Remain Available | 352 |
| Reprogramming | 47 |
| Limitation of funds | 0 |
| Transfer | 548 |
| Subject to | 136 |
| Necessary | 419 |

b. Qualitative Analysis

To validate the database-driven keywords results, the research team read the excerpts of the bills within the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Appropriations Bill. Focusing on the 8000-series and Department of Defense (DoD) sections, each keyword identified by the automated Python scan was reviewed in context. This refinement process narrowed the list of actual violations. The initial findings: manual analysis identified 15 instances of jurisdictionally “non-conforming” provisions in the NDAA (10.34% of 145 keyword hits) and 5 instances in the Appropriations Bill (5.21% of 96 hits), as illustrated in Figure 7.

A suggested non-conforming provision that was flagged from the use of “subject to,” from the FY2024 Appropriations Bill follows:

SEC. 8021. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Air Force may convey at no cost to the Air Force, without consideration, to Indian tribes located in the States of Nevada, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Oregon, Minnesota, and



Washington relocatable military housing units located at Grand Forks Air Force Base, Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Ellsworth Air Force Base, and Minot Air Force Base that are excess to the needs of the Air Force.(b) The Secretary of the Air Force shall convey, at no cost to the Air Force, military housing units under subsection (a) in accordance with the request for such units that are submitted to the Secretary by the Operation Walking Shield Program on behalf of Indian tribes located in the States of Nevada, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Oregon, Minnesota, and Washington. Any such conveyance shall be subject to the condition that the housing units shall be removed within a reasonable period of time, as determined by the Secretary. (H.R. 2882–118th Cong. 2024)

SEC. 8021 was flagged as jurisdictionally non-conforming because the entire section functions as a policy directive, which falls outside the appropriators’ formal jurisdiction. While the phrase “subject to” initially triggered the keyword match, further review during the contextual analysis and confirmation from the inter-rater process confirmed that the full provision represents an attempt by appropriators to assert policy-level control, an authority reserved for the authorizers. Thus, the entire section was identified as non-conforming, with the keyword serving as a discovery point rather than the sole issue.

A jurisdictionally conforming use of the same term, “subject to,” can be seen in SEC. 8006. of the 2024 Appropriations Bill:

SEC. 8006. (a) With regard to the list of specific programs, projects, and activities (and the dollar amounts and adjustments to budget activities corresponding to such programs, projects, and activities) contained in the tables titled Explanation of Project Level Adjustments in the explanatory statement regarding this Act and the tables contained in the classified annex accompanying this Act, the obligation and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available in this Act for those programs, projects, and activities for which the amounts appropriated exceed the amounts requested are hereby required by law to be carried out in the manner provided by such tables to the same extent as if the tables were included in the text of this Act. (b) Amounts specified in the referenced tables described in subsection (a) shall not be treated as subdivisions of appropriations for purposes of section 8005 of this Act: Provided, That section 8005 of this Act shall apply when transfers of the amounts described in subsection (a) occur between appropriation accounts, subject to the limitation in subsection (c): Provided further, That the transfer amount limitation provided in section 8005 of this Act shall not apply to transfers of amounts described in subsection (a) if such transfers are



necessary for the proper execution of such funds. (c) During the current fiscal year, amounts specified in the referenced tables in titles III and IV of this Act described in subsection (a) may not be transferred pursuant to section 8005 of this Act other than for proper execution of such amounts, as provided in subsection (b). (H.R. 2882–118th Cong. 2024)

While the use of “subject to” is located within this section, there is not additional policy entered within the provision; therefore, it is found to be conforming. All the context for the conforming and non-conforming uses of the terms can be found in Appendix B.

These findings underscore the value of qualitative human analysis, which served to refine the automated dataset by filtering out conforming keyword occurrences and isolating only those that reflected procedural non-compliance. Full excerpts from the FY2024 NDAA and Appropriations Bill are provided in Appendix B.




Figure 7. FY2024 Keyword Instances by Bill Type

The qualitative review refined the dataset by removing non-DoD content and reclassifying conforming keyword usage, significantly reducing the number of potential jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions initially identified by automated analysis. In FY2024 NDAA, non-conforming instances were reduced from an initial automated count of 145 down to 15, a refinement of approximately 89.66%. In the FY2024 Defense

Appropriations Bill, the count dropped from 96 to 5, representing a reduction of 94.79%. These reductions, shown in Tables 10 and 11 and visually represented in Figure 7, underscore the importance of manual contextual analysis in filtering out procedural language that may appear noncompliant at first glance but aligns with standard legislative practice upon review.

Table 10. FY2024 Appropriations Keyword Frequency

| Keyword | Frequency |
|------------------|-----------|
| Amend | 3 |
| Establish | 17 |
| Expire | 1 |
| Necessary | 14 |
| Remain Available | 13 |
| Reprogramming | 5 |
| Subject to | 6 |
| Transfer | 36 |
| Urgent | 1 |
| | 96 |

Table 11. FY2024 NDAA Keyword Frequency

| Keywords | Frequency |
|--------------|-----------|
| Critical | 46 |
| Mandate | 4 |
| Maximum | 18 |
| Minimum | 39 |
| Statutory | 19 |
| Use of Funds | 19 |
| | 145 |

The qualitative review demonstrated that the use of targeted keywords and phrases is a viable method for enhancing Congressional review of legislation in support of procedural transparency. This method enabled the identification of instances of jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions, which aligned with specific keywords listed in Tables 12 and 13. During manual review, the research team found that several provisions within the Appropriations Bill and the NDAA contained one or more of these flagged keywords, as documented in Appendix B. As previously noted, the NDAA contained a higher volume of keyword instances and a correspondingly greater number of



non-conforming provisions, with 10.34% of occurrences deemed out of jurisdiction. The team further analyzed these instances to determine which keywords most frequently correlated with jurisdictional overreach by Congressional committees. This distribution of keyword-triggered non-conforming provisions is illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. This process also demonstrated the efficiency of using keyword filters as a front-end screening method. Across all five fiscal years, the automated scripts initially identified 2,149 keyword hits in the NDAA and 20,577 in the Appropriations Bills. Narrowed results to FY2024 413 keyword hits in the NDAA and 1900 in the Appropriations Bill. However, after applying filters and manual validation, only 145 NDAA provisions and 96 Appropriations provisions required qualitative review. This represents a workload reduction of over 98%, significantly reducing the manual burden and allowing the research team to focus on the most contextually relevant legislative content.

Table 12. FY2024 NDAA Non-conforming Summary by Keyword and Section

| Keyword | Section | Final analysis |
|--------------|---------|----------------|
| Critical | 576 | Non-conforming |
| Mandate | 1041 | Non-conforming |
| Mandate | 1048 | Non-conforming |
| Maximum | 2817 | Non-conforming |
| Minimum | 2856 | Non-conforming |
| Statutory | 348 | Non-conforming |
| Statutory | 1305 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1031 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1032 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1033 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1034 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1045 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1048 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 1353 | Non-conforming |
| Use of Funds | 2889 | Non-conforming |



Table 13. FY2024 Appropriations Non-conforming Summary by Keyword and Provision

| Keyword | Provision | Final Analysis |
|------------|-----------|----------------|
| Establish | 8041 | Non-conforming |
| Establish | 8049 | Non-conforming |
| Establish | 8055 | Non-conforming |
| Subject To | 8021 | Non-conforming |
| Transfer | 8043 | Non-conforming |




Figure 8. FY2024 NDAA Non-conforming




Figure 9. FY2024 Appropriations Non-conforming

As Logan (2009) suggests, authorizers do not typically rely on statutory constraints to delineate their responsibilities from those of appropriators. However, this research demonstrates that statutory requirements can, in practice, function as legislative constraints on appropriations—at times embedding partisan mandates into policy beyond their original scope. Four instances in the FY2024 NDAA sample featured the use of “statutory” or “mandate” language within legislative sections, indicating potential overreach. In addition, authorizers were found to employ funding riders—such as minimums, maximums, and “use of funds” clauses—that extend beyond their jurisdictional mandate of establishing or maintaining programs and policies. These types of funding limitations accounted for 66.67% of all identified non-conforming provisions in FY2024. Notably, the phrase “limitation” had appeared in 60% of the identified non-conforming provisions, suggesting its potential value as an indicator of procedural overreach. However, this phrase was not included in the original keyword set used for the automated analysis of the NDAA. Future keyword modeling may benefit from incorporating such contextually significant terms to improve the detection of jurisdictional misalignments.

While keywords such as “minimum,” “maximum,” and “critical” appeared frequently, they were not consistently strong indicators of procedural misconduct. In contrast, the Appropriations Act reflected a lower rate of non-conforming provisions (5.21%), and visual review showed a clearer pattern of appropriators refraining from directing how funds should be raised or reallocated, functions typically reserved for authorizers. This finding challenges the prevailing assumption that appropriators are the primary source of jurisdictional boundary violations.

Aherne (2024) previously noted that the term “establish” is sometimes used in appropriations legislation to bypass the authorizing process. In this dataset, “establish” appeared in 60% of the Appropriations non-conforming cases, despite the limited sample size. Notably, the term “shall” appeared in all five appropriation provisions identified as non-conforming; however, due to its frequent presence in conforming provisions, it did not emerge as a reliable indicator of non-conforming provisions.

Overall, the analysis suggests that in FY2024, authorizers more frequently employed language that encroached upon fiscal responsibilities, potentially introducing constraints or funding conditions within policy legislation. These findings underscore the value of human-led validation in uncovering subtle jurisdictional overreach and reinforce the broader thesis that both chambers contribute to the erosion of clearly defined boundaries between authorization and appropriation processes.

B. SUMMARY

Chapter IV examined the evolving differences between authorizations and appropriations in the United States defense legislation from FY2020 to FY2024. By utilizing a blend of automated keyword frequency analysis and manual contextual validation, the research uncovered consistent patterns of jurisdictional overlap between the National Defense Authorization Acts and the Defense Appropriations Bills. While initial automated results indicated that the Appropriations Committees held a wider influence, further manual analysis, particularly of Title VIII: General Provisions, showed that the NDAA had more instances of jurisdictionally “non-conforming” provisions compared to the Appropriations Bills for FY2024. This revelation challenged existing



assumptions regarding which committees most frequently overstepped their formal boundaries.

The analysis revealed that external factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine, significantly influenced spikes in legislative language activity, particularly during FY21 and FY23. FY24 indicates signs of stabilization yet still exhibited notable jurisdictional encroachments. Ultimately, the study confirmed that although the de jure separation between policy (authorizers) and funding (appropriators) is formally established, in practice, both committee types often blur these lines, incorporating implicit authority within their legislation. Manual review played a crucial role in uncovering the subtle behaviors, underscoring the necessity of qualitative validation in addition to quantitative methods.



V. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this research was to investigate whether blurred boundary exists between authorizers and appropriators in congressional defense funding. FY2024 findings revealed the NDAA contained more instances of non-conforming provisions (15) than the Defense Appropriations Bill (5). The fact that the authorization bill had more non-conforming provisions than the appropriations bill challenges conventional assumptions that the appropriators are more prone to cross their jurisdictional boundary. The analysis demonstrates a method of automated analysis that flagged a broad range of potential violations, qualitative review that narrowed the dataset substantially, resulting in the potential for shaving time in reviewing future committee behavior. Additionally, these results point to a more complex and reciprocal pattern of boundary-blurring behavior than previously emphasized in the literature.

B. ANSWER TO RESEARCH QUESTION

1. Accepting the literature's claim that the de jure boundary between the authorizers and appropriators is violated, are there patterns in the provisions in the acts that reveal a de facto boundary?

Due to no qualitative review was conducted for FY2020-FY2023, no conclusions can be drawn about patterns of non-conformity in those years. Only FY2024 provides a valid basis for assessing how congressional committees assert or exceed their jurisdiction through legislative language.

- 1a. If so, what patterns have been prevalent throughout the past five fiscal years?

At this stage, the analysis is limited to identifying patterns in keyword occurrences, which may suggest—but do not confirm—underlying trends of non-conformity. A more comprehensive qualitative analysis is required to substantiate such interpretations.

FY20 showed relatively modest keyword activity and the highest overall alignment between NDAA and Appropriations language, likely results of pre-pandemic procedural regularity.



FY21 exhibited the most pronounced spike in the authorizer side directive language, especially in keywords like “mandate,” “statutory,” and “critical.” This suggests a year of assertive policy expansion, possibly linked to emerging post-COVID priorities.

FY22 Appropriations documents used “subject to” and “transfer” at high levels, indicating that appropriators responded to FY2021’s suggesting legislative adjustments and oversight verse constraint.

FY23 stayed moderately consistent, but not peaking. The imbalance suggests growing differences. The same keywords such as “establish,” “subject to,” and “transfer” appeared in both bill types with nearly equal frequency, reflecting either tighter collaboration or growing jurisdictional blurring.

FY24 saw a decline in all key terms, potentially signaling a normalization phase of backlog resolution from previous high-activity years. FY24 was also the election year.

1b. If the patterns exist how many are conforming versus non-conforming during FY2024?

Since the correlation is not definitive at this time the answer will focus on how many instances of jurisdictionally non-conforming provisions occurred during the analysis of FY24, represented in Figure 8 and Figure 9.

2. What is the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Defense Subcommittees of Appropriations?

In Sections A and B of Chapter II the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and Defense Subcommittees of Appropriations was thoroughly discussed.

2a. In what ways could either committee exceed their jurisdiction or violate chamber rules?

As part of Section D of Chapter II, the development of keywords was grounded in insights drawn from the literature review. The readings identified specific ways in which each committee could potentially exceed or violate its jurisdictional boundaries, and these conceptualizations informed the construction of the keyword set.

2b. For fiscal year 2024, what evidence exists of such behavior by appropriators and authorizers?



In FY2024, several provisions within the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) were identified as jurisdictionally non-conforming—not solely due to keyword frequency but based on how policy-oriented language functioned to imply fiscal control. Of the 145 keyword instances identified in the NDAA, 15 were ultimately classified as non-conforming. In comparison, the Appropriations Bill yielded 5 such instances out of 96 keyword occurrences. These patterns suggest that jurisdictional overreach can occur in both directions: appropriators may incorporate conditional or directive language that shapes policy, while authorizers may embed fiscal constraints or employ terminology typically reserved for appropriations law.

This analysis underscores that the issue lies not in the presence of a keyword per se, but in its legislative context and intended purpose. To this end, Tables 12 and 13 summarize the identified instances of non-conforming keyword usage within the FY2024 NDAA and Appropriations Bill. The analysis assessed 14 keywords or phrases within the Appropriations Bill, several of which are more commonly associated with authorization. While both authorizers and appropriators occasionally crossed jurisdictional boundaries, the findings demonstrate a greater frequency and consistency of encroachment on the part of authorizers. Specifically, the NDAA exhibited more cases in which policy provisions encroached upon fiscal territory, supporting the conclusion that, in FY2024, authorizers engaged in more measurable jurisdictional overreach than appropriators.

C. LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY

Like any research endeavor, this study encountered several limitations that deserve recognition: interpretation of legislative language, variations in document characteristics, potential bias in analysis, specific comparison focus, and undocumented legislative actions. The mere presence of a keyword in a legislative document does not automatically imply specific behaviors or intentions from a committee. Contextual interpretation is essential, and actual intent must be inferred rather than taken for granted. Differences in document length and detail may have affected keyword frequencies, even after normalization efforts. This issue is further exacerbated by the tendency of legislative documents to increase in size and complexity over time due to repetitive content unless significant changes are made.



Although the keyword list was based on academic literature, there may have been some bias introduced during the analysis of the database in Chapter IV, term grouping, and interpretation. Additionally, researcher subjectivity in defining boundaries may have influenced the findings. Another constraint of the methodology was the initial selection of keywords, which may not have fully captured all instances of jurisdictional misconduct. Some provisions might have indicated overreach without triggering any of the pre-defined keywords utilized in the automated analysis. For example, “limitation” or “limitations” often linked to appropriations-based constraints. This gap became apparent during the manual review process. A broader or more refined keyword set could have enhanced detection accuracy and yielded a more comprehensive dataset.

The analysis concentrated on comparing NDAAs and Appropriations Bills within the same fiscal years, which restricted the ability to observe longer-term trends, particularly when a policy is authorized in one year and funded in a later cycle. While the Python scripts utilized in the methodology were deliberately broad (capturing keyword frequencies and matches throughout the entirety of each legislative document) this strategy aimed to provide a thorough initial overview of relevant language. However, this expansive approach also meant that not all findings were directly connected to jurisdictional overreach as seen in Appendix B. To address this, the FY2024 Appropriations data was further refined by concentrating on keyword occurrences within Title VIII: General Provisions. This focused review allowed the research team to zero in on the most procedurally significant provisions pertinent to the research questions, while acknowledging that not every keyword occurrence indicated a jurisdictional issue. Not all legislative actions are publicly recorded. Informal negotiations, points of order, oral agreements, and the influence of committee members with dual roles depicted in Figure 5, may have shaped outcomes that are not captured in the final language of the bill. Despite these constraints, the combination of board automated analysis and targeted manual validation offered a well-rounded and credible foundation for evaluating jurisdictional patterns and shaping the study’s conclusions.



D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

To build on the findings of this study and address its methodological constraints, future research should pursue several key directions. First, while keyword frequency provides a useful quantitative proxy, it cannot substitute for context-sensitive interpretation. Future studies should incorporate qualitative methodologies—such as content analysis—to better capture legislative intent.

Second, to account for variations in document length and repetitive language future work should implement more sophisticated normalization techniques. These could include weighting keyword frequency by word count or page length, using TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document frequency) to adjust for overrepresented but less meaningful terms, or applying natural language processing (NLP) tools to detect and de-duplicate boilerplate text sections. Such techniques would help ensure more accurate comparisons across bills of varying size and structure.

Third, to mitigate potential biases in keyword selection and categorization, researchers should consider using interdisciplinary expert validation, or inter-coder reliability testing to strengthen construct validity of the coding being performed. A common word throughout the 15 non-conforming provisions was “limitation,” which occurred nine times. The importance of this common word is traditionally associated with appropriations language used to control how funds are spent, yet it appeared frequently in authorizing legislation. Its presence in the NDAA suggests that policy drafters may be embedding fiscal restrictions in a way that blurs jurisdictional lines, reinforcing the study’s central claim that overreach is not exclusive to appropriators. Additionally, utilizing “limitation” as a keyword to search the authorizations may yield other non-conforming provisions that were not found during our data extraction, as it was not used as a keyword during our search of the NDAA.

Fourth, extending the analysis beyond single-year comparisons of National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) and Appropriations Bills could enable a more dynamic, longitudinal understanding of the policy cycle, particularly in cases where legislative authorization and funding are temporally decoupled. Finally, to capture the full spectrum of legislative influence, future research should triangulate bill text analysis



with other data sources—such as committee transcripts, staff interviews, committee reports, and internal communications—to illuminate the informal processes and power dynamics, including the dual roles of committee members (as illustrated in Figure 5), that shape final legislative outcomes but often remain undocumented. Such methodological enhancements would not only address the limitations identified here but also contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of legislative behavior in Defense policymaking.

E. SUMMARY

This thesis set out to examine the legislative dynamics shaping U.S. Defense policy, using keyword-based text analysis to assess the evolving language of the NDAA's and Appropriations Bills. The findings reveal significant patterns in how congressional committees engage with defense policy, highlighting both consistencies and divergences in authorization and funding discourse. In doing so, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship between legislative intent, policy implementation, and institutional behavior. While the methodological approach provides valuable insights, it also underscores the challenges of interpreting legislative texts absent broader contextual data. Nevertheless, by integrating computational tools with political analysis, this work offers a foundation for future research to explore the subtleties of legislative influence, particularly in domains characterized by complexity, confidentiality, and strategic ambiguity. Continued inquiry in this area will be essential as the legislative branch plays an increasingly critical role in shaping the U.S. strategic posture in a multipolar world and, a more refined study may create an opportunity for simplified transparency.



APPENDIX A. PYTHON SCRIPTS

A. EXTRACT_TEXT_FROM_PDFS.PY

```
import os
import pdfplumber
import pandas as pd
import re

# Define folder containing PDFs
pdf_folder = r"C:\Users\britt\OneDrive - Naval Postgraduate School\Documents\py4e"

# Define CSV output file
csv_output = os.path.join(pdf_folder, "extracted_text_data_filtered.csv")

# Initialize data storage
data = []

# Define the relevant naming patterns for Appropriations & NDAA PDFs
relevant_patterns = [
    r'BILLS-116hr\d+enr FY2020\.pdf',
    r'BILLS-116hr\d+enr FY2021\.pdf',
    r'BILLS-117hr\d+enr FY2022\.pdf',
    r'BILLS-117hr\d+enr FY2023\.pdf',
    r'BILLS-118hr\d+enr FY2024\.pdf',
    r'PLAW-116-\d+_NDAA FY2020\.pdf',
    r'PLAW-117-\d+_NDAA FY2021\.pdf',
    r'PLAW-117-\d+_NDAA FY2022\.pdf',
    r'PLAW-117-\d+_NDAA FY2023\.pdf',
    r'PLAW-118-\d+_NDAA FY2024\.pdf',
    r'BILLS-118publ047_Further Consolidated Appropriations FY2024\.pdf' # Newly added!
]

# Extract text from PDFs
for filename in os.listdir(pdf_folder):
    if any(re.match(pattern, filename) for pattern in relevant_patterns): # Only process relevant PDFs
        pdf_path = os.path.join(pdf_folder, filename)
        try:
            with pdfplumber.open(pdf_path) as pdf:
                text = "\n".join([page.extract_text() for page in pdf.pages if page.extract_text()])
                data.append({"PDF File": filename, "Extracted Text": text[:1000]}) # Store first 1000 characters
                print(f"Extracted text from {filename}")
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"ERROR extracting text from {filename}: {e}")

# Convert to DataFrame and Save
df = pd.DataFrame(data)
df.to_csv(csv_output, index=False, encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")

# Show output confirmation
print(f"Extracted text saved to: {csv_output}")
print(df.head()) # Show the first few rows
```

B. KEYWORD_ANALYSIS.PY CODE



✕ Text Extraction and Keyword Pr...

```

1 import os
2 import pdfplumber
3 import pandas as pd
4 import re
5 import pdf2image
6 import pytesseract
7 from PIL import Image
8 from collections import Counter
9
10 # Define folder path containing PDFs
11 pdf_folder = r"C:\Users\britt\OneDrive - Naval Postgraduate School\Documents\py4e"
12
13 # Debug: Check if the folder exists
14 if not os.path.exists(pdf_folder):
15     print(f"✗ ERROR: Folder does not exist: {pdf_folder}")
16     exit()
17
18 # Print detected files
19 print("\n📁 Checking files in:", pdf_folder)
20 try:
21     files_in_directory = os.listdir(pdf_folder)
22     print("📄 Found Files:", files_in_directory) # List all files in directory
23 except Exception as e:
24     print(f"✗ ERROR: Unable to list directory contents: {e}")
25     exit()
26
27 # Define keywords for each category
28 appropriations_keywords = [
29     "Establish", "Amend", "Repeal", "Emerge", "Urgent", "Urgency",
30     "Earmark", "Reprogramming", "Limitation of funds", "Transfer",
31     "Subject to", "Necessary"
32 ]
33
34 ndaa_keywords = [
35     "Prior Authorization", "Statutory", "Use of funds",
36     "Critical", "Mandate", "Minimum", "Maximum"
37 ]
38
39 # Function to extract text from PDFs
40 def extract_text_from_pdf(pdf_path):
41     text = ""
42     try:
43         with pdfplumber.open(pdf_path) as pdf:
44             for page_num in range(len(pdf.pages)): # Process each page separately
45                 page = pdf.pages[page_num]
46                 extracted_text = page.extract_text()
47                 if extracted_text:
48                     text += f"[[Page {page_num + 1}]]\n" + extracted_text + "\n"
49
50     if not text.strip():
51         raise ValueError(f"⚠ No text detected in {os.path.basename(pdf_path)} - Trying OCR!")
52
53     except Exception as e:
54         print(f"✗ ERROR extracting text from {pdf_path}: {e}")
55
56     # ✗ OCR Fallback for Scanned PDFs
57     print(f"🔍 Running OCR on {os.path.basename(pdf_path)}")
58     try:
59         images = pdf2image.convert_from_path(pdf_path)
60         for i, img in enumerate(images):
61             extracted_text = pytesseract.image_to_string(img)
62             text += f"[[Page {i + 1}]]\n" + extracted_text + "\n"
63     except Exception as ocr_error:
64         print(f"✗ OCR Failed for {pdf_path}: {ocr_error}")
65
66     return text.lower()
67
68 # Function to count keyword occurrences

```



```

X Text Extraction and Keyword Pr...
70 """Counts occurrences of each keyword in the text."""
71 word_counts = Counter()
72 for word in keywords:
73     word_counts[word] = text.count(word.lower())
74 return word_counts
75
76 # Function to extract keyword context with APA citation
77 def extract_keyword_context(text, keywords, pdf_name, window=50):
78     results = []
79     text_lines = text.split("\n") # Split text into lines
80
81     # Page Number Tracking
82     page_map = {} # Stores word positions and corresponding page numbers
83     current_page = None # Track the current page
84
85     # Map word positions to page numbers
86     for line_num, line in enumerate(text_lines):
87         # Detect page number markers
88         page_match = re.search(r"\[Page (\d+)\]", line)
89         if page_match:
90             current_page = int(page_match.group(1)) # Update current page
91
92         # Store keyword positions with page numbers
93         for keyword in keywords:
94             for match in re.finditer(rf"\b{re.escape(keyword.lower())}\b", line, re.IGNORECASE):
95                 position = match.start()
96                 page_map[position] = current_page if current_page else "Unknown"
97
98     # Extract context and assign page numbers
99     for keyword in keywords:
100         pattern = rf"\b{re.escape(keyword.lower())}\b"
101         matches = list(re.finditer(pattern, text, re.IGNORECASE))
102
103         for match in matches:
104             start, end = match.start(), match.end()
105             context_snippet = text[max(0, start - window): min(len(text), end + window)]
106
107             # Get the closest page number for the keyword position
108             keyword_page = page_map.get(start, "Unknown")
109
110             # APA Citation Format
111             citation = f"({pdf_name}, p. {keyword_page})" if keyword_page != "Unknown" else f"({pdf_name})"
112             results.append((keyword, context_snippet, citation))
113
114     return results
115
116 # Function to save keyword definitions
117 def generate_definitions_csv(pdf_name, keywords):
118     definitions_dict = {
119         "Keyword": keywords,
120         "Definition": [
121             "To create or formally bring into existence" if "Establish" in k else
122             "To modify or revise an existing law, regulation, or provision" if "Amend" in k else
123             "To revoke, rescind, or officially eliminate a law or provision" if "Repeal" in k else
124             "Refers to the need for legal approval before taking an action" if "Prior Authorization" in k else
125             "No legal definition found"
126             for k in keywords
127         ]
128     }
129     df_definitions = pd.DataFrame(definitions_dict)
130     df_definitions.to_csv(os.path.join(pdf_folder, f"{pdf_name}_definitions.csv"), index=False)
131
132 # Loop through all PDFs and process **only Appropriations or NDAA files**
133 for filename in files_in_directory:
134     if filename.endswith(".pdf"):
135         print(f"Checking: {filename}") # Debugging statement
136
137         pdf_path = os.path.join(pdf_folder, filename)
138         pdf_name = os.path.splitext(filename)[0]

```



```

140 # Determine document type based on file naming patterns
141 if re.search(r'\b(Appropriations|BILLS-|Consolidated|General Provision)\b', filename, re.IGNORECASE):
142     keywords = appropriations_keywords
143     output_label = "Appropriations"
144 elif re.search(r'\b(NDAA|PLAW)\b', filename, re.IGNORECASE):
145     keywords = ndaa_keywords
146     output_label = "NDAA"
147 else:
148     print(f"⚠ Skipping {filename} (No match for Appropriations or NDAA)")
149     continue # Skip files that are neither Appropriations nor NDAA
150
151 print(f"\n🔍 Processing {output_label} File: {filename}")
152
153 # Extract text
154 text = extract_text_from_pdf(pdf_path)
155
156 # ✅ Keyword Counts
157 keyword_counts = count_keywords(text, keywords)
158 df_counts = pd.DataFrame(keyword_counts.items(), columns=["Keyword", "Count"])
159 df_counts.to_csv(os.path.join(pdf_folder, f'{pdf_name}_{output_label}_counts.csv'), index=False)
160
161 # ✅ Keyword Contexts (with APA-style citations)
162 keyword_contexts = extract_keyword_context(text, keywords, pdf_name)
163 df_contexts = pd.DataFrame(keyword_contexts, columns=["Keyword", "Context", "Citation"])
164 df_contexts.to_csv(os.path.join(pdf_folder, f'{pdf_name}_{output_label}_contexts.csv'), index=False)
165
166 # ✅ Keyword Definitions
167 generate_definitions_csv(pdf_name, keywords)
168
169 print(f"✅ Finished processing {filename}")
170

```



C. MERGE_KEYWORD_COUNTS.PY CODE

```
import os
import re
import pandas as pd

# ✅ Define the folder containing CSV files
csv_folder = r"C:\Users\briitt\OneDrive - Naval Postgraduate School\Documents\py4e"

# ✅ List all CSV files that contain keyword counts
csv_files = [f for f in os.listdir(csv_folder) if f.endswith("_counts.csv")]

# ✅ Function to extract Fiscal Year from filename
def extract_fiscal_year(filename):
    match = re.search(r"FY(\d{4})", filename) # Looks for 'FY2023', 'FY2020' etc.
    return match.group(1) if match else "Unknown"

# ✅ Initialize empty lists to store DataFrames
appropriations_dfs = []
ndaa_dfs = []

# ✅ Loop through and process each CSV
for file in csv_files:
    file_path = os.path.join(csv_folder, file)
    df = pd.read_csv(file_path)

    # ✅ Extract fiscal year
    fiscal_year = extract_fiscal_year(file)

    # ✅ Identify and filter relevant files
    if any(bill in file for bill in ["BILLS-116", "BILLS-117", "BILLS-118"]) and "Appropriations" in file:
        df["Bill Type"] = "Appropriations"
        appropriations_dfs.append(df)
    elif "NDAA" in file and fiscal_year in ["2020", "2021", "2022", "2023", "2024"]:
        df["Bill Type"] = "NDAA"
        ndaa_dfs.append(df)

    # ✅ Add extracted Fiscal Year column
    df["Fiscal Year"] = fiscal_year # 🔥 Ensuring this column is added
    df["Source File"] = file # Store filename for reference

# ✅ Merge all Appropriations DataFrames
if appropriations_dfs:
    merged_appropriations_df = pd.concat(appropriations_dfs, ignore_index=True)
    output_path_appropriations = os.path.join(csv_folder, "merged_appropriations_counts.csv")
    merged_appropriations_df.to_csv(output_path_appropriations, index=False)
    print(f"✅ Merged Appropriations CSV saved to {output_path_appropriations}")

# ✅ Merge all NDAA DataFrames
if ndaa_dfs:
    merged_ndaa_df = pd.concat(ndaa_dfs, ignore_index=True)
    output_path_ndaa = os.path.join(csv_folder, "merged_ndaa_counts.csv")
    merged_ndaa_df.to_csv(output_path_ndaa, index=False)
    print(f"✅ Merged NDAA CSV saved to {output_path_ndaa}")

# ✅ Exit if no relevant files found
if not appropriations_dfs and not ndaa_dfs:
    print("⚠️ No relevant CSV files found! Exiting script.")
```



D. KEYWORD_FREQUENCY_ANALYSIS.PY CODE

```
import pandas as pd
import glob

# Define keyword lists
appropriations_keywords = [
    "Establish", "Amend", "Repeal", "Emerge", "Urgent", "Urgency",
    "Earmark", "Reprogramming", "Limitation of funds", "Transfer",
    "Subject to", "Necessary"
]

ndaa_keywords = [
    "Prior Authorization", "Statutory", "Use of funds",
    "Critical", "Mandate", "Minimum", "Maximum"
]

# Load all appropriations and NDAA keyword frequency files
appropriations_files = glob.glob(".*Appropriations_counts.csv")
daa_files = glob.glob(".*NDAA_counts.csv")

# Create empty dataframes for output
appropriations_output = pd.DataFrame(index=appropriations_keywords)
daa_output = pd.DataFrame(index=ndaa_keywords)

# Process Appropriations files
for file in appropriations_files:
    df = pd.read_csv(file)
    source_name = file.split("/")[-1].replace("_Appropriations_counts.csv", "") # Extract
    source name

    # Create a new column for this source
    appropriations_output[source_name] = 0 # Default to zero occurrences

    for keyword in appropriations_keywords:
        if keyword in df.iloc[:, 0].values:
            keyword_counts = pd.to_numeric(df[df.iloc[:, 0] == keyword].iloc[:,
1:].values.flatten(), errors='coerce').sum()
            appropriations_output.at[keyword, source_name] = keyword_counts

# Process NDAA files
for file in daa_files:
    df = pd.read_csv(file)
    source_name = file.split("/")[-1].replace("_NDAA_counts.csv", "") # Extract source name

    # Create a new column for this source
    daa_output[source_name] = 0 # Default to zero occurrences

    for keyword in ndaa_keywords:
        if keyword in df.iloc[:, 0].values:
            keyword_counts = pd.to_numeric(df[df.iloc[:, 0] == keyword].iloc[:,
1:].values.flatten(), errors='coerce').sum()
            daa_output.at[keyword, source_name] = keyword_counts

# Save the formatted output
appropriations_output.to_csv("formatted_appropriations_keyword_frequencies.csv")
daa_output.to_csv("formatted_ndaa_keyword_frequencies.csv")

print("Saved: formatted_appropriations_keyword_frequencies.csv and
formatted_ndaa_keyword_frequencies.csv")
```



E. APPROPRIATIONS_BAR_CHART.PY

```
python Copy Edit

import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns

# ☒ Load the data
file_path = "merged_appropriations_counts.csv"
df = pd.read_csv(file_path)

# ☒ Ensure 'Fiscal Year' is numeric
df["Fiscal Year"] = pd.to_numeric(df["Fiscal Year"], errors="coerce").astype(int)

# ☒ Create Bar Chart
plt.figure(figsize=(18, 10))
sns.barplot(data=df, x="Fiscal Year", y="Count", hue="Keyword", dodge=True)

# ☒ Formatting
plt.title("Keyword Frequency by Fiscal Year (Bar Chart) - Appropriations Data")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Keyword Frequency")
plt.xticks(rotation=45)
plt.legend(title="Keywords", bbox_to_anchor=(1.05, 1), loc='upper left')
plt.grid(axis='y')

# ☒ Show plot
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
```



F. APPROPRIATIONS_LINE_CHART.PY

Keyword Trend Analysis ▾

```
import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns
import numpy as np

# ✓ Load the data
file_path = "merged_appropriations_counts.csv"
df = pd.read_csv(file_path)

# ✓ Ensure 'Fiscal Year' is numeric and sorted
df["Fiscal Year"] = pd.to_numeric(df["Fiscal Year"], errors="coerce").astype(int)
df = df.sort_values("Fiscal Year") # Ensure chronological order

# ✓ Create Line Chart
plt.figure(figsize=(18, 10))
sns.lineplot(data=df, x="Fiscal Year", y="Count", hue="Keyword", marker="o", linewidth=2)

# ✓ Formatting
plt.title("Keyword Trend Over Fiscal Years (Line Chart) - Appropriations Data")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Frequency")

# ✓ Ensure x-axis only shows whole numbers (no .5 years)
plt.xticks(ticks=np.arange(df["Fiscal Year"].min(), df["Fiscal Year"].max() + 1, 1), fontsize=12)

plt.legend(title="Keywords", bbox_to_anchor=(1.05, 1), loc='upper left')
plt.grid(True)

# ✓ Show plot
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
```



G. NDAA_BAR_CHART.PY

```
python                                                                    Copy Edit

import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns

# ✓ Load the filtered NDAA data
file_path = "merged_ndaa_counts.csv" # Ensure this file exists
df = pd.read_csv(file_path)

# ✓ Convert 'Fiscal Year' to numeric
df["Fiscal Year"] = pd.to_numeric(df["Fiscal Year"], errors="coerce").astype("Int64")

# ✓ Set figure size
plt.figure(figsize=(18, 10))

# ✓ Create Bar Chart
sns.barplot(
    data=df,
    x="Fiscal Year",
    y="Count",
    hue="Keyword",
    dodge=True,
    palette="magma" # Adjust color style
)

# ✓ Formatting
plt.title("Keyword Frequency by Fiscal Year (Bar Chart) - NDAA Data")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Keyword Frequency")
plt.xticks(rotation=45)
plt.legend(title="Keywords", bbox_to_anchor=(1.05, 1), loc="upper left")
plt.grid(axis="y", linestyle="--")

# ✓ Show plot
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
```



H. NDAA_LINE_CHART.PY

```
python                                                                    Copy Edit

import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns
import numpy as np

# ✓ Load the data
file_path = "merged_ndaa_counts.csv"
df = pd.read_csv(file_path)

# ✓ Ensure 'Fiscal Year' is numeric and remove non-whole years
df["Fiscal Year"] = pd.to_numeric(df["Fiscal Year"], errors="coerce").astype(int)
df = df.sort_values("Fiscal Year")

# ✓ Set figure size
plt.figure(figsize=(16, 10))

# ✓ Create Line Plot
sns.lineplot(
    data=df,
    x="Fiscal Year",
    y="Count",
    hue="Keyword",
    marker="o",
    linewidth=2
)

# ✓ Formatting
plt.xticks(
    ticks=np.arange(df["Fiscal Year"].min(), df["Fiscal Year"].max() + 1, 1),
    fontsize=12
) # Ensure only whole years appear

plt.title("Keyword Trend Over Fiscal Years (Line Chart) - NDAA Data", fontsize=14)
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year", fontsize=12)
plt.ylabel("Frequency", fontsize=12)

# ✓ Improved legend
plt.legend(title="Keywords", bbox_to_anchor=(1.05, 1), loc="upper left", fontsize=10)

# ✓ Show plot
plt.tight_layout()
plt.show()
```



I. OVERLAY_LINE_CHART.PY

```
Python Code to Generate Overlay Line Chart

python Copy Edit

import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

# ☒ Load the datasets
file_paths = {
    "Appropriations": "merged_appropriations_counts.csv",
    "NDAA": "merged_ndaa_counts.csv"
}

# ☒ Prepare data storage
trend_data = {}

for label, path in file_paths.items():
    df = pd.read_csv(path)

    # Ensure correct column names
    if "Fiscal Year" not in df.columns or "Count" not in df.columns:
        print(f"✗ ERROR: Missing required columns in {label} dataset!")
        continue

    # Summarize total keyword frequency by year
    yearly_totals = df.groupby("Fiscal Year")["Count"].sum()
    trend_data[label] = yearly_totals

# ☒ Convert to DataFrame
df_trends = pd.DataFrame(trend_data)

# ☒ Plot the overlay line chart
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 6))
for column in df_trends.columns:
    plt.plot(df_trends.index, df_trends[column], marker="o", label=column, linewidth=2)

plt.title("Appropriations vs. NDAA Keyword Frequency Trends (2020-2024)")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Total Keyword Frequency")
plt.xticks(df_trends.index) # Ensure only whole years
plt.legend(title="Bill Type")
plt.grid(True)

# ☒ Show Plot
plt.show()
```



J. DEEP_DIVE_ANALYSIS.PY CODE

```
import pandas as pd

# ✅ Load datasets
file_paths = {
    "Appropriations": "merged_appropriations_counts.csv",
    "NDAA": "merged_ndaa_counts.csv"
}

summary_data = []

for label, path in file_paths.items():
    df = pd.read_csv(path)

    # Ensure correct columns exist
    if "Fiscal Year" not in df.columns or "Keyword" not in df.columns or "Count" not in df.columns:
        print(f"❌ ERROR: Missing required columns in {label} dataset!")
        continue

    # ✅ Compute total frequency per year
    yearly_totals = df.groupby("Fiscal Year")["Count"].sum().reset_index()
    yearly_totals["Bill Type"] = label

    # ✅ Find top keywords per year
    top_keywords = df.groupby(["Fiscal Year", "Keyword"])["Count"].sum().reset_index()
    top_keywords = top_keywords.sort_values(["Fiscal Year", "Count"], ascending=[True, False])

    # ✅ Get the most frequent keyword per year
    top_per_year = top_keywords.groupby("Fiscal Year").first().reset_index()
    top_per_year["Bill Type"] = label
    top_per_year = top_per_year.rename(columns={"Keyword": "Top Keyword", "Count": "Top Keyword Count"})

    # ✅ Merge total counts with top keywords
    final_summary = yearly_totals.merge(top_per_year, on=["Fiscal Year", "Bill Type"])
    summary_data.append(final_summary)

# ✅ Combine results
df_summary = pd.concat(summary_data)

# ✅ Save as CSV
df_summary.to_csv("keyword_trend_summary.csv", index=False)

# ✅ Show results
print("\n🔥 Keyword Trend Summary (Appropriations vs. NDAA)")
print(df_summary)
```



K. KEYWORD_TREND_ANALYSIS.PY (VISUALIZATION) CODE

```
import pandas as pd
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import seaborn as sns

# ✅ Load the keyword trend data
file_path = "your_keyword_trend_data.csv" # Update this with your actual file name
df = pd.read_csv(file_path)

# ✅ Convert Fiscal Year to integer
df["Fiscal Year"] = pd.to_numeric(df["Fiscal Year"], errors="coerce").astype("Int64")

# ✅ Set visualization style
sns.set_style("whitegrid")

# 🐞 **1. Bar Chart: Total Keyword Frequency by Fiscal Year**
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 6))
sns.barplot(data=df, x="Fiscal Year", y="Count", hue="Bill Type", dodge=True)
plt.title("Total Keyword Frequency by Fiscal Year")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Keyword Frequency")
plt.legend(title="Bill Type")
plt.xticks(rotation=45)
plt.show()

# 🐞 **2. Grouped Bar Chart: Top Keywords by Bill Type**
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 6))
sns.barplot(data=df, x="Fiscal Year", y="Top Keyword Count", hue="Bill Type", dodge=True)
plt.title("Top Keyword Count by Fiscal Year and Bill Type")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Top Keyword Frequency")
plt.legend(title="Bill Type")
plt.xticks(rotation=45)
plt.show()

# 🐞 **3. Line Chart: Keyword Trends Over Time**
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 6))
sns.lineplot(data=df, x="Fiscal Year", y="Top Keyword Count", hue="Top Keyword", style="Bill Type", marker="o")
plt.title("Top Keyword Trends Over Time (Appropriations vs. NDAA)")
plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
plt.ylabel("Keyword Frequency")
plt.legend(title="Top Keyword", bbox_to_anchor=(1.05, 1), loc='upper left')
plt.xticks(rotation=45)
plt.grid(True)
plt.show()
```



L. FINAL_FILTERED_BY_SIDE_BAR_CHART.PY CODE

```
X Fiscal Year Bar Chart Generation v

1 import pandas as pd
2 import re
3 import seaborn as sns
4 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
5
6 # Load cleaned dataset with extracted source and target excerpts
7 df1 = pd.read_csv("final_approp_to_ndaa_excerpts.csv")
8 df2 = pd.read_csv("final_ndaa_to_approp_excerpts.csv")
9
10 # Combine the two datasets and assign bill types
11 df1["Bill Type"] = "Appropriations"
12 df2["Bill Type"] = "NDAA"
13 combined_df = pd.concat([df1, df2], ignore_index=True)
14
15 # Combine source and target excerpts for year search
16 combined_df["Combined Text"] = combined_df["Source Excerpt"].fillna('') + " " + combined_df["Target Excerpt"].fillna('')
17
18 # Extract all 4-digit years from the combined text
19 combined_df["Extracted Years"] = combined_df["Combined Text"].apply(
20     lambda text: re.findall(r'\b(20[2-4][0-9]|2020|2021|2022|2023|2024)\b', str(text))
21 )
22
23 # Explode the extracted years for proper counting
24 exploded_df = combined_df.explode("Extracted Years")
25
26 # Convert to numeric and filter for 2020-2024 only
27 exploded_df["Extracted Years"] = pd.to_numeric(exploded_df["Extracted Years"], errors='coerce')
28 filtered_df = exploded_df[exploded_df["Extracted Years"].between(2020, 2024)]
29
30 # Count frequencies by Fiscal Year and Bill Type
31 counts = filtered_df.groupby(["Extracted Years", "Bill Type"]).size().unstack(fill_value=0).reset_index()
32 counts.columns.name = None
33
34 # Plotting
35 plt.figure(figsize=(10, 6))
36 melted = counts.melt(id_vars="Extracted Years", var_name="Bill Type", value_name="Total Matches")
37 sns.barplot(data=melted, x="Extracted Years", y="Total Matches", hue="Bill Type")
38
39 plt.title("Jurisdictional Crossovers by Fiscal Year (2020-2024)")
40 plt.xlabel("Fiscal Year")
41 plt.ylabel("Total Matches (Crossover Frequency)")
42 plt.legend(title="Bill Type")
43 plt.xticks(rotation=45)
44 plt.tight_layout()
45 plt.savefig("final_filtered_fy_bar_chart.png")
46 plt.show()
47
```



APPENDIX B. FY2024 APPROPRIATIONS AND NDAA CONTEXT EXCERPT ANALYSIS

A. FY2024 APPROPRIATIONS BILL CONTEXT EXCERPT ANALYSIS

| Keyword | Provision | .\BILLS-118hr2882eahFY2024 | Final analysis |
|------------------|-----------|---|----------------|
| Establish | 8026 | SEC. 8026. (a) None of the funds appropriated in this Act are available to establish a new Department of Defense (department) federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), either as a new entity, or as a separate entity administered by an organization managing another FFRDC, or as a nonprofit membership corporation consisting of a consortium of other FFRDCs and other non-profit entities. (b) Except when acting in a technical advisory capacity, no member of a Board of Directors, Trustees, Overseers, Advisory Group, Special Issues Panel, Visiting Committee, or any similar entity of a defense FFRDC, or any entity that contracts with the Federal government to manage or operate one or more FFRDCs, or any paid consultant to a defense FFRDC shall receive funds appropriated by this Act as compensation for services as a member of such entity; Provided, That a member of any such entity shall be allowed travel expenses and per diem as authorized under the Federal Joint Travel Regulations, when engaged in the performance of membership duties; Provided further, That except when acting in a technical advisory capacity, no paid consultant shall receive funds appropriated by this Act as compensation by more than one FFRDC in a calendar year. | Conforming |
| Remain Available | 8034 | SEC. 8034. In addition to any other funds made available for such purposes, there is appropriated \$50,000,000, for an additional amount for the "National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund", to remain available until September 30, 2026 , for activities pursuant to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 96 et seq.); Provided, That none of the funds provided under this section may be obligated or expended until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense provides the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a detailed execution plan for such funds. | Conforming |
| Necessary | 8039 | SEC. 8039. During the current fiscal year, appropriations which are available to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance may be used to purchase items having an investment item unit cost of not more than \$350,000; Provided, That upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary to meet the operational requirements of a Commander of a Combatant Command engaged in a named contingency operation overseas, such funds may be used to purchase items having an investment item unit cost of not more than \$500,000. | Conforming |
| Establish | 8041 | SEC. 8041. The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations to prohibit the sale of any tobacco or tobacco-related products in military resale outlets in the United States, its territories and possessions at a price below the most competitive price in the local community; Provided, That such regulations shall direct that the prices of tobacco or tobacco related products in overseas military retail outlets shall be within the range of prices established for military retail system stores located in the United States. | Non-conforming |
| Transfer x3 | 8043 | SEC. 8043. None of the funds appropriated by this Act for programs of the Central Intelligence Agency shall re-main available for obligation beyond the current fiscal year, except for funds appropriated for the Reserve for Contingencies, which shall remain available until September 30, 2025; Provided, That funds appropriated, transferred, or otherwise credited to the Central Intelligence Agency Central Services Working Capital Fund during this or any prior or subsequent fiscal year shall remain available until expended ; Provided further, That any funds appropriated or transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency for advanced research and development acquisition, for agent operations, and for covert action programs authorized by the President under section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093) shall remain available until September 30, 2025; Provided further, That any funds appropriated or transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency for the construction, improvement, or alteration of facilities, including leased facilities, to be used primarily by personnel of the intelligence community, shall remain available until September 30, 2026 | Non-conforming |



B. FY2024 NDAA CONTEXT EXCERPT ANALYSIS

| Keyword | PLAW-188-31-NDAA FY2024 | Final analysis |
|------------|--|----------------|
| Minimum x2 | SEC. 2831. DESIGN STANDARDS FOR COVERED MILITARY UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING. (a) UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR FLOOR SPACE AND NUMBER OF MEMBERS ALLOWED.—(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 2856 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—(A) in the section heading, by striking “local comparability of floor areas” and inserting “standards”; (B) by striking “in” and inserting “(a) LOCAL COMPARABILITY IN FLOOR AREAS.—In”; (C) in subsection (a), as designated by subparagraph (B)—(i) by inserting “, except for purposes of meeting minimum area requirements under subsection (b)(1)(A),” after “in that locality”; and (ii) by inserting “covered” before “military unaccompanied housing”; and (D) by adding at the end the following new subsections: “(b) FLOOR SPACE AND NUMBER OF MEMBERS ALLOWED.—In the design and configuration of covered military unaccompanied housing, the Secretary of Defense shall establish uniform design standards that—“(1) provide a minimum area of floor space, not including bathrooms or closets, per individual occupying a unit of covered military unaccompanied housing; “(2) ensure that not more than two individuals may occupy such a unit; and “(3) provide definitions and measures that specify—“(A) criteria of design; “(B) quality of construction material to be used; and “(C) levels of maintenance to be required. | Conforming |
| Minimum x2 | “§ 2856b. Covered military unaccompanied housing: standards for habitability “(a) STANDARDS REQUIRED.—For the purposes of assigning a member of the armed forces to a unit of covered military unaccompanied housing, the Secretary of Defense shall establish uniform minimum standards for covered military unaccompanied housing, that shall include minimum requirements for—“(1) condition; “(2) habitability, health, and environmental comfort; “(3) safety and security; and “(4) any other element the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.” (b) LIMITATION ON ISSUANCE OF WAIVERS.—Any waiver of a uniform standard described in subsection (a) may only be issued by a Secretary of a military department.”. (b) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense develops the uniform standards under section 2856b of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)), the Secretary of Defense shall issue to each Secretary of a military department guidance on such uniform standards. | Conforming |
| Minimum | “§ 2856a. Covered military unaccompanied housing: waivers of covered privacy and configuration standards “(c) COVERED PRIVACY AND CONFIGURATION STANDARD DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘covered privacy and configuration standard’ means the minimum standards for privacy and configuration applicable to covered military unaccompanied housing described in Department of Defense Manual 4165.63 titled ‘DoD Housing Management’ and dated October 28, 2010 (or a successor document).”. (c) TEMPORARY BIENNIAL BRIEFING ON WAIVERS; LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—(1) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 30 days after the submission of the budget of the President to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, and on a biennial basis thereafter until the date that is two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, each Secretary of a military department shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on waivers of covered privacy and configuration standards pursuant to section 2856a of title 10, United States Code, for covered military unaccompanied housing under the jurisdiction of that Secretary that includes—(A) the number, disaggregated by military installation, of waivers in effect as of the date of such briefing relating to occupancy; (B) a list of each waiver described in subparagraph (A) that includes—(i) an identification of the official who approved each such waiver, (ii) a description of the military necessity underlying each such waiver, and (iii) a statement of the period each such waiver is effective; and (C) an identification of the number of members of the Armed Forces that reside in covered military unaccompanied housing subject to a waiver described in such subparagraph. (2) LIMITATIONS.—(A) OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal 2024 for Administration and Service-wide Activities, operations and maintenance, Army, not more than 75 percent may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of the Army provides the first respective briefing described in paragraph (1). (B) OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal 2024 for Administration and Service-wide Activities, operations and maintenance, Navy, not more than 75 percent may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of the Navy provides the first respective briefing described in such paragraph. (C) OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal 2024 for Administration and Service-wide Activities, operations and maintenance, Air Force, not more than 75 percent may be obligated or expended until the Secretary of the Air Force provides the first respective briefing described in such paragraph. | Non-conforming |
| Minimum | SEC. 2835. PILOT PROGRAM FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS TO REPLACE CERTAIN COVERED MILITARY UNACCOMPANIED HOUSING FACILITIES. (a) IN GENERAL.—Each Secretary of a military department may carry out a pilot program under which each such Secretary administers a military construction project, not otherwise authorized by law, to replace a covered military unaccompanied housing facility—(1) that such Secretary determines is not in compliance with the uniform standards for covered military unaccompanied housing under section 2856b of title 10, United States Code (as added by section 2832); and (2) for which the total cost of a repair project to bring such covered military unaccompanied facility into compliance with such uniform standards exceeds 75 percent of the total cost of such a military construction project. (b) FACILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A facility constructed pursuant to a military construction project under a pilot program under subsection (a)—(1) with respect to the covered military unaccompanied housing facility such facility replaces—(A) may not have a capacity to house more members of the Armed Forces; (B) shall be designed and utilized for the same purpose; and (C) shall be located on the same military installation; and (2) shall be designed to meet, at a minimum, standards for construction, utilization, and force protection. | Conforming |



C. FY24 APPROPRIATION PROVISIONS ALIGNED TO KEYWORD

| Provision | Keyword |
|-------------|---|
| 8003 | Remain Available |
| 8005 | Necessary Reprogramming Transfer |
| 8006 | Necessary Subject to Transfer |
| 8007 | Establish Necessary Reprogramming Transfer |
| 8008 | Establish Necessary Transfer |
| 8012 | Establish |
| 8014 | Necessary |
| 8015 | Transfer |
| 8021 | Subject To |
| 8026 | Establish |
| 8034 | Remain Available |
| 8039 | Necessary |
| 8041 | Establish |
| 8043 | Remain Available Transfer |
| 8044 | Establish Transfer |
| 8049 | Establish |
| 8050 | Transfer |
| 8052 | Transfer |
| 8054 | Transfer |
| 8055 | Establish |
| 8062 | Transfer |
| 8064 | Necessary Remain Available Transfer |
| 8066 | Transfer |
| 8067 | Establish Transfer |



| Provision | Keyword |
|-----------|---|
| 8068 | Remain Available |
| 8069 | Transfer Establish |
| 8072 | Amend Subject To Transfer |
| 8074 | Transfer |
| 8078 | Expire Necessary Transfer |
| 8079 | Establish |
| 8080 | Amend |
| 8081 | Remain Available |
| 8083 | Establish Necessary Reprogramming Transfer |
| 8084 | Transfer |
| 8085 | Reprogramming Transfer Urgent |
| 8086 | Subject To |
| 8087 | Necessary |
| 8088 | Transfer |
| 8091 | Necessary Reprogramming Transfer |
| 8092 | Establish Remain Available Transfer |
| 8095 | Transfer |
| 8096 | Remain Available |
| 8099 | Amend Establish Transfer |
| 8101 | Establish Necessary |
| 8103 | Necessary |
| 8105 | Transfer |



| Provision | Keyword |
|-----------|--|
| 8109 | Remain Available |
| 8110 | Remain Available |
| 8114 | Transfer |
| 8115 | Transfer |
| 8116 | Transfer |
| 8117 | Remain Available |
| 8120 | Subject To Transfer |
| 8124 | Establish |
| 8125 | Transfer |
| 8131 | Transfer |
| 8139 | Subject To |
| 8140 | Establish Necessary Remain Available |
| 8144 | Transfer |
| 8145 | Transfer |
| 8148 | Remain Available Transfer |

*Words in red indicate it was flagged as non-conforming

D. FY24 NDAA SECTIONS ALIGNED TO KEYWORD

| Section | Keyword |
|---------|-----------|
| 4 | Statutory |
| 15 | Critical |
| 121 | Minimum |
| 123 | Maximum |
| 127 | Minimum |
| 132 | Minimum |
| 133 | Minimum |
| 134 | Minimum |
| 137 | Minimum |
| 148 | Critical |



| Section | Keyword |
|------------|---------------------|
| 149 | Critical |
| 152 | Critical |
| 214 | Critical |
| 220 | Maximum |
| 223 | Critical Minimum |
| 224 | Critical Minimum |
| 226 | Minimum |
| 227 | Critical |
| 228 | Minimum |
| 233 | Critical |
| 242 | Critical |
| 243 | Critical |
| 244 | Critical |
| 245 | Critical |
| 305 | Critical |
| 348 | Statutory |
| 352 | Minimum |
| 367 | Critical |
| 391 | Critical |
| 413 | Minimum |
| 414 | Maximum |
| 502 | Critical |
| 509 | Maximum Minimum |
| 576 | Critical |
| 577 | Minimum |
| 588 | Minimum |
| 592 | Use of Funds |
| 613 | Critical |
| 627 | Maximum |
| 654 | Minimum |
| 835 | Critical |
| 842 | Statutory |
| 851 | Maximum |
| 856 | Critical |
| 860 | Critical |
| 902 | Critical |



| Section | Keyword |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| 904 | Minimum |
| 1016 | Critical |
| 1031 | Use of Funds |
| 1032 | Use of Funds |
| 1033 | Use of Funds |
| 1034 | Use of Funds |
| 1041 | Mandate |
| 1045 | Use of Funds |
| 1048 | Mandate Use of Funds |
| 1061 | Use of Funds |
| 1064 | Minimum |
| 1080 | Critical |
| 1091 | Statutory |
| 1104 | Critical |
| 1113 | Minimum |
| 1114 | Mandate |
| 1203 | Critical |
| 1204 | Minimum |
| 1211 | Minimum |
| 1221 | Minimum |
| 1230 | Statutory |
| 1250 | Critical Use of Funds |
| 1273 | Statutory |
| 1305 | Statutory |
| 1306 | Minimum |
| 1309 | Statutory |
| 1310 | Use of Funds |
| 1313 | Minimum |
| 1317 | Minimum |
| 1352 | Use of Funds |



| Section | Keyword |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1353 | Statutory Use of Funds |
| 1411 | Critical Maximum |
| 1412 | Critical |
| 1413 | Critical |
| 1414 | Critical |
| 1502 | Statutory |
| 1511 | Critical |
| 1514 | Critical |
| 1516 | Minimum |
| 1517 | Critical |
| 1519 | Critical |
| 1519 | Minimum |
| 1527 | Minimum |
| 1534 | Minimum |
| 1535 | Critical |
| 1544 | Statutory |
| 1552 | Maximum |
| 1601 | Maximum |
| 1604 | Critical |
| 1611 | Minimum |
| 1621 | Use of Funds |
| 1645 | Use of Funds |
| 1669 | Minimum |
| 1687 | Use of Funds |
| 1690 | Critical |
| 1736 | Critical |
| 1803 | Critical |
| 1829 | Critical |
| 1831 | Use of Funds |
| 1841 | Use of Funds |
| 2809 | Maximum |
| 2811 | Critical |



| Section | Keyword |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| 2817 | Maximum Minimum |
| 2817 | Minimum |
| 2821 | Minimum |
| 2824 | Minimum |
| 2831 | Minimum |
| 2834 | Mandate |
| 2835 | Minimum |
| 2853 | Critical |
| 2856 | Minimum |
| 2874 | Maximum |
| 2875 | Maximum Minimum |
| 2889 | Use of Funds |
| 3123 | Critical |
| 3131 | Critical Maximum |
| 3535 | Maximum |
| 5302 | Statutory |
| 7324 | Statutory |
| 15103 | Maximum |
| 15106 | Maximum |
| N/A | Statutory |
| N/A | Statutory |
| N/A | Statutory |
| N/A | Statutory |
| N/A | Statutory |
| N/A | Statutory |
| N/A | Use of Funds |

*Words in red indicate it was flagged as non-conforming



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