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Assessing the Impact of U.S. Economic Nationalist Policies on Department of Defense Contracting Patterns

December 2025

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Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943.

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, the U.S. government has implemented a series of economic nationalist policies to bolster domestic manufacturing and reduce reliance on foreign suppliers in support of national defense. These efforts, particularly within the Department of Defense (DoD), are intended to enhance supply chain resilience and strengthen the defense industrial base. However, it remains unclear whether such policies have resulted in measurable shifts in DoD contracting behavior, especially in terms of awarding contracts to U.S.-based manufacturers. This study addresses this knowledge gap by analyzing trends in DoD manufacturing contracts from 2008 to 2024, evaluating the impact of these policies on procurement outcomes, and assessing their alignment with broader national security objectives. The findings indicate that while domestic sourcing remained consistently high across the period of analysis, recent domestic preference initiatives primarily influenced the composition of contract awards rather than the overall distribution of procurement spending. As a result, procurement outcomes only partially align with national security goals to reduce foreign reliance, suggesting that sustained progress will require reinforcing procurement preferences with long-term industrial investment, supply chain transparency, and capability development.



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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AECA	Arms Export Control Act
BA	Berry Amendment
BAA	Buy American Act
BTS	Bureau of Transportation Statistics
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CHIPS	Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSET	Center for Security and Emerging Technology
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DBB	Defense Business Board
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
DoD	Department of Defense
DODIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOJ	Department of Justice
DPA	Defense Production Act
EO	Executive Order
ERP	Economic Report of the President
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
GAO	Government Accountability Office
FPDS	Federal Procurement Data System
FY	Fiscal Year
H.R.	House of Representatives Bill
IF	In Focus
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IN	Insight
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulations
MIAO	Made in America Office
MQA	Microelectronics Quantifiable Assurance
NAICS	North American Industry Classification System



NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NEC	National Economic Council
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIP	Office of Industrial Policy
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PCB	Printed Circuit Board
PSC	Product Service Code
R&D	Research and Development
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
U.S.	United States
USC	United States Code



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examines whether a recent wave of U.S. economic nationalist policies have materially changed how the Department of Defense sources manufactured goods and whether those changes advance stated national security and industrial base objectives. Using manufacturing contracts from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2024, the research evaluates how the number, value, and composition of awards to U.S. versus foreign suppliers has evolved alongside key policy milestones, including Buy American Act reforms, executive orders, and successive National Defense Authorization Act provisions. The primary focus of the research is on determining whether these policies have produced measurable shifts in sourcing patterns that meaningfully reduce foreign reliance in areas critical to defense readiness.

The analysis relies on prime contract data from USASPENDING.gov for North American Industry Classification System 31 through 33 manufacturing codes. Contracts are classified as domestic or foreign based on place of performance and further divided into “contestable” and “non-contestable” product and service codes, reflecting whether items are reasonably open to global sourcing or are expected to be produced in the United States. The study constructs annual series for obligations, contract counts, and average contract values by subcategory, and then examines patterns over time and across major policy periods, while treating the fiscal year 2013 through 2016 sequestration era as a confounding fiscal shock. The mixed-methods design combines this quantitative trend analysis with qualitative assessment of how observed patterns align with the strategic aims of recent industrial base and supply-chain initiatives.

Across the full period, the obligation data indicates a consistent reliance on U.S. manufacturers. Total domestic obligations for manufacturing remain stable at roughly 90 to 95 percent of annual spending, with foreign suppliers consistently accounting for a single digit share that averages around eight percent. Within this stable aggregate, however, the composition of domestic obligations fluctuates significantly between contestable and non-contestable categories. The most notable shift occurs in fiscal years 2021 and 2022, when contestable obligations rise sharply and non-contestable obligations decline, coinciding



with Executive Order 14005, strengthened Buy American content thresholds, and NDAA provisions targeting printed circuit boards and electronics supply-chain risks. However, this pattern proves temporary as in fiscal years 2023 and 2024, contestable and non-contestable share revert toward earlier levels even as total manufacturing obligations reach series highs. Taken together, these results indicate that recent policies affected how obligations were distributed within the domestic portfolio but did not generate a sustained increase in the overall domestic share or a durable decline in foreign obligations.

Contract count trends tell a more directional story about participation. After data reporting stabilized in fiscal year 2016, U.S. contestable contracts steadily increase both in absolute terms and as a share of total awards, while U.S. non-contestable contracts gradually decline as a share of the total. This suggests that domestic competitive participation has broadened over time, consistent with policy efforts to tighten waiver oversight and reinforce opportunities for U.S. producers in sectors that could otherwise be served by foreign suppliers. At the same time, the count of foreign non-contestable contracts remains relatively small and declines, but the average size of these awards has grown rapidly. By fiscal year 2024, foreign non-contestable contracts are substantially more expensive on a per-award basis than comparable U.S. non-contestable contracts, implying that a shrinking number of foreign suppliers continue to provide high-value items in areas where statutes and policy intent presume domestic sourcing.

The integrated analysis of average contract values underscores this concern. From FY 2016 to FY 2024, foreign non-contestable contracts experience the fastest growth in average award size of any category, and at several points become the highest value contracts in the dataset. This pattern is consistent with a scenario in which DoD secures exemptions or waivers for foreign sourcing in specialized categories where domestic capacity is either insufficient or absent. In such cases, foreign firms can command premium prices because DoD has limited alternatives and urgent mission requirements. The result is a more concentrated, more expensive set of foreign dependencies precisely in the categories targeted by policy for protection, resilience, and reshoring.

Viewed against recent National Security Strategy guidance and related industrial base initiatives, the findings indicate partial but incomplete alignment between



procurement outcomes and strategic objectives. On one hand, the persistence of a high domestic share in contract participation suggests that economic nationalist policies have reinforced broad domestic engagement in defense manufacturing. On the other hand, the growth in the value and relative cost of foreign non-contestable awards points to enduring capability gaps in critical technologies and advanced manufacturing segments. Procurement behavior thus aligns with national security goals in breadth by sustaining domestic participation, but diverges in depth, as the most high-value contracts remain disproportionately exposed to foreign suppliers.

Overall, the study concludes that recent economic nationalist policies have been effective in maintaining domestic participation in DoD manufacturing contracts, but they have not yet produced a structural reduction in foreign reliance in high-value contracts. The dominant effect observable in the data is compositional and often temporary, rather than a durable shift in the overall allocation of obligations between domestic and foreign sources. Closing the remaining gaps will require policy tools beyond procurement preferences alone, including targeted industrial investment, focused capability development, more granular supply-chain mapping, and sustained implementation of critical-materials strategies. Strengthening data quality and contract-level transparency will also be necessary to distinguish acceptable strategic partnerships from high-risk dependencies and to ensure that future domestic preference initiatives translate into lasting improvement in defense industrial resilience rather than short-term reclassification of existing demand.



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I. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

The United States (U.S.) government has a long history of supporting domestic manufacturing to enhance national defense capabilities, which has a tradition tracing back to Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 “Report on Manufactures.” Throughout U.S. history, policymakers have advanced a variety of initiatives to ease reliance on foreign suppliers, with particular focus on Department of Defense (DoD) spending. These efforts aim to make supply chains more resilient, keep the economy nimble and ready to respond to challenges, and use federal buying power strategically to support the nation’s defense industry.

However, while there has been no shortage of policy ambition, quantitative analysis on whether these strategies are changing how the DoD procures goods and services is limited. This research addresses this gap by closely examining DoD contract trends in the manufacturing sector from fiscal year (FY) 2008 to FY 2024 and evaluates how policy impacts align with national security objectives.

B. OBJECTIVES

This study will assess how U.S. economic nationalist policies have influenced DoD contracting patterns from FY 2008 to FY 2024 by analyzing the change in the number and value of contract awards to domestic versus foreign manufacturers. To do so, this analysis uses data assembled from USASPENDING.gov to capture contract counts, total obligations, and domestic versus foreign contract award ratios. In doing so, this paper quantitatively determines if trends are aligned with key policy milestones. Observed procurement shifts will be mapped to major policy interventions, including the Buy American Act (BAA), numerous Executive Orders (EO), National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provisions, and the Defense Production Act (DPA) to evaluate whether policies that seek to drive domestic preference correspond to measurable increases in domestic contract sourcing.

This study is intended to inform policymakers shaping acquisition and industrial policy, DoD acquisition officials making sourcing decisions, industry stakeholders



managing compliance, and academic researchers examining procurement dynamics and supply chain resilience. For policymakers and acquisition officials, the analysis aims to provide a quantitative evaluation of whether domestic preference initiatives are associated with measurable shifts in sourcing to help inform future policy, oversight, and program guidance. For industry stakeholders, this analysis seeks to guide trend visibility in supplier development and risk management strategies to aid in future strategic sourcing decisions. For researchers, the documented methodology supports replication and research expansion to enable further analysis into policy efficacy and sector-specific dynamics.

In sum, the objective of this paper is to determine if policies that direct domestic preference result in measurable shifts toward U.S. manufacturers, and how those shifts vary by policy period. The findings are intended to inform policy updates, support acquisition planning and supplier development, and provide a clear basis for replication and further research on domestic sourcing initiatives.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The first research question examines how recent U.S. policies directing the DoD to increase reliance on domestic manufacturing have influenced both the number and value of contracts awarded to U.S.-based manufacturers since FY 2008. In doing so, this paper assesses whether these changes correspond with major domestic preference policies such as the Buy American Act.

The second question explores quantitative trends in DoD manufacturing contract awards to the United States versus foreign suppliers and how these trends align with policy initiatives aimed at enhancing supply chain resilience and national security. In doing so, this analysis observes award patterns across years to determine whether changes in sourcing behavior mirror broader national efforts to secure critical manufacturing capacities and reduce dependency on foreign suppliers.

The third and final research question evaluates the extent to which shifts in DoD procurement patterns reflect the strategic goals of recent domestic sourcing and industrial base policies, using the National Security Strategy (NSS) as the benchmark. This qualitative assessment focuses on the degree of alignment between actual contracting



behavior and the intent of policy frameworks to determine whether the observed outcomes reinforce stated objectives.

D. HYPOTHESIS

This paper hypothesizes that recent U.S. economic nationalist policies have led to a measurable increase in the ratio and total value of DoD contracts awarded to U.S.-based manufacturers. These changes are expected to show an upward trend in domestic contracting activity and a corresponding decline in reliance on foreign suppliers, reflecting a policy-driven shift in DoD procurement behavior.

The secondary hypothesis predicts that shifts in DoD procurement patterns since FY 2008 align with the strategic goals outlined in federal industrial base and supply chain resilience policies. Specifically, changes in contracting behavior are expected to reflect progress toward broader national objectives that link an increased reliance on domestic manufacturing to national security, economic readiness, and defense supply chain assurance.

E. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

“Economic nationalist policies” are government policies aimed at strengthening domestic manufacturing, protecting strategic industries, and reducing reliance on foreign suppliers that serve as the operating mechanisms of economic nationalism, a broader political economic strategy rooted in national power, security, and legitimacy (Westra, 2025, paras. 1–2). The concept captures a broader shift in national strategy that emphasizes economic security as a foundation of military and geopolitical strength, prioritizing production within the United States even when it diverges from global market efficiency (Imas et al., 2025, pp. 1–3). Within the DoD context, economic nationalist policies include domestic preference laws that direct federal demand toward U.S. producers and strengthen critical supply chains (United States (U.S.) Code, 2023, §4533). These policies are designed to expand industrial capacity, ensure availability of critical materials for defense, and align manufacturing activity with national security objectives (Westra, 2025, paras. 1–2).



For this research, a “domestic manufacturer” refers to a prime contractor or vendor registered in the U.S. whose principal place of business or contract performance occurs within U.S. jurisdictions or outlying areas, consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (FAR, 2025a, §25.101). This classification reflects the federal definition used for domestic end products in reporting. A “foreign manufacturer” refers to a contractor organized under the laws of a non-U.S. country or performing work associated with a foreign country code as recorded in USASPENDING.gov (FAR, 2025a, §25.101). This distinction provides the analytical framework for measuring how DoD obligations are distributed between U.S. and international suppliers and for identifying shifts in sourcing patterns following domestic preference policy changes.

In this study, procurement refers to the process through which the DoD acquires goods and services required to support operational readiness and strategic objectives (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.b). Defined under the FAR, DoD procurement encompasses all contract actions generating obligated funds for manufacturing, logistics, and sustainment (FAR, 2025b, §2.101). The analysis in this thesis focuses on the procurement of manufacturing contracts identified under North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 31–33, as reported in USASPENDING.gov, capturing the manufacturing sector (Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 2022, pp. 7–8).

“Supply chain resilience,” as used in this research, describes the ability of defense-relevant industrial and logistics networks to anticipate, withstand, and recover from disruptions while maintaining continuity of production and delivery (DoD, 2022, p. 6). Federal policy defines resilience as including diversification of supply sources, domestic stockpile development, and coordinated investments to reduce reliance on foreign or high-risk suppliers (National Economic Council (NEC) & National Security Council (NSC), 2024, p. 4). Collectively, supply chain resilience forms the foundation for industrial stability and rapid mobilization in times of crisis, aligning with the DoD’s supply chain action plan (DoD, Office of Industrial Policy (OIP), 2021).

The “industrial base” refers to the integrated ecosystem of private industry, public facilities, and skilled labor responsible for developing, producing, and sustaining



equipment, materials, and systems essential to national defense (DoD, OIP, 2021, pp. 8–9). As outlined in the DoD Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, the defense industrial base includes both commercial firms and government-owned production resources that collectively ensure material readiness (DoD, OIP, 2021). The industrial base is the focal point of federal policy efforts to enhance U.S. domestic manufacturing competitiveness and ensure secure, scalable capacity for defense production (DoD, OIP, 2021).

“National security objectives” link economic capacity, industrial preparedness, and military readiness to ensure U.S. autonomy in producing and sustaining essential defense materials (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment, n.d.). Within this framework, procurement policies such as the BAA and DPA position economic security as a core element of national defense, emphasizing the need for domestic industrial independence. These objectives guide the policies analyzed in this thesis and serve as the benchmark for evaluating whether procurement outcomes align with national security and supply chain resilience goals.

F. METHODOLOGY

This study employs a mixed-methods approach integrating quantitative data analysis with qualitative policy assessment to evaluate the impact of U.S. economic nationalist policies on DoD procurement patterns. The quantitative component involves the collection and analysis of contract data from USASPENDING.gov, focusing on prime manufacturing contracts categorized by the NAICS code. Annual counts and monthly obligations for domestic and foreign contract awards will be extracted, cleaned, and standardized to identify measurable trends over time. Descriptive statistical methods and trend analysis will be applied to assess changes in domestic award share and contracting value surrounding major policy milestones, including amendments to the BAA, NDAAs, and EOs.

The qualitative component of this paper then examines the alignment of observed procurement trends with stated objectives in key policy documents. This assessment draws on federal industrial base reports, DoD supply chain plans, and relevant academic literature to evaluate whether measurable shifts in purchasing behavior support the strategic aims of



supply chain resilience, domestic industrial capacity expansion, and national security assurance. By combining quantitative analysis with contextual policy assessment, this study provides both an empirical and interpretative assessment of how federal actions have shaped sourcing outcomes within the defense industrial base.

G. LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH

Several limitations exist within this study's scope and data sources. First, the analysis relies on publicly available contract data from USASPENDING.gov, which may contain incomplete, inconsistent, or misclassified entries. Furthermore, the USASPENDING.gov occasionally generates inconsistent results when applying identical data filters, suggesting potential issues with the underlying data retrieval processes.

Second, while statistical techniques will highlight correlations between major policy actions and observed procurement shifts, establishing direct causality remains challenging. External influences such as budget fluctuations, program life cycles, global market dynamics, and defense emergencies can obscure the extent to which policy interventions independently drive sourcing changes.

Third, limitations in data granularity constrain the ability to link individual contract actions directly to specific policy milestones or provisions. Since many policies have overlapping implementation timelines and sectoral impacts, alignment between reforms and procurement activity should be interpreted as indicative rather than conclusive.

Moreover, this study cannot fully separate contract awards for goods or services that are exclusively produced by U.S.-based firms due to unique industrial, technological, or intellectual property constraints. Certain defense items such as specialized weapon systems, proprietary components, or platform-specific maintenance services may have no viable foreign equivalents, resulting in domestic sourcing outcomes that occur independently of policy influence. To partially address this, the analysis classifies Product Service Codes (PSC) as either non-contestable (those expected to be manufactured in the United States) or contestable (those that can feasibly source from foreign or domestic suppliers). However, this classification is based on a qualitative assessment of each PSC description rather than an exact indicator. As a result, while the PSC framework helps to



distinguish categories that are more or less likely to be inherently domestic, it cannot fully capture every case where foreign production is technically infeasible or restricted by regulation. Conversely, there may also be cases in which only foreign products exist, and no viable U.S. alternative is available, resulting in sourcing outcomes that favor foreign suppliers even when domestic production would otherwise be preferred or required by law. Consequently, some portion of observed domestic sourcing may reflect structural industrial constraints rather than the direct influence of preference policies.

Additionally, the sourcing classification used in this study reflects the reported place of performance at the prime contractor level. As a result, contracts fulfilled domestically but incorporating foreign subcomponents are categorized as U.S. sourced, and foreign prime awards using U.S. inputs are categorized as foreign, potentially understating the complexity of multi-tier supply chains. This may mask dependencies embedded at lower tiers of production, preventing a fully accurate assessment of where strategic foreign reliance persists.

Furthermore, all obligation and average contract value figures used in this study are reported in nominal dollars, consistent with publicly available DoD procurement data. As a result, some portion of the observed growth reflects general price inflation rather than increases in real purchasing power. Since inflation in defense manufacturing can differ significantly from headline consumer inflation, the degree of real change likely varies across sourcing categories. Future research incorporating defense-specific price indices would allow more precise estimation of real cost and dependency dynamics.

Finally, the research is confined to unclassified DoD contracting data. Classified procurement activities, which often involve advanced technologies or sensitive defense capabilities, are excluded from this analysis. As a result, the study provides insights into broad procurement trends and policy effects but does not capture the full extent of domestic sourcing within classified or national security restricted programs.



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II. BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The background chapter outlines recent U.S. economic policies, assessing how statutes, executive actions, and defense-specific authorities have evolved to reduce foreign reliance and strengthen the defense manufacturing industrial base. It outlines the foundational role of the BAA, the tools of the DPA, the targeted EOs for assessing and securing critical supply chains, and annual NDAA provisions that embed sourcing, assurance, and oversight into acquisition practice. This chapter also discusses the DoD's dominant purchasing position and lessons learned from global disruptions to explain why procurement policy has been deliberately aligned with resilience to translate market power into secure, reliable, and scalable capacity for national security.

B. KEY U.S. POLICIES SHAPING DOMESTIC SOURCING AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT

The evolution of federal policy supporting domestic manufacturing has been guided by successive legislative acts and executive directives, each reinforcing the strategic goal of reducing foreign reliance on defense manufacturing and strengthening the U.S. industrial base. Together, these statutory mandates, executive initiatives, and emergency authorities have created a multilayered policy landscape that directly impacts DoD procurement. Below, each milestone policy is discussed in chronological order, with emphasis on how subsequent amendments and directives have influenced the defense acquisition system.

1. The Buy American Act of 1933

The BAA, enacted in 1933, established the foundational statutory requirement that federal agencies prioritize U.S. manufactured products for procurement (Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2021). The BAA “requires the federal government to purchase domestic supplies for public use in the United States and outlying areas” (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.a, Definition, para. 2) “unless a specific exemption (exception or waiver) applies” (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.a, Definition, para. 1). In doing so, this Act institutionalized support for American industry as a matter of national policy



(Defense Acquisition University, n.d.a). Historically, the influence of the BAA was offset by a domestic content threshold of 50%, meaning that a product only needed to have 50% of the cost of its components manufactured in the United States to qualify as “domestic” (later increased to 55% in 2021). Further reducing the Act’s impact, agencies could easily acquire broad waivers for non-availability, unreasonable cost, or public interest determinations (FAR, 2025a, §25.103).

Despite these limitations, the BAA fundamentally shaped the legal framework and overarching approach of defense procurement. The BAA established the principle that federal procurement should contribute to national industrial capacity, inform acquisition strategy, and dictate contract eligibility criteria (CRS, 2021). Major amendments implemented in October 2022, driven by EO 14005, marked the most significant strengthening of the BAA since its enactment (FAR, 2022, Background, paras. 1–2). These reforms increased the required domestic content threshold from 55% to 60% immediately, with scheduled increases to 65% in 2024 and 75% in 2029 (FAR, 2022, Increase to the Domestic Content Threshold, paras. 1–2). The amendments also enhanced price preferences for domestic products and established stricter compliance and reporting mechanisms across the federal acquisition system (FAR, 2022, Fallback Threshold, para. 1). For DoD suppliers, these changes reconfigured the available supplier landscape, narrowing contract eligibility to those meeting higher domestic content standards and intensifying focus on supply chain manufacturing verification (Department of Defense, 2024).

2. The Berry Amendment of 1941

The Berry Amendment (BA), originating in § 523 of the Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Act of 1941, required the then War Department (now DoD) to procure certain items only if grown, reprocessed, reused, or produced in the United States (CRS, 2020). Introduced during U.S. mobilization for World War II, this provision was intended to ensure self-sufficiency in defense supply chains and preserve domestic manufacturing capacity for wartime readiness (International Trade Administration (ITA), n.d.a).



The BA was included in subsequent annual defense appropriations for decades until it was made permanent in FY 1994 and finally codified in 2002 as 10 U.S.C. § 2533a (now § 4862) (ITA, n.d.). In its current form, the BA prohibits use of DoD appropriated funds to acquire covered items including food, clothing, fabrics, fibers, yarns, textiles, and hand or measuring tools unless they are produced domestically. The requirement applies to purchases by or for DoD, including buys executed through other federal agencies on DoD's behalf (ITA, n.d.b).

The BA's purpose is to safeguard critical segments of the U.S. defense industrial base by ensuring that essential goods remain domestically sourced and available during crises (ITA, n.d.a). It is intended to reinforce industrial resilience and reduce foreign dependency within defense procurement by directing demand to U.S. producers in designated categories. At the same time, the BA has created compliance burdens on contracting officials, and the DoD has documented recurring deficiencies in clause usage, exception documentation, and origin verification (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoDIG), 2018). These oversight findings underscore that while the BA's intent is to strengthen industrial resilience, its implementation requires continued attention to contract administration, supplier compliance, and accurate reporting to achieve its intended national-security objectives (DoDIG, 2018).

3. The Defense Production Act of 1950

The DPA, originally enacted in 1950, granted the President broad statutory authorities to ensure the timely availability of essential domestic industrial resources for national defense and security purposes (CRS, 2023a). The DPA authorizes the federal government to prioritize and allocate the production and delivery of materials, services, and facilities considered vital to national defense, allowing for the rapid mobilization and expansion of industrial capacity in response to both emergent crises and long-term strategic needs (CRS, 2023a). While the Act comprises multiple authorities, Title III is the most significant as it authorizes federal investment (through grants), purchase commitments, and loans directed at developing, modernizing, and sustaining domestic manufacturing



capacity for critical goods that may otherwise be vulnerable to global supply chain disruptions (CRS, 2023a; DoD, Office of Industrial Base Policy, n.d.).

In recent years, the DPA has been utilized to address several vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industrial base, including efforts to expand production of semiconductors, rare earth materials, batteries, and medical supplies where foreign supply dependence is deemed a strategic risk (NEC & NSC, 2024, pp. 11–12). The COVID-19 pandemic, along with ongoing geopolitical competition, highlighted the value of DPA authorities, as it enabled federal agencies to support private-sector investment, mitigate shortages, and rapidly scale production capacity well beyond standard acquisition mechanisms (The White House, 2023, p. 183). Title III initiatives under the DPA supplement routine procurement by filling critical gaps, reducing single source dependencies, and reinforcing the broader objectives of supply chain resilience. The Act remains an essential component of federal acquisition and national defense strategy, directly influencing the conditions under which manufacturers operate.

4. AECA and ITAR of 1976

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), enacted in 1976, provides the statutory authority for regulating the export and import of defense articles and services in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives (Control of Arms Exports and Imports, 2025). Codified at 22 U.S.C § 2751, AECA authorizes the President to control defense exports, designate which items require licensing and impose civil or criminal penalties for violations (Control of Arms Exports and Imports, 2025).

The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) implement the AECA and were first issued by the U.S. Department of State (DoS) to establish specific procedures, definitions, and compliance standards for defense trade controls (DoS, n.d.). Administered by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), ITAR governs the manufacture, export, import, and brokering of defense articles and services (Control of Arms Exports and Imports, 2025). ITAR identifies controlled items on the U.S. munitions list and requires that the United States or foreign entities handling these items register with DDTC and obtain authorization before any export, transfer, or release of technical data occurs (DoS,



2025a). Licensing obligations extend to subcontractors, technical-data exchanges, and releases to foreign persons within the United States, creating wide-ranging compliance requirements across the defense industrial base (DoS, n.d.).

Together, the AECA and ITAR form the core of the U.S. defense export controls. The AECA provides the legal framework for regulating defense trade, while ITAR operationalizes authority through detailed licensing and compliance procedures. This framework limits the transfer of sensitive technologies to unauthorized parties and ensures that U.S. defense exports align with national security goals (DoS, 2025b).

5. Sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 1985

Sequestration was an automatic, across-the-board cancellation of budgetary resources when federal spending exceeds limits established by statute (CRS, 2023c). The mechanism originated in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which first introduced sequestration as a fiscal enforcement tool to control growing federal deficits (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2019a). Sequestration predominantly emerged under the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, enacted amid a broader effort to reduce federal debt following the 2008 financial crisis (CRS, 2019b).

The BCA sought to achieve roughly \$1.2 trillion in deficit reduction over ten years by establishing discretionary spending caps and creating a bipartisan committee tasked with developing a targeted savings plan (GAO, 2019, p. 1-6). When the committee failed to reach agreement, the law triggered sequestration beginning in FY 2013, requiring OMB to implement automatic, across-the-board reductions in non-discretionary spending including defense (GAO, 2013). These cuts were applied uniformly, without regard to program priority or mission relevance, and were intended to compel Congress to enact alternative deficit-reduction measures (GAO, 2013).

For the DoD, sequestration represented one of the most significant funding contractions since the post-Cold War drawdown (GAO, 2015). The automatic cuts constrained resources for all DoD appropriations including Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Research and Development creating long-term planning and readiness challenges across the DoD. These reductions did not target specific sourcing preferences



but instead constrained overall procurement budgets, meaning that observed changes in domestic versus foreign contracting during this period may reflect fiscal reductions rather than deliberate shifts driven by domestic preference policy.

6. Executive Order 13806 of 2017

EO 13806: Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base (2017), directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), in conjunction with other federal agencies, to conduct a comprehensive assessment of U.S. manufacturing and defense industrial base vulnerabilities (The White House, 2017). The executive order mandated a “whole-of-government” review to provide an unclassified report identifying critical materials, supply chain risks, and actionable recommendations to strengthen industrial capacity. The assessment involved examining nine traditional defense sectors and seven cross-cutting capabilities, from aircraft and missiles to workforce development and materials production.

The resulting report delivered to President Trump in 2018 identified over 300 vulnerabilities across ten risk archetypes affecting the manufacturing and defense industrial base (DoD, 2018). The assessment concluded five major challenges in the macro forces: “sequestration and uncertainty of government spending; the decline of critical markets and suppliers; unintended consequences of U.S. government acquisition behavior; aggressive industrial policies of competitor nations—particularly China—and the loss of vital skill in the domestic workforce” (Harper & Magnuson, 2018, para. 3), all of which “erode the capabilities of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and threaten the Department of Defense’s ability to be ready for the ‘fight tonight,’ and to retool for great power competition” (Harper & Magnuson, 2018, para. 4). These findings directly informed subsequent legislative and executive actions aimed at strengthening domestic manufacturing capacity and reducing foreign supply chain dependencies.

EO 13806’s impact extended beyond this initial assessment, catalyzing significant follow-on legislation and executive actions that further reshaped DoD procurement policy. Subsequent NDAAs incorporated multiple provisions responding to the EO’s recommendations, including enhanced supply chain risk management authorities and new



domestic sourcing restrictions for sensitive materials (CRS, 2024b). President Biden's EO 14017 (2021), explicitly built upon EO 13806's analytical framework by expanding supply chain reviews beyond defense to include civilian sectors (The White House, 2021). For the DoD, this resulted in the 2022 report *Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains*, which provided updated assessments and recommendations (DoD, 2022). EO 13806 established institutional mechanisms for industrial base monitoring and risk assessment, fundamentally altering the regulatory environment for defense procurement.

7. Executive Order 14005 of 2021

EO 14005, *Ensuring the Future is Made in All of America by All of America's Workers*, established a government-wide policy to maximize the use of domestically produced goods, products, materials, and services in federal procurement to support American workers and businesses. This set a clear directive that agencies prioritize U.S. supply chains wherever permissible under law (The White House, 2021). The order created the Made in America Office (MIAO) within the OMB to centralize oversight of Buy American waivers and harmonize agency practices, thereby instituting a consistent, government-wide mechanism to scrutinize waiver requests and reduce unnecessary reliance on foreign sources (The White House, OMB, n.d.).

EO 14005 also directed agencies to review and revise rules and practices inconsistent with domestic preference objectives, requiring them to submit proposed waivers for centralized review. This directive coupled policy with process to increase discipline, comparability, and transparency in the application of domestic content requirements (The White House, 2021). To support and enforce EO 14005, OMB issued guidance establishing a digital waiver portal and public postings on [MadeInAmerica.gov](https://www.madeinamerica.gov) so that stakeholders can view proposed and approved waivers, improving transparency and market intelligence for domestic suppliers and enabling public and interagency scrutiny before awards are made (OMB, 2021). The site provides public access to proposed and approved Made in America waiver records and status, creating transparency that was historically absent and enabling suppliers to identify opportunities to substitute domestic alternatives prior to award decisions.



In a further key implementation step, EO 14005 directed the FAR Council to strengthen Buy American requirements, resulting in a 2022 amendment to raise domestic content thresholds and establish a framework for enhanced price preferences for designated “critical” items central to national and economic security (FAR, 2022). The amendment raised the domestic content threshold from 55% to 65% in 2024 and will gradually increase it to 75% in 2029. This phased approach aligns procurement incentives with deeper U.S. manufacturing of components over time and provides industry with a predictable path to invest in domestic capacity (FAR, 2022, Increase to Domestic Content Threshold, para. 1). To manage supply constraints during the transition period, the amendment established a limited fallback threshold allowing use of the prior content level in specified cases when higher-content domestic items are unavailable or unreasonably priced. This provision helps mitigate acquisition delay risks while domestic suppliers scale production capacity (FAR, 2022, Fallback Threshold, para. 1).

At the department level, implementation reinforces centralized waiver oversight by requiring agencies to route waiver actions through OMB’s MIAO. This embeds EO 14005’s governance structure into acquisition workflows and ensures that agency determinations align with uniform government-wide standards (U.S. Department of Justice, 2021). Taken together, EO 14005’s policy mandates, OMB’s centralized waiver transparency, and the FAR’s strengthened thresholds have collectively reshaped federal purchasing by elevating domestic content, tightening enforcement, and institutionalizing transparent waiver governance that supports industrial base expansion in line with national security objectives.

8. National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA)

NDAAs are enacted annually by Congress and have incrementally added domestic sourcing mandates, sensitive-material bans, and supply chain risk controls, making them central levers for transitioning DoD procurement toward U.S. and allied industrial capacity across critical sectors (CRS, 2025). Beginning with limitations on specialty metals, materials, and extending to electronics and minerals, Congress has used progressive NDAAs, particularly between FY 2018 and FY 2024, to tighten foreign-source restrictions



while expanding oversight, stockpile tools, and assurance requirements that secure defense supply chains end-to-end (CRS, 2024a). The FY 2019 NDAA consolidated and updated long-standing domestic source restrictions for specialty metals under 10 U.S.C. § 2533c, reinforcing DoD mandates that critical alloys be domestically produced to sustain U.S. metal manufacturing capacity in end items and components (U.S. Congress, 2018, §2533c). Additionally, it enacted a new sensitive materials ban, which barred the DoD from acquiring certain materials and precious metals, including magnets and tungsten from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (U.S. Congress, 2018, §2533c). This ban aimed to reduce dependence on non-allied sources for components integrated into defense systems.

In addition to material-source controls, the FY 2019 NDAA also introduced Section 889, a government-wide prohibition on procuring or obtaining Chinese telecommunications and video surveillance equipment and services, including Huawei, ZTE, and their subsidiaries (U.S. Congress, 2018, §889). Section 889 further barred agencies from entering “into a contract (or extend or renew a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, system, or services that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system” (U.S. Congress, 2018, §889b). These prohibitions collectively narrowed the pool of eligible suppliers and reinforced incentives for domestic or allied sourcing of critical systems and subcomponents.

In the FY 2020 NDAA, Congress accelerated microelectronics security by directing the DoD to “establish trusted supply chain and operational security standards” (U.S. Congress, 2019, §230c). This shift enabled the DoD to transition away from the more restrictive “trusted foundry” model, where the DoD could only procure certain microelectronics from a small pre-approved list of U.S.-based facilities (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2022). The new risk-based “quantifiable assurance” approach evaluated components based on measurable security criteria, allowing the DoD to maintain access to leading commercial technologies while ensuring verifiable hardware integrity (U.S. Congress, 2019, §230c).

Congress reinforced this trajectory in subsequent years, mandating oversight and independent assessment to track implementation challenges and ensure measurable risk



control in defense procurement. For example, the FY 2021 NDAA extended electronics assurance into Printed Circuit Boards (PCB) sourcing controls and directed broader supply chain risk management, adding traceability and country-of-origin controls that complement sensitive-materials restrictions within defense systems (U.S. Congress, 2021, §841). Building on these measures, the FY 2022 NDAA sustained this progression by expanding supply chain visibility, mapping, and enforcement directives for critical materials and electronics, complementing several executive actions and DPA investments focused on rare earth magnets and critical materials for defense manufacturing (U.S. Congress, 2022a).

The FY 2023 NDAA maintained this trajectory by strengthening the microelectronics restrictions and requiring an independent expert review of the DoD's microelectronics quantifiable assurance (MQA) approach (U.S. Congress, 2022b, §219). This review aimed to validate risk-based assurance methods for accessing commercial leading-edge nodes while safeguarding hardware integrity (U.S. Congress, 2022b, §219). Concurrently, the FY 2023 NDAA advanced national defense stockpile reforms and critical mineral priorities to accelerate acquisition and processing of strategic materials integral to munitions, avionics, and propulsion systems to improve surge capacity and reduce reliance on adversarial sources (U.S. Congress, 2022b, §1414).

Building on FY 2023's emphasis on risk-based assurance and strategic materials, the FY 2024 NDAA shifted from assessment to execution. This legislation prioritized reshoring, stockpile modernization, and component-level security measures that operationalized sourcing and verification across key nodes such as semiconductors, PCBs, and critical minerals (U.S. Congress, 2023). Through targeted reporting and strengthened oversight mechanisms, Congress translated policy intent into enforceable acquisition practices. These measures improved supply chain traceability, reduced procurement risks, and incentivized defense contractors to prioritize domestic and allied sourcing, thus aligning with national security objectives (CRS, 2024c).

Collectively, these provisions reinforced support for domestic capacity building and systematic supply chain risk management, increasing visibility and compliance expectations for contractors and suppliers while reducing reliance and exposure to Chinese and Russian sourcing channels in defense components and materials.



9. CHIPS and Science Act of 2022

Enacted in 2022, the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act established a comprehensive statutory framework to strengthen and restore semiconductor manufacturing, expand U.S. research, and secure microelectronics supply chains that are central to national defense and security (U.S. Congress, 2022c). The Act authorizes grants and loans to support fabrication facilities, advanced packaging, upstream materials and equipment, aligning incentives and financing tools to accelerate domestic investment and manufacturing (U.S. Congress, 2022c). The CHIPS and Science Act appropriated billions of dollars to the “CHIPS for America” fund to expand semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the U.S. by providing financial incentives for building and equipping domestic fabrication facilities and firms across the semiconductor supply chain. The Act additionally directed significant R&D funding to National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST), to be implemented in partnership with U.S. industry through the National Semiconductor Technology Center (NIST, 2025a).

In addition to its industrial objectives, the Act includes national security provisions that restrict recipients from expanding advanced semiconductor manufacturing capacity in designated countries of concern or from engaging in joint research with foreign entities, ensuring that federal incentives do not inadvertently strengthen adversarial capacities (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2025b). Subsequent executive updates have emphasized coordination of CHIPS incentives with export controls and allied partnerships to secure microelectronics supply chains while promoting domestic production and advanced packaging capabilities (The White House, 2024).

Finally, congressional analyses and official reports have positioned the CHIPS and Science Act as a central pillar of modern U.S. industrial policy, linking supply chain resilience and domestic capability building with national security outcomes that directly intersect with DoD sourcing and assurance objectives (CRS, 2023b).

10. National Security Strategy

The NSS, serves as the overarching policy framework guiding U.S. defense, industrial, and economic security objectives. Published periodically by the Executive



Branch, the NSS defines the nation's strategic priorities and identifies the industrial base as a pillar of national power. Recent NSS's emphasize revitalizing domestic manufacturing, securing defense supply chains, and reducing dependency on foreign suppliers for critical and emerging technologies (Biden, 2022; NSC, 2017). These strategic objectives are reflected in related policies such as BAA, DPA, and EOs, which operate in parallel with the NSS by advancing its emphasis on domestic industrial capacity and supply-chain security through federal procurement practices. By situating domestic sourcing policies within this broader framework, the NSS provides the benchmark against which this study evaluates where observed procurement trends align with U.S. national security and industrial resilience priorities.

C. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AS A MAJOR PURCHASER

The DoD is the federal government's largest contracting entity, routinely accounting for the majority of total federal contract obligations and shaping market conditions across the national industrial base (CRS, 2018). In recent years, the DoD has obligated hundreds of billions of dollars annually on contracts spanning weapons systems, services, construction, logistics, IT, and sustainment, underscoring its outsized leverage over supplier investment and capacity decisions (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). Official data from USASPENDING.gov shows the breadth of DoD purchasing across vendors with obligations visible by department, place of performance, and recipient, highlighting how defense demand touches virtually every major industrial sector (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). Without contractor support across this spectrum, the U.S. would be unable to arm, field, and sustain an effective fighting force, making DoD procurement patterns a structural driver of U.S. manufacturing and technology advancement (CRS, 2018).

Given this scale of purchasing power, the DoD's ability to execute its mission rests on supply chains that can withstand adversary interference, economic shocks, and systemic disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, federal policy and DoD strategy treat supply chain resilience and domestic manufacturing as core national strategic requirements (DoD, 2022).



Reflecting these priorities, the DoD’s 2022 report *Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains* identifies several vulnerabilities in microelectronics, castings and forgings, energetics, and precious metals and couples these findings with a coordinated framework to expand domestic capacity and allied sourcing through internal programs, interagency tools, international partnerships, and targeted industry investment (DoD, 2022). Dedicated authorities and funding, including those under the DPA, translate this framework into concrete industrial expansion in critical nodes, turning resilience from a planning principle into measurable procurement and production outcomes that reduce risk (CRS, 2023a; DoD, 2022).

Given that the DoD represents the largest share of federal contracting, its sourcing rules and award preferences act as market signals that shape supplier behavior. Recent policy changes intentionally align this leverage with resilience objectives (CRS, 2018). Directed procurement methodologies, such as BAA requirements, strengthen domestic preference by raising content expectations and establishing an enhanced evaluation framework for designated “critical” items. These measures steer contract awards toward secure and allied supply lines (FAR, 2022). In parallel, the DoD’s supply chain action plan operationalizes these signals through domestic and allied capacity expansion, better transparency, and targeted use of DPA authorities. Together, these actions translate strategic intent into measurable procurement and production outcomes (DoD, 2022). The overarching goal is for federal policy to harness the DoD’s purchasing power to not only procure what the force needs, but also to cultivate a secure and scalable industrial base that meets those needs, directly linking award decisions to national security resilience (Atlantic Council, 2021).

D. GLOBAL DISRUPTIONS

Global disruptions over the past decade have exposed structural vulnerabilities in the networks that provide critical defense inputs, revealing how localized shocks can cascade through multi-tier supply chains and impact readiness (DoD, 2022). The COVID-19 pandemic created simultaneous supply and demand shocks as factories shut down, labor activity declined, and transportation networks slowed, exposing single points of failure



within supply chains supporting defense programs (DoD, OIP, 2021). Resulting delays in key components and subcomponents underscored a key lesson for the DoD: risk concentrates in lower-tier suppliers and logistics chokepoints, and secure supply chains require deliberate resilience by design (DoD, 2022).

Maritime chokepoints exert significant influence on global trade flows, with disruptions causing schedule delays and inventory shortfalls that impact defense-relevant sectors (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2021). For example, the 2021 Suez Canal blockage delayed hundreds of vessels, triggering weeks of downstream congestion and substantial losses in the global economy, underscoring how even brief closures can distort production cycles far from the point of disruption (Qu et al., 2024). More recently, security risks in the Red Sea have forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, lengthening transit times, tightening effective shipping capacity, and raising freight costs. These disruptions propagate through supply chains, increasing input costs and reducing delivery reliability (International Monetary Fund, 2024). As the DoD relies heavily on commercial logistics to provide material solutions, this volatility translates into procurement uncertainty, schedule risk, and readiness impacts in the absence of stockpiles and alternate routes (DoD, 2022).

Geopolitical conflict has further intensified supply risks in critical commodities and components, tightening markets for energy, gases, and specialty materials essential to defense manufacturing (World Bank Group, 2022). For example, the war in Ukraine disrupted supplies of neon and other noble gases used in semiconductor manufacturing, compounding an already tight microelectronics market and illustrating how single-region concentrations can destabilize supply chains (Varadarajan et al., 2024). Compounding these effects, energy price shocks and sanctions increased cost volatility and raised the risk of production curtailments, elevating the premium on sources for fuels, metals, and chemicals (World Bank Group, 2022). These dynamics validate the need for diversified sourcing and stockpiles for items whose disruption would ripple across multiple defense programs (DoD, 2022).

Cyber and systemic risks add another layer of concern, as digital intrusions and data compromises can interrupt production, corrupt quality assurance, and/or degrade logistics



visibility across globalized supplier networks (DoD, OIP, 2021). The Defense Business Board has emphasized “supply chain illumination” to map dependencies, monitor risk indicators, and prioritize interventions at critical nodes as a form of proactive resilience (Defense Business Board, 2025). In practice, visibility tools, trusted supplier qualifications, and data-sharing frameworks enable targeted use of authorities, such as the DPA, to remediate vulnerabilities before they degrade operational outcomes (DoD, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, 2025).

Collectively, these disruptions motivate strategic priorities from just-in-time efficiency toward assured availability for defense-critical supply chains, aligning procurement policy with industrial base development (DoD, 2022). To support this, federal acquisition rules have been tightened to favor domestic manufacturing and higher domestic content thresholds, prioritizing critical items in evaluations, harnessing DoD purchasing power to steer capacity toward secure and allied sources (FAR, 2022). The DoD’s action plan to secure the supply chain through targeted investments, stockpiling, and supplier development aims to expand surge capacity and reduce single-point dependencies (DoD, 2022). By integrating procurement policy with supply-chain risk management, the U.S. converts lessons from global disruptions into durable industrial capacity that can absorb shocks, sustain production, and safeguard military readiness (DoD, OIP, 2022).

E. CONCLUSION

Taken together, the policy architecture of domestic preference established by the BAA, the mobilization authorities of the DPA, successive executive orders, and iterative NDAA mandates have converged to make procurement a primary instrument for steering the defense industrial base toward greater resilience. The DoD’s role as the government’s largest buyer amplifies these policies into market signals that shape supplier investment, while supply chain action plans and targeted Title III interventions convert strategy into measurable capacity at critical nodes. In response to public health, geopolitical, and maritime disruptions, this integrated approach links award decisions to assured availability, positioning federal acquisition not only to meet current requirements but to harden U.S. and allied production against future shocks that could compromise readiness.



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III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this literature review is to ground this study in the broader body of research on economic nationalism, DoD procurement, and supply chain resilience. In doing so, it will frame how prior policy analyses and academic studies have addressed the core questions guiding this thesis' research questions. Specifically, this review examines literature on how recent U.S. policies have altered the quantity and value of DoD awards to domestic manufacturers, what trends have emerged in domestic versus foreign contract patterns over time, and how shifts in procurement behavior align with stated goals for supply chain security and industrial base growth.

This review systematically analyzes existing literature to identify where prior studies have documented the effects of domestic preference policies and where significant gaps remain. By clarifying areas of consensus and uncertainty, this section establishes the foundation for the study's contribution: providing new quantitative evidence and qualitative assessment that links major policy milestones and observable procurement outcomes.

B. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND DEFENSE POLICY

Theoretical perspectives on economic nationalism emphasize competition over resources, market protection, and the primacy of state interests in shaping long-term policy behavior (Helleiner, 2002). Academics generally frame economic nationalism as a distinct approach that prioritizes domestic capacity, regulatory autonomy, and security over global integration and efficiency, especially when national survival or technological leadership is at stake (Fetzer, 2020, pp. 964–965; Helleiner, 2002, pp. 311–312). In the context of defense policy, this perspective translates into skepticism towards overreliance on international supply chains and provides an enduring rationale for direct government intervention to safeguard critical manufacturing, ensure national security, and promote resilience in the face of external shocks or strategic rivalry (House Armed Services Committee, 2021, pp. 2–3).



Building on these theoretical foundations, analysis of nationalist policies in U.S. defense procurement underscores both the strategic goals and practical tradeoffs embedded in domestic content rules like the BAA and DPA. On one hand, government and peer-reviewed academic sources agree that statutes such as the BAA formalize a legal preference for U.S.-made goods in federal contracting, and multiple studies have documented their impact on restricting import competition in sensitive sectors, thereby bolstering U.S. manufacturing employment for covered products (CRS, 2021; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024). However, these laws are also crafted with a range of built-in exceptions for public interest, cost, and international trade agreements, which can leave significant loopholes in implementation and create broad variation in compliance and outcomes across agencies (Acosta & Cox, 2025; CRS, 2021).

Empirical research further highlights that while Buy American constraints do reduce the amount of federal money spent on imports, they can also generate notable efficiency tradeoffs. For example, macroeconomic analysis by Acosta & Cox (2025) found that sectors subject to strict domestic content rules tend to exhibit weaker fiscal multipliers compared to less-constrained sectors, as increased input costs and supply chain rigidities partially offset the intended stimulus effect of government spending (Acosta & Cox, 2025, p. 24). Similarly, a 2024 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) study estimates that the BAA has raised U.S. manufacturing employment by roughly 100,000 jobs (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024). However, this increase has come at a cost of \$154,000 to \$238,000 per job created, primarily due to higher prices and the increased effect of tighter content restrictions (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024).

Complementing these economic assessments, recent policy reviews, including the 2024 White House Quadrennial Supply Chain Review, support these findings. They recommend not only increasing statutory procurement preferences but also pairing them with targeted incentives, supply chain mapping, and strategies to enhance resilience and ensure that domestic sourcing translates to real security and readiness gains (NEC & NSC, 2024).

Beyond government reports, analysis by nonpartisan think tanks and law reviews also emphasize the policy complexity surrounding domestic preference regimes. The



Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), for example, argues that while sourcing requirements can provide market certainty and increase domestic industrial manufacturing, they must be paired with investments in supply chain visibility, technology, and allied collaboration to guard against single points of failure, foreign retaliation, or counterproductive inefficiencies (Harding & Ghoorhoo, 2023). Similarly, law reviews and academic analyses emphasize that the effectiveness of U.S. nationalist policy hinges on the ability of federal agencies to adapt rules for globalized industries and rapidly changing technologies, with consistent enforcement, reassessment, and multilateral approaches (Benneer & Wiener, 2019; Johnston, 2025).

Overall, the literature converges on a key insight: while domestic content laws remain an important tool in U.S. defense industrial strategy, their ultimate value depends on effective oversight, sector-specific risk management, and policymakers' ability to balance national security objectives with global supply chain realities. Consensus among officials and academics holds that economic nationalist policies such as the BAA and the DPA should be applied as flexible tools, rather than as ends in themselves, to build a resilient, adaptive, and secure defense supply base (NEC & NSC, 2024; DoD, 2023).

C. U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE

Key government and independent reports describe the U.S. defense industrial base as resilient but increasingly challenged by key vulnerabilities ranging from workforce shortages to supply chain fragility and foreign dependencies. The DoD's Annual Industrial Capabilities Reports consistently flag single-source suppliers, aging industrial infrastructure, and limited access to critical minerals as areas of persistent risk, indicating that disruptions at lower-tier suppliers or loss of domestic production capacity can have cascading effects on readiness and surge capacity (DoD, OIP, 2022). Building on these assessments, the DoD's 2022 report, *Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains*, further documents that supply chain mapping and targeted industrial investments are now treated as mission essential activities, with current strategy calling for active monitoring of supply nodes, workforce development, and measures to close critical gaps to minimize national exposure to geopolitical and economic shocks (DoD, 2022).



Complementing DoD assessments, studies by the CRS highlight that industrial base dependencies on offshore suppliers for semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and specialty chemicals are a standing concern, being combatted with legislative and policy interventions targeting vulnerabilities through domestic production incentives and risk reporting requirements (CRS, 2024d). These findings are reiterated by the White House's Quadrennial Supply Chain Review (2024), which situates defense manufacturing alongside other national critical sectors and highlights how domestic supply chain resilience serves as a foundation for economic recovery and sustained global competitiveness (NEC & NSC, 2024).

Taken together, these studies converge towards a common conclusion: strengthening domestic manufacturing is indispensable for preserving national security objectives. Government and academic sources alike recognize that U.S.-based production establishes technological leadership, force adaptability, and assured access to vital systems and materials, while also delivering economic benefits through job creation and regional development (NEC & NSC, 2024; DoD, OIP, 2022). Consequently, policies that foster domestic manufacturing advantage, such as procurement preference rules, strategic stockpiles, and investment in skilled labor, are widely seen as the necessary preconditions for an industrial base that supports the full spectrum of U.S. defense missions (CRS, 2024d; DoD, 2022).

D. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON DOD CONTRACTING PATTERNS AND METHODOLOGIES

Literature on DoD contracting patterns has grown increasingly sophisticated over the past two decades, leveraging new data resources and analytic techniques to track trends in procurement. Early research primarily relied on aggregate budget data, descriptive government reports, and high-level observations about overarching U.S. defense spending (Jang et al., 2021). In recent years, however, the introduction of comprehensive electronic contract reporting systems, including the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and USASPENDING.gov, has enabled more granular, empirical tracking of contract awards, allowing researchers to directly measure obligations and visualize trends over time (CRS, 2018).



While these data sources have significantly advanced empirical research in this field, studies note several limitations and inconsistencies within the FPDS and related databases, particularly in capturing contract origin, place of performance, and supplier classifications (CRS, 2018). As CRS notes, the “place of performance” field in FPDS is essential for estimating the geographic location of work and therefore distinguishing between domestic and international defense procurement but cautions that only one primary country is recorded per contract action and the underlying data may mask multinational or multi-location supply chains (CRS, 2018, pp. 8–9).

Despite these caveats, academic and policy analyses generally find that FPDS and USASPENDING.gov data, when carefully cleaned and standardized, are robust enough for identifying broad domestic and foreign sourcing trends and for informing federal oversight and policy evaluations (CRS, 2018).

Building on these data foundations, several large-sample studies have emerged to track the evolution of DoD spending patterns, often focusing on the impacts of specific legislative or executive policy changes. For example, Acosta & Cox (2025) apply a methodology that distinguishes contracts more and less constrained by BAA rules, then examines supplier import behavior. Their findings indicate that stricter domestic content requirements reliably induce higher shares of U.S. sourced content and reduce import reliance in covered sectors (Acosta & Cox, 2025). In parallel, trend analyses conducted annually from CSIS reveal both cyclical and structural patterns in procurement. These studies show that obligations surged during post-9/11 conflicts, declined following the Budget Control Act’s spending caps, and rebounded steadily since 2015, marked by continued increases in the domestic share of contract value (Jang et al., 2021; Sanders et al., 2023).

Most recent research extends beyond descriptive statistics, applying econometric modeling and trend analysis to explain procurement dynamics and test causal relationships. CSIS and other policy research centers highlight fluctuations in total obligation authority, changes in acquisition priorities, and continuing resolutions have all played significant roles in shaping annual defense contracting allocations (Jang et al., 2021). Additionally, in Ingabire’s (2022) *What Makes Your Business a Winner: Empirical Analysis Using the*



Department of Defense Contracts with Small Manufacturing Firms, the author uses DoD contract data to explore how procurement set-aside and strategic sourcing policies affect the distribution of work among suppliers of varying size, nationality, and ownership structure (Ingabire, 2022). Her analysis finds that successful small manufacturing firms are typically located in manufacturing hubs, participate in R&D networks, and meet quality standards but are often domestically focused, which raises questions about how limited export activity may constrain innovation and competitiveness (Ingabire, 2022). This research demonstrates how data-driven approaches can identify patterns of equity and origin in defense spending while also illustrating the analytical limits imposed by data classification and reporting practices.

Complementing these studies, Acosta & Cox (2025) in *The Macroeconomic Effects of the Buy American Act* applied fiscal analysis and regional input-output modeling to defense contracts, studying sector and region-specific effects of procurement obligations from the BAA (Acosta & Cox, 2025). Additionally, researchers have capitalized on innovations in contract-level data linkage, matching award records with firm-level import/export behavior, industry classification codes, and milestone dates for policy interventions. For example, a study by the Harvard Environmental Law Review and the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University identifies that, while open data platforms offer a valuable window for tracking adoption of key technologies, the presence of exemptions, umbrella contracts, and non-transparent reporting standards can hinder direct attribution to specific policy effects (CSET, 2023; Johnston, 2025).

Despite these empirical advances, a persistent theme in the literature is the difficulty of directly linking discrete policy milestones to measurable changes in procurement outcomes. CSIS studies and CRS analysis highlight that, while statistical breakpoints and changes in trend can often be correlated with the timing of reforms, the reality of overlapping implementation periods, delayed reporting effects, and concurrent external shocks make robust causal attribution challenging (CRS, 2018; Sanders et al., 2023). Simply put, while shifts in domestic versus foreign award share around policy milestones generally point in the direction of intent, exceptions, lag times, and background trends can



blur the relationship. As a result, most studies recommend combining quantitative analysis with qualitative review to capture a more holistic view of policy effects.

Supporting this methodological consensus, reviews published by the Oxford University Press and other peer-reviewed outlets emphasize the importance of using a mixed-methods approach to analyze procurement trends, combining contract-level analysis with content analysis of policy documents and industry interviews to bridge the gaps and triangulate findings in defense procurement research (Kundu et al., 2025). Ultimately, the literature converges on the view that while the U.S. has made significant progress tracking and analyzing defense contracting patterns by supplier nationality, the linkage between procurement rules and actual sourcing outcomes remains nuanced, requiring research to continuously refine their methodologies and acknowledge both the strengths and constraints of available data and analytic tools.

In summary, past research provides a robust empirical base showing how DoD contract spending has evolved, offering broad evidence for the effectiveness of domestic preference policies in influencing award patterns, while candidly acknowledging the analytic complexities that make it difficult to isolate the direct impact of legislative or regulatory reform on day-to-day procurement outcomes. This evolving body of work continues to shape both the methodological approach and the research questions motivating this thesis, underscoring the value of detailed, mixed-methods analysis of federal contracting and industrial base policy.

E. CONCLUSION

The literature reviewed in this chapter collectively demonstrates significant progress in documenting the evolution of U.S. economic nationalist policies, assessing their influence on defense procurement, and diagnosing the persistent challenges facing the defense industrial base and its supply chains. Researchers have shown that statutes like the BAA and the DPA have impacted procurement behavior by incentivizing domestic sourcing and strengthening key industrial capabilities. At the same time, the literature emphasizes that longer-term effectiveness of these policies depends on sustained



enforcement, adaptability to a globalized market environment, and the availability of robust, standardized datasets that allow policymakers to evaluate real outcomes.

Despite these advances, a consistent gap across empirical studies is the limited ability to directly connect specific interventions to measurable contract-level outcomes. While aggregate spending and trends in domestic versus foreign award are well documented, clear attribution to policies frequently remains obscured by data limitations, waiver utilization, changes in reporting practices, and the timing of external shocks or concurrent reforms. As recent studies note, understanding the relationship between targeted policy milestones and shifts in procurement behavior requires standardized and granular analysis that can account for implementation lag, sectoral effects, and the layered structure of defense acquisition.

This thesis seeks to address these gaps by integrating comprehensive contract-level data analysis with policy milestone timelines and a qualitative assessment of industrial and security objectives. In doing so, it aims to deliver decision-relevant evidence on whether, when, and how economic nationalist policies have influenced DoD procurement behavior and thus advanced domestic content, strengthened supply chains, and aligned with broader U.S. industrial strategy and security goals.



IV. METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the methodological framework used to examine how DoD manufacturing contract awards have shifted between domestic and foreign suppliers from FY 2008 to FY 2024. The analysis utilizes a quantitative approach using data extracted from USASPENDING.gov. Consistent data filters, classification criteria, and aggregation procedures were applied to ensure comparability across fiscal years and to isolate changes in sourcing patterns attributable to domestic preference policies and related procurement directives. These methods allow for a systematic evaluation of how the DoD’s contracting behavior aligns with key policy developments such as the BAA, DPA, and BA.

B. WEBSITE METHODOLOGY

This study draws on publicly available procurement data from USA.gov (2025), “the official open data source of federal spending information, including information about federal awards such as contracts, grants, and loans” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). This website consolidates data reported by federal agencies through FPDS, Financial Assistance Broker Submission (FABS), and System for Award Management (SAM) and presents multiple analytical tools to examine obligations, awards, and trends over time (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). The two primary tools utilized to pull data from USASPENDING.gov include “Prime Award Results” and “Results Over Time.”

1. Prime Award Results

In the USASPENDING.gov (2025) “Prime Award Results” view, the analysis compiles award summaries based on selected filters and represents aggregated transactions that share a unique award identifier. Each row within the dataset reflects a prime award summary, which consolidates all modification and associated transactions under a single award ID. This structure allows for the analysis of contracts at the summary level rather than fragmented individual transactions, ensuring consistency in tracking the full scope of DoD contracting activity. When time-period filters are applied, the dataset includes prime



awards where the earliest and latest transactions overlap with the specified fiscal years, regardless of whether individual actions occurred entirely within that range (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). This analysis pulls each FY distinctly.

2. Results Over Time

The “Results Over Time” filter aggregates federal action obligation amounts for prime award transactions falling within user-defined time intervals (annual, quarterly, or monthly). Obligations represent the legally binding financial commitments recorded at the time of contract execution and are therefore an appropriate measure for analyzing the magnitude and timing of procurement activity. Transactions sharing the same unique identifier are grouped into a single prime award summary to prevent double-counting and ensure consistency across reporting views (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025).

Together, these two views provide insight into DoD contracting patterns in a time series format. “Prime Award Results” enables the count of awards and the distribution of obligations across recipient countries and industrial classifications, while the “Results Over Time” highlights changes in total obligations. These tools form the foundation for the quantitative dataset used in this study, allowing for research to be systematically aggregated, filtered, and exported into Microsoft Excel for further categorization and statistical analysis.

C. DATA EXTRACTION METHODOLOGY

To construct the quantitative dataset used in this analysis, data was extracted from USASPENDING.gov using consistent filters applied across all fiscal years from FY 2008 through FY 2024. When multiple fiscal years are selected together, the view aggregates contract counts across years rather than displaying values for each fiscal year individually. Therefore, separate retrievals were necessary to capture year-specific contract counts.

Additionally, due to system performance limitations, the website was unable to process all required filters simultaneously. As a result, the data were downloaded separately for each fiscal year and subsequently concatenated in Excel to create the final consolidated dataset.



The application of consistent filters across all four reports (summarized in Table 1) was intended to ensure methodological reliability and comparability in the dataset. By holding constant every parameter except for “Country” and “PSC,” the analysis isolates variation attributable solely to sourcing location and contestability classification. Limiting the “Time Period” to individual fiscal years from FY 2008 through FY 2024 enables year-by-year analysis. The “Show New Awards Only” option was selected to eliminate contract modifications and prevent duplication of counts and obligations, ensuring that the dataset reflected new contracting activity rather than administrative adjustments.

The “Award Type” was restricted to “Contracts,” which includes Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) Calls, Purchase Orders, Delivery Orders, and Definitive Contracts. This exclusion removes mechanisms such as grants, loans, and direct payments that do not represent procurement transactions, thereby maintaining focus on manufacturing obligations.

Specifying the DoD as the awarding agency confined the dataset to awards issued directly under DoD authority, while leaving the funding agency field blank avoided double counting for interagency transfers. The NAICS codes were limited to the 31–33 manufacturing series to ensure relevance to the research scope. The “Country” filter alternated between “United States” and “All Foreign Countries” (summarized in Table 2) to distinguish domestic from international sourcing patterns, allowing for comparison of DoD contracting behavior between foreign and domestic awards. The “PSC” filter also alternated (summarized in Table 2) as either “contestable” or “non-contestable” as described below and outlined in the Appendix. The remaining fields, including Treasury Account Symbol, Recipient, and Award Amount, were left intentionally blank to preserve the full population of eligible manufacturers.

For U.S. versus foreign sourcing, this analysis relied on the vendor’s reported place of performance location at the award level. In cases where a contract involved a supply chain with mixed domestic and foreign components, the dataset does not disaggregate sourcing below the prime awardee level, and those awards are attributed to the country associated with the prime contractor’s reported performance location. As a result, a contract fulfilled by a U.S. prime that incorporates foreign components is categorized as



domestic, while a foreign prime incorporating U.S. inputs would be categorized as foreign. Although this approach may understate the complexity of distributed supply chains, it aligns with how DoD procurement records reflect sourcing decisions and ensures consistent treatment across all observations.

Table 1. Applied Filters

Time Period	Fiscal Year FY2008 – FY2025
Award Type	Contracts Only
Awarding Agency	DoD as Awarding Agency
NAICS Codes	31, 32, 33
Country	United States or All Foreign Countries
PSCs	Contestable or non-contestable (Refer to Appendix PSC Coding)
All Other Fields	Blank

Table 2. Report Structure

Report 1	Country = United States; PSC = Non-contestable
Report 2	Country = United States; PSC = Contestable
Report 3	Country = All Foreign; PSC = Non-contestable
Report 4	Country = All Foreign; PSC = Contestable

The classification of PSCs as contestable or non-contestable was developed to distinguish between goods that are subject to statutory domestic sourcing requirements and those open to international competition. This distinction was necessary to isolate the impact of policy-driven sourcing restrictions on DoD contracting behavior. “Contestable” PSCs refer to products that are not governed by laws, regulations, or policies requiring domestic manufacture and may therefore be competitively sourced from either U.S. or foreign suppliers. These items are effectively open to global competition and reflect market-based procurement outcomes. In contrast, “non-contestable” PSCs include items that, by statute, law, or policy, must be produced within the United States unless a specific exception or waiver applies.



These PSCs capture products explicitly subject to domestic sourcing mandates, such as those established under the BAA, DPA, Berry Amendment, and NDAA provisions that limit foreign participation on specific manufacturing items. The determination of whether a PSC was considered “contestable” or “non-contestable” was completed through a manual qualitative review of each PSC description to determine whether the item’s nature necessitated U.S. manufacture (outlined in the Appendix). The classification relied on a qualitative content analysis of each PSC description, cross-referenced with statutory and regulatory guidance (e.g. FAR clauses, ITAR-controlled lists, BAA, DPA, and Berry Amendment categories) to identify whether the product’s characteristics or end use necessitated U.S. sourcing. This approach ensured that each code’s categorization accurately reflected real-world policy constraints and provided meaningful analytical basis for comparing contracting patterns across items with and without domestic sourcing requirements.

To illustrate this classification approach, PSC 1305 (Ammunition, through 30mm) was categorized as non-contestable because its nature and statutory treatment clearly require domestic production. Items within this PSC are closely tied to controlled defense-industrial capabilities and fall under strict national security protections, including AECA and ITAR authorities. As a result, foreign sourcing for this PSC requires elevated review or explicit authorization. This represents a straightforward case where legal guidance is explicit.

However, classification challenges emerge in edge cases such as with PSC 6135 (Batteries, Non-Rechargeable). These items may be commercially available yet also support critical military equipment and therefore may be subject to strengthened domestic sourcing rules depending on their end use. To resolve this ambiguity, the classification relied on whether the PSC predominantly encompassed commercially ubiquitous products (contestable) or clearly defense-critical items requiring domestic manufacture (non-contestable). Since the majority of obligations under PSC 6135 involved commercial components widely procured through open competition, it was classified as contestable despite isolated instances where specific line items might be subject to heightened sourcing controls. This qualitative framework, balancing statutory constraints, policy guidance, and



the nature of the product class, was applied consistently across all PSCs examined to ensure accurate categorization and meaningful analytical comparison.

D. DATA COMPILATION AND PREPARATION

Following data extraction, contract count and obligation data were compiled and organized in Microsoft Excel to facilitate consistent analysis across years and categories. Separate columns were created for contestable and non-contestable PSCs, each subdivided by “Place of Performance” (United States or Foreign).

1. Aggregation of Contract Counts and Obligations

The contract count dataset captured the annual number of new DoD manufacturing contracts within four primary subcategories: U.S. non-contestable, U.S. contestable, foreign non-contestable, and foreign contestable. For each fiscal year, these values were aggregated to produce total figures at the domestic and foreign level. Specifically, total U.S. contracts were calculated by summing U.S. contestable and U.S. non-contestable awards, while total foreign were derived from the combined foreign contestable and foreign non-contestable awards. The grand total for each fiscal year was then determined by adding total U.S. and total foreign awards together. Since the PSC filters collectively encompassed all manufacturing categories under NAICS codes 31–33, these combined totals represented the complete population of new DoD manufacturing contract awards for each fiscal year.

The obligation dataset followed the same categorical structure but was initially downloaded at the monthly level. Monthly obligation values were subsequently summed into an annual total to align the aggregation with the contract count dataset. This standardization ensured that both datasets were directly comparable and enabled consistent cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of contracting trends across fiscal years and PSC classifications.

2. Calculation of Share of Total

To evaluate the relative distribution of contracts and obligations across categories, a share-of-total metric was calculated for each subcategory and fiscal year. This measure was derived by dividing each subcategory’s raw value (contact count or obligation amount)



by the corresponding annual total. For example, the share of total for U.S. contestable contracts was calculated as:

$$\text{Share of Total (U.S. Contestable)} = \frac{\text{U.S. Contestable Contracts}}{\text{Total Contracts}}$$

The same formula was applied to each subcategory for both contract count and obligation data. This allowed for year-over-year comparison of how the DoD's sourcing composition shifted between domestic and foreign suppliers, as well as between contestable and non-contestable products.

3. Calculation of Average Contract Size

To estimate the average financial size of new DoD manufacturing contracts, total annual obligations for each subcategory were divided by the corresponding number of contract awards in that same fiscal year. This yielded an average contract size metric that provided a normalized measure of contract magnitude, independent of total award volume.

$$\text{Average Contract Size} = \frac{\text{Total Obligations (Subcategory)}}{\text{Contract Count (Subcategory)}}$$

This calculation was performed for each subcategory annually to support comparative analysis of contract scale between U.S. and foreign recipients and across contestability classifications.

4. Compound Average Growth Rate (CAGR)

The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is a statistical measure that expresses the constant annual rate at which a value grows or declines over a defined multi-year period. By relying only on the first and last values in the series, a CAGR smooths out interim fluctuations and assumes steady compounding, making it particularly useful for representing long-term directional change without the noise of year-to-year variability. In this study, a CAGR calculation is applied to DoD manufacturing contract obligations and awards to provide a normalized metric for comparing growth trends across supplier categories and policy periods.



$$CAGR = \left(\frac{Ending\ Value}{Beginning\ Value} \right)^{\left(\frac{1}{Number\ of\ Years} \right)} - 1$$

5. Calculation of Standard Deviation

To assess variability across years, standard deviations were calculated for each subcategory using the STDEV.P() function in Excel. This function measures the standard deviation for an entire population rather than a sample. Given that the dataset encompasses all DoD manufacturing contract awards reported between FY 2008 and FY 2024 (rather than a subset or sample), use of STDEV.P() was appropriate.

E. CONCLUSION

In summary, this chapter established the methodological approach for evaluating trends in DoD manufacturing contract awards across domestic and foreign suppliers from FY 2008 through FY 2024. By integrating consistent filters, standardized data retrieval procedures, and implementing a qualitative PSC classification framework, the approach ensures transparency, comparability, and analytical rigor across all datasets. The resulting dataset enables examination of how sourcing behavior has evolved in relation to key policies and structural conditions within the defense industrial base.



V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes DoD procurement patterns from FY 2008 to FY 2024 to assess how domestic preference policies, industrial base initiatives, and evolving national security priorities have shaped the distribution of contract obligations and contract counts. The analysis examines trends across contestable and non-contestable categories to identify how procurement behavior has responded to statutory and executive actions such as the BAA, EOs, NDAA amendments, and recent microelectronics and supply chain security measures. Since sequestration introduced substantial budget-driven volatility from FY 2013 to FY 2016, the chapter distinguishes between structural, policy-driven changes and those driven by fiscal constraints, ensuring that observed trends are interpreted within their appropriate context.

By combining obligation values, contract counts, and average contract sizes, this analysis provides perspective on where procurement shifted, how intensively, and in response to which policy environments. Ultimately, this chapter establishes the empirical foundation for assessing whether DoD procurement behavior aligns with contemporary national security objectives, particularly the goal of reducing foreign dependence in critical supply chains while strengthening the resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base.

B. CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS ANALYSIS

1. Trends

Total contract obligations grew from \$95.6 billion in FY 2008 to \$109.9 billion in FY 2024, representing a 14.9% increase over the 17-year period. However, all obligation values used in this study are reported in nominal dollars, consistent with the format of publicly available DoD procurement data. When inflation over the period is considered, this nominal increase would likely reflect a net decline in real purchasing power, suggesting that overall resource availability did not meaningfully expand during the study period. This context highlights that the more substantial shifts in the data reflect spending volatility rather than sustained real growth in contracting activity. In particular, the



sequestration period introduced a sharp decline in total obligations, falling 38.2% from FY 2008 to FY 2016, driven largely by fiscal constraints rather than domestic preference policy effects. As a result, this decline creates a confounding factor that limits pre-FY 2016 policy attribution when interpreting observed sourcing trends.

2. Compositional Shifts in Domestic Obligations

The most notable pattern does not appear in the overall domestic share of contract obligations, which averaged 92.2% of total obligations with a standard deviation of 2.2 percentage points across the study period. Instead, it emerges in the changing composition of that share between contestable and non-contestable categories. U.S. contestable obligations increased from a low of 34.9% in FY 2013 to a peak of 55% in FY2022, before declining sharply to 35.1% in FY 2023 and held steady at 36.2% in FY 2024. The 18.8 percentage point reversal from peak in just two years suggests the FY 2021 to FY 2022 was temporary rather than structural.


U.S. non-contestable obligations moved inversely, declining from 58.8% in FY 2020 to 37.2% in FY 2022, then rebounding to 55.8% in FY 2023 and holding steady at 55.3% in FY 2024. The standard deviation of U.S. contestable share (6.0 percentage points) is nearly three times higher than that of total U.S. share (2.2 percentage points), indicating high volatility in domestic contract composition despite stable overall domestic preference.

3. Foreign Obligations

Combined foreign share remained relatively steady with an average contribution of 7.8% and a standard deviation of 2.2 percentage points throughout the data history. Reaching its lowest point of 4.1% in FY 2020 before moderating to 8.4% in FY 2024, which is more in-line with its historic share. Foreign contestable share contributed an average of 6.2% with a standard deviation of 1.7 percentage points. Meanwhile, foreign non-contestable, theoretically limited to rare exemptions, contributed an average of 1.6% of total obligations with a standard deviation of 0.8 percentage points. However, foreign non-contestable exhibited concerning patterns in average contract value (discussed below).



Figure 1. Total Obligations by Subcategory



4. Policy period analysis

During the sequestration era (FY 2013–2016), attributing changes to domestic preference policies is problematic due to concurrent budget constraints. Domestic composition shifted toward U.S. contestable categories in FY 2014–2015 possibly due to consolidation of programs from fiscal pressure.


Post sequestration, (FY 2017–2018) coincided with Executive Order 13806’s supply chain assessment. Total obligations recovered to \$78.2 billion (FY 2017) and \$94.7 billion (FY 2018), with U.S. share rising to approximately 95.1%. While EO 13806 focused on assessment rather than direct procurement action, the 2018 report revealed over 300 vulnerabilities across 10 risk archetypes may have catalyzed follow-on actions reflected in these trends.

The FY 2021–2022 period has the most dramatic compositional shift, corresponding with EO 14005, FY 2021 NDAA PCB controls, and FY 2022 NDAA’s major BAA amendment. U.S. contestable surged to 51.5-55%, while U.S. non-contestable dropped to 37.2-43.4%. This suggests policies shifted the categorization of the competitive landscape of contracts rather than increasing overall domestic share, which was already at approximately 95%.

The FY 2023–2024 reversal, despite CHIPS Act implementation and FY 2023–2024 NDAA microelectronics restrictions, saw U.S. Contestable drop to 35.1-36.2% while U.S. non-contestable rebounded to 55.3-55.8%. Total obligations reached series highs of \$106.5 billion and 109.9 billion respectively, while foreign share remained steady at approximately 8.4%. This pattern suggests policy faced fundamental limits on increasing total share of obligations to the United States.



Figure 2. Obligations by Share of Total



5. Summary

The obligation data reveals that domestic preference remained consistently high throughout the period, with the major observable impact appearing in the compositional shifts between contestable and non-contestable categories rather than in total domestic versus foreign allocation. The data does not show a sustained directional trend in total domestic share but rather fluctuates around a 90–95% baseline, with a dramatic but temporary spike in contestable share during FY 2021–2022.

Overall, the data suggests that while domestic preference policies such as the BAA and BA maintained a consistently high baseline of domestic sourcing, more recent executive actions (EO 14005, FY 2021–2022 NDAAs) may have produced short-lived but measurable compositional effects. These policies appear to have temporarily expanded the share of competitively sourced domestic contracts without permanently shifting overall obligation shares, implying that their influence was procedural in altering contracting classifications and competitive behavior, rather than structural in reshaping the long-term distribution of procurement volume.

C. CONTRACT COUNT ANALYSIS

1. Data Quality Considerations

Total contract count data shows a clear discontinuity beginning between FY 2014 (394,203 contracts) and FY 2015 (1,387,225 contracts), reflecting a 252% increase driven by changes in federal reporting and data collection requirements rather than actual procurement expansion (U.S. Department of Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, 2023). Reporting normalization appears to have continued through FY 2016 (1,876,092 contracts), which also displays irregular count patterns that are inconsistent with subsequent years. Consequently, contract count data prior to FY 2016 are excluded from this analysis to ensure methodological consistency and comparability. Post-transition, counts stabilize within a 2.2–2.5 million range, averaging 2.48 million from FY 2021–2024.

2. Sustained Directional Trends

Unlike obligations, U.S. contract count share shows clear sustained directional trends. U.S. contestable contracts increase steadily from 90.8% (FY 2016) to 93.2% (FY 2024), while U.S.




non-contestable declined from 5.8% to 3.9% over the same period. In absolute terms, U.S. contestable contracts increased from 1.7 million to 2.3 million while U.S. non-contestable declined 13.0% (109,323 to 95,088) despite total contract count growth across U.S. and foreign contracts.

Combined U.S. contract share remained remarkably stable at 96.7-97.5% with a standard deviation of only 0.2 percentage points, representing even higher and more stable domestic preference than observed in obligation data which had a standard deviation of 2.2 percentage points. Foreign contracts represent only 2.5-3.3% of total count, with Foreign non-contestable negligible at 0.1-0.2%. Similarly, the share of total foreign contracts remained stable over time, ranging between 2.5% and 3.3%, with a standard deviation of 0.2% from FY 2016 to FY 2024.



Figure 3. Count by Share of Total



3. Policy Period Analysis

The FY 2017–2018 period saw contract counts reach 2.4 million, with U.S. contestable share increasing to 91.7% in FY 2018 and total spending peaking at 97.5% in FY 2018 corresponding with EO 13806 timing. The FY 2019 NDAA specialty metal restrictions coincided with foreign share dropping to a historic low of 2.5%.

The clearest policy-correlated shift occurred in FY 2021–2022 (EO 14005 and BAA amendments), when U.S. contestable count peaked at 93.5-93.6% and U.S. non-contestable fell to 3.6% in FY 2022. Unlike obligations, this elevated contestable share sustained through FY 2024 (93.2%), suggesting durable behavioral change in contract award patterns.


Despite significant shifts in the composition of domestic contracts, the overall distribution of obligations between U.S. and foreign awards remained proportionally stable. In other words, while the balance between contestable and non-contestable categories within the United States changed, but ultimately reverted, the aggregate share of total spending allocated to domestic versus foreign suppliers did not materially shift.

4. Divergence from Obligation Patterns

The contract count reveals a fundamental structural difference: a small percentage of contracts (non-contestable at 3.9% in FY 2024) commands a disproportionately large percentage of obligations (55.3% in FY 2024). The data suggests policy-correlated shifts appear more sustained and directional in contract counts than in obligation values, indicating domestic preference policies had measurable impact on where contracts are awarded (distribution) but less sustained impact on where money flows (economic impact)



Figure 4. Total Contract Count by Category



5. Integrated Analysis: Average Contract Values

To understand true procurement behavior, analyzing average contract values across categories reveals the mechanism behind divergent count and obligation patterns (see Table 3). Since these values are reported in nominal dollars, part of the observed growth reflects general price inflation rather than increases in real purchasing power. Additionally, inflation in defense-relevant manufacturing sectors may differ from the headline inflation rate, meaning the degree of real change likely varies by category.

Table 3. Average Contract Values from FY 2016 to FY 2024

Category	FY 2016 Average	FY 2024 Average	Change	CAGR
US Contestable	\$12,174	\$15,508	27%	3.1%
US Non-contestable	\$315,458	\$698,578	121%	10.4%
Foreign Contestable	\$51,254	\$88,792	73%	7.1%
Foreign Non-contestable	\$314,144	\$902,366	187%	14.1%
All Contracts	\$31,503	\$44,495	41%	4.4%

The combined obligation and contract count trends reveal that while domestic manufacturing remained the dominant source of DoD procurement, the structural dependencies on foreign suppliers persisted in high-value, non-contestable categories. The disproportionate rise in average value of foreign non-contestable contracts suggests that supply chain resilience goals remain only partially achieved. Rather than diversifying or rebuilding domestic capacity, the DoD appears to have become increasingly reliant on a smaller set of specialized suppliers, and has not fully mitigated critical industrial base vulnerabilities central to national security objectives.

6. U.S. Contestable

The FY 2016 baseline reveals U.S. contestable average contracts increased 27% (\$12,174 to \$15,508), with a 3.1% compound average growth rate (CAGR), roughly tracking inflation, alongside a 35% increase in contract count (1.7 to 2.3 million). The increase in contract



count indicates genuine expansion of domestic competitive procurement. This suggests policy successfully directed more procurement actions through competitive domestic channels, achieving the stated goal of strengthening the domestic industrial base through increased contract opportunities. However, the modest growth in average contract value (3% annually) indicates this expansion did not come with significant per-contract cost growth beyond general price trends. Furthermore, while contract count success is clear the temporary nature of total obligation share change (36% in FY 2016 to 55% FY 2021 back to 36% in FY 2024) shows that expanding the number of competitive contracts did not sustainably shift where the majority of procurement dollars flow.

7. U.S. Non-contestable

The 121% increase in average U.S. non-contestable value likely reflects sustained consolidation and inflation in major programs. Starting from \$315,458 in FY 2016, these contracts more than doubled to \$698,578 by FY 2024. Combined with declining contract count (109,323 to 95,088, down 13%), this indicates fewer but substantially larger major programs, consistent with defense acquisition program maturation and platform cost growth.

8. Foreign Contestable

From FY 2016 to FY 2024, foreign contestable average values increased 73% (7.1% CAGR). This growth exceeded both inflation and U.S. contestable growth, suggesting foreign firms winning competitive contracts are capturing increasingly valuable work, rather than being pushed out of higher-value categories. Combined with slower growing foreign contact count (2.4% CAGR), this indicates policies did not reduce foreign competitiveness in the market. Foreign firms adapted and won larger contracts despite domestic preference policies. In fact, foreign contestable contracts grew nearly 2.3 times faster than U.S. contestable (3.1% CAGR). This occurred despite explicit policies to preference domestic suppliers in competitive procurement.

9. Foreign Non-contestable

The 187% increase in foreign non-contestable average value (14.1% CAGR), the fastest growth of any category, reveals a significant and potentially concerning finding. Crucially, in FY 2016, Foreign and U.S. non-contestable contracts were essentially equal in average value



(\$314,144 vs. \$315,458, a 0.4% difference). By FY 2024, foreign non-contestable contracts (\$902,366) were 29% more expensive than U.S. non-contestable contracts (\$698,57) representing a fundamental transformation in the strategic balance of dependencies.

This transformation is particularly troubling as foreign non-contestable contracts represent procurement where BAA and related statutes should have required domestic sourcing, but DoD obtained exemptions or waivers to procure from foreign sources. The statutory framework presumes non-contestable items will be domestically sourced and foreign procurement in this category occurs only under specific extenuating circumstances including domestic nonavailability, inadequate domestic capability or capacity, or public interest waiver for national security reasons.

Capability gaps may force premium procurement when DoD obtains foreign exemptions for items where no domestic alternative exists despite statutory preference. In such cases, foreign suppliers recognize DoD has no choice and exercise monopolistic pricing power. This explanation suggests technology leadership in cutting-edge semiconductors, specialized materials, and advanced sensors have concentrated in foreign hands, with emergency or urgent operational needs forcing premium pricing for guaranteed supply and small production runs where foreign suppliers will not offer volume discounts. The 187% growth from FY 2016 to FY 2024 under this interpretation indicates capability gaps are growing and becoming substantially more expensive to fill.

The premium may reflect systematic differences in what types of items require foreign exemptions versus what can be domestically sourced. Foreign non-contestable contracts may concentrate in cutting-edge semiconductors, advanced sensors, specialized materials processing, and unique manufacturing capabilities, while U.S. non-contestable includes more conventional systems, established technologies, and mature programs. Under this interpretation, the most technologically advanced and mission critical items requiring non-contestable protection may systematically require foreign exemptions because U.S. industrial base gaps are concentrated in high-value, sophisticated categories, which is a concerning indication of domestic capability decline in the specific areas policies aimed to strengthen.

From FY 2016 to the FY 2023 peak, the average foreign non-contestable contract rose to \$1.36 million, an 89% premium over U.S. non-contestable contracts and the highest per-contract



value in the dataset. This divergence coincided with the first year of the CHIPS Act implementation, suggesting that efforts to reduce foreign technology dependence initially exposed critical domestic capability gaps, driving record foreign exemptions. Although the FY 2024 decline to a 29% premium indicates normalization, the data suggests a “new normal” in which foreign exemptions remain costlier and more concentrated. With 41% fewer foreign non-contestable contracts awarded but an increase of 187% in value, the DoD appears to have reduced marginal foreign sourcing while becoming more dependent on a smaller number of high-value foreign suppliers in the categories specifically targeted by policy for domestic protection. As stated in limitations, this analysis is constrained by the absence of contract-level data. Without disaggregating the approximately 1,500-1,700 annual contracts into categories of strategic partnerships, critical technology dependencies, and specialized capabilities, the precise distribution of where risk to strategic supply chains remains uncertain. The findings should therefore be interpreted as indicative rather than definitive, highlighting the need for granular contract-level analysis to distinguish between acceptable strategic dependencies and high-risk technological vulnerabilities.

D. ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

The observed procurement trends only partially align with the strategic goals articulated in the NSS and related policy frameworks emphasizing domestic industrial revitalization and reduced foreign dependence in critical supply chains. While the steady increase in U.S. contestable contract counts reflects progress toward expanding domestic production participation, the simultaneous rise in foreign non-contestable contract obligations and average contract value indicates persistent capability gaps in advanced manufacturing sections. These outcomes suggest that DoD procurement patterns support NSS objectives in breadth, by sustaining domestic participation, but diverge in depth as high-value categories remain dependent on foreign suppliers. This partial alignment underscores the structural nature of industrial base challenges that cannot be resolved through procurement policy alone, but require broader investment, innovation, and capacity-building initiatives consistent with the NSS’s long-term objectives for strategic resilience.



E. CONCLUSION

Across FY 2008–2024, DoD procurement consistently sourced the vast majority of obligations from U.S. manufacturers, yet the composition of those domestic obligations shifted considerably throughout the data history. While total domestic share remained stable at roughly 90–95%, contestable and non-contestable categories moved sharply in response to certain fiscal conditions and policy actions. While the FY 2021–2022 surge in U.S. contestable obligations reflected short-term policy effects, they quickly reversed by FY 2023–2024. These patterns indicate that recent domestic preference initiatives altered procurement classifications and competitive dynamics but did not produce lasting change in where procurement dollars ultimately flowed.

Contract counts, however, show more durable shifts. U.S. contestable contract counts rose steadily from FY 2016–2024, suggesting sustained expansion of domestic competitive participation. At the same time, high-value foreign non-contestable contracts increased in value, revealing persistent capability gaps in areas where DoD is expected to source domestically but relies on foreign suppliers under exemption authorities. These high-value dependencies grew even as the number of such contracts declined, underscoring the concentration and costliness of foreign sourcing.

Overall, the findings show that domestic preference policies succeeded in broadening domestic participation but were less effective at reducing reliance on foreign suppliers in critical, high-value sectors. Procurement patterns therefore align with national security objectives in expanding domestic competition but diverge in areas tied to advanced manufacturing and technological resilience. Addressing the structural gaps will require policy tools beyond procurement preferences such as industrial investment, capability development, and long-term supply chain rebuilding.



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VI. CONCLUSION

A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH FOCUS

This study was conducted to determine whether recent U.S. economic nationalist policies have measurably shifted DoD manufacturing procurement toward domestic suppliers and away from foreign sources, and whether those sourcing patterns align with stated national security objectives. Using contract count and obligation data from FY 2008 through FY 2024, the analysis assessed domestic versus foreign source trends, differentiated contestable and non-contestable product categories, and evaluated outcomes across distinct policy periods associated with major statutory and executive actions. The results of this analysis provide decision-relevant insight into how federal acquisition behavior has evolved in response to domestic preference directives, and where gaps remain in strengthening the defense industrial base.

B. INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

The analysis demonstrates that U.S. domestic preference policies have maintained a consistently high level of domestic sourcing in DoD manufacturing, with domestic obligations fluctuating within a narrow 90–95 percent range throughout the entire period of analysis. As a result, no sustained upward directional trend is observed that would indicate a major structural shift away from foreign suppliers. Instead, the most notable effects appear in the composition of domestic awards. Short-term surges in U.S. contestable obligations, particularly during FY 2021 through FY 2022, suggest that recent executive actions and NDAA amendments influenced how domestic contracts were classified and competed, however these effects quickly receded in FY 2023 through FY 2024, indicating procedural influence rather than lasting structural change in procurement distribution.

Contract count data, however, revealed a more durable pattern. The steady rise in U.S. contestable contract counts from FY 2016 through FY 2024 indicates a meaningful expansion of competitive domestic participation over time, even as overall obligation shares held stable. In contrast, foreign non-contestable awards exhibit a divergent pattern including fewer contracts overall, but at much higher values. This concentration suggests that DoD remains dependent on a limited number of foreign suppliers for specialized, high-value capabilities. The aggregate



obligation data does not identify which product areas drive these outcomes, underscoring a need for future research to determine whether they reflect genuine domestic capability gaps, strategic supply choices or other procurement dynamics.

Taken together, the findings show that domestic preference policies have reinforced an already high baseline of domestic sourcing and expanded U.S. participation in competitive contracting. However, they have not yet reduced reliance on foreign sources in areas where domestic industrial capacity remains constrained. Procurement outcomes therefore partially align with national security objectives to strengthen the defense industrial base, but persistent foreign dependencies in high-value segments highlight the limits of sourcing policies when deeper industrial investment and capability development are absent.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

These findings reinforce federal strategy documents emphasizing that procurement policy alone is insufficient to ensure resilient domestic manufacturing capability. While domestic preference requirements have helped maintain a high baseline of domestic sourcing and expand competitive participation among U.S. manufacturers, they have not produced sustained reductions in foreign reliance in areas where domestic capacity may be constrained. To fully achieve national security objectives, the United States must pair sourcing requirements with long-term industrial investments, supply chain visibility improvements, and capability development in areas where foreign concentration presents strategic risk.

Additionally, the persistence of foreign sourcing in non-contestable categories suggests that some U.S. reliance on partner-nation industrial capabilities may be strategic rather than avoidable. Continued use of partner-nation production could reflect coordinated burden-sharing and coalition industrial integration. However, without greater transparency into the intent behind these sourcing decisions, these outcomes risk being misinterpreted as capability gaps rather than deliberate resilience strategies.

Collectively, these findings demonstrate that while domestic sourcing has remained consistently strong in DoD manufacturing, recent domestic preference initiatives have primarily influenced the composition of contract awards rather than the overall distribution of procurement spending. Short-term fluctuations in contestable categories suggest procedural adjustments in how



domestic contracts are classified and competed, but do not yet represent structural changes in sourcing behavior. National security priorities related to industrial depth and reduced foreign reliance therefore require more sustained and targeted efforts beyond procurement policy alone to achieve meaningful long-term impact.

D. POLICY AND ACQUISITION RECOMMENDATIONS

The results of this study highlight the value of domestic preference requirements in sustaining strong levels of U.S. sourcing and expanding competitive participation among domestic manufacturers. However, they also demonstrate that procurement policy alone has not produced lasting structural shifts in foreign reliance, particularly within high-value non-contestable segments. To better align sourcing outcomes with national security objectives, several policy and acquisition actions should be considered.

First, targeted industrial investment is necessary to complement existing sourcing requirements. Because domestic preference policies have primarily influenced contract classification and competition rather than production capacity, long-term investment in defense-critical manufacturing capabilities is required to close persistent gaps where foreign suppliers currently fill essential roles. Such investment would support the development of specialized materials, production technologies, and workforce skills that are not directly created through procurement preferences alone.

Second, enhanced transparency into the drivers of foreign non-contestable awards would improve strategic decision-making. Understanding whether these awards reflect unavoidable domestic limitations, deliberate allied burden-sharing, or other procurement dynamics is essential for tailoring appropriate policy interventions. Improved reporting mechanisms or supplier-level visibility could ensure that continued foreign sourcing is more clearly aligned with prioritized resilience objectives.

Lastly, acquisition strategies should continue to reinforce robust domestic competition. The sustained rise in U.S. contestable contract counts from FY 2016 – FY 2024 suggests positive momentum that can be supported through measures that reduce entry barriers, expand supply-chain participation among small and mid-sized firms, and prevent excessive market concentration.



Strengthening the competitive landscape helps build depth across the industrial base and reduces vulnerability to single-point failures.

E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study identifies several opportunities for future research that could further clarify DoD manufacturing sourcing patterns and their strategic implications. First, the composition of foreign, non-contestable contract awards merits deeper examination. Although these awards constitute a small portion of total manufacturing obligations, their overall dollar value has increased even as the number of awards has remained flat or declined. Future research should disaggregate this category by product type, geographic recipient, and prime contractor location to determine whether growth is driven by a concentration of high-value specialized items, changes in allied production capabilities, or evolving DoD sourcing preferences. This type of analysis would clarify whether rising foreign obligations in non-contestable categories reflect genuine domestic capability gaps, strategic exceptions, or other structural procurement factors.

A second area for further study involves analyzing contracts intentionally routed to allied or partner nations as part of broader supply chain security, burden-sharing, and resiliency strategies. Recent DoD and national security documents emphasize diversifying away from single-country dependencies while strengthening cooperative production networks. Future research could identify patterns where specific PSCs or manufacturing functions are deliberately sourced from key allies, such as NATO partners, Australia, Japan, or other industrial base collaborators, to determine whether these choices represent coordinated strategy, capability specialization, or opportunistic procurement. This work would provide insight into how “ally-shoring” manifests in actual contracting behavior.

A third avenue for future research involves assessing the impact of domestic sourcing thresholds and content requirements on contract pricing and competition outcomes. While this study evaluated trends in contract counts and obligations, it did not examine whether increasing domestic content requirement (e.g., recent BAA threshold increases) affect unit costs, bid competitiveness, or the distribution of contract awards among large versus small manufacturers. Linking pricing patterns to changes in statutory domestic content thresholds could reveal whether



these policies impose cost premiums, encourage market consolidation, or incentivize new domestic entrants.

Collectively, these research directions would build on the present analysis by providing greater insight into drivers behind shifting domestic and foreign sourcing patterns, the strategic role of allies' supplies, and the broader economic effects of domestic preference policies.

F. CLOSING STATEMENT

By integrating federal policy context with empirical contracting data, this study provides a grounded assessment of how U.S. economic nationalist policies translate into measurable procurement outcomes. The evidence indicates that while domestic sourcing remained consistently strong, recent policy initiatives primarily influenced the composition of contract awards by expanding competitive participation among U.S. suppliers rather than shifting overall procurement volume away from foreign sources. At the same time, the continued concentration of high-value foreign awards underscores areas where domestic manufacturing capacity remains constrained or strategically augmented through partner-nation production. Fully aligning procurement outcomes with national security objectives will therefore require sustained industrial development, capability investment, and improved supply chain visibility alongside existing sourcing preferences.



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AI DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Generative artificial intelligence tools were used in preparing this work. Specifically, AI was employed for the following purposes: enhancing grammar, clarity, and conciseness; assisting with the identification of sources relevant to the topic; and formatting in-text citations and references. The use of these tools was approved according to institutional and faculty guidance, in alignment with NPS policy on generative AI use. ChatGPT and Perplexity were the AI models used.

All recommendations and suggestions provided by the AI were reviewed and applied at the author's discretion, and final editorial decisions were made by the author to ensure the accuracy, integrity, and originality of the content. All ideas, arguments, interpretations, and analyses presented in this work are entirely the author's own. Efforts were made to mitigate any risks related to AI-generated inaccuracies, over-reliance on automated recommendations, or misuse of field-specific terminology by verifying changes and consulting with academic resources when appropriate. All AI-generated outputs were independently verified for factual accuracy before inclusion.



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APPENDIX: PSC CODING

PSC Series	PSC Series Name	PSC Code	PSC Code Name	Non-Contestable	Contestable
10	Weapons	1005	GUNS, THROUGH 30MM	x	
10	Weapons	1010	GUNS, OVER 30MM UP TO 75MM	x	
10	Weapons	1015	GUNS, 75MM THROUGH 125MM	x	
10	Weapons	1020	GUNS, OVER 125MM THROUGH 150MM	x	
10	Weapons	1025	GUNS, OVER 150MM THROUGH 200MM	x	
10	Weapons	1030	GUNS, OVER 200MM THROUGH 300MM	x	
10	Weapons	1035	GUNS, OVER 300MM	x	
10	Weapons	1040	CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT	x	
10	Weapons	1045	LAUNCHERS, TORPEDO AND DEPTH CHARGE	x	
10	Weapons	1055	LAUNCHERS, ROCKET AND PYROTECHNIC	x	
10	Weapons	1070	NETS AND BOOMS, ORDNANCE	x	
10	Weapons	1075	DEGAUSSING AND MINE SWEEPING EQUIPMENT	x	
10	Weapons	1080	CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION EQUIPMENT	x	
10	Weapons	1090	ASSEMBLIES INTERCHANGEABLE BETWEEN WEAPONS IN TWO OR MORE CLASSES	x	
10	Weapons	1095	MISCELLANEOUS WEAPONS	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1105	NUCLEAR BOMBS	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1110	NUCLEAR PROJECTILES	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1115	NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND WARHEAD SECTIONS	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1120	NUCLEAR DEPTH CHARGES	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1125	NUCLEAR DEMOLITION CHARGES	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1127	NUCLEAR ROCKETS	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1130	CONVERSION KITS, NUCLEAR ORDNANCE	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1135	FUZZING AND FIRING DEVICES, NUCLEAR ORDNANCE	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1140	NUCLEAR COMPONENTS	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1145	EXPLOSIVE AND PYROTECHNIC COMPONENTS, NUCLEAR ORDNANCE	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1190	SPECIALIZED TEST AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT, NUCLEAR ORDNANCE	x	
11	Nuclear Ordnance	1195	MISCELLANEOUS	x	



			NUCLEAR ORDNANCE		
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1210	FIRE CONTROL DIRECTORS	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1220	FIRE CONTROL COMPUTING SIGHTS AND DEVICES	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1230	FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS, COMPLETE	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1240	OPTICAL SIGHTING AND RANGING EQUIPMENT	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1250	FIRE CONTROL STABILIZING MECHANISMS	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1260	FIRE CONTROL DESIGNATING AND INDICATING EQUIPMENT	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1265	FIRE CONTROL TRANSMITTING AND RECEIVING EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1270	AIRCRAFT GUNNERY FIRE CONTROL COMPONENTS	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1280	AIRCRAFT BOMBING FIRE CONTROL COMPONENTS	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1285	FIRE CONTROL RADAR EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1287	FIRE CONTROL SONAR EQUIPMENT	x	
12	Fire Control Eqpt	1290	MISCELLANEOUS FIRE CONTROL EQUIPMENT	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1305	AMMUNITION, THROUGH 30MM	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1310	AMMUNITION, OVER 30MM UP TO 75MM	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1315	AMMUNITION, 75MM THROUGH 125MM	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1320	AMMUNITION, OVER 125MM	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1325	BOMBS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1330	GRENADES	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1336	GUIDED MISSILE WARHEADS AND EXPLOSIVE COMPONENTS	x	
13	Ammunition and	1337	GUIDED MISSILE AND SPACE VEHICLE	x	



	Explosives		EXPLOSIVE PROPULSION UNITS, SOLID FUEL; AND COMPONENTS		
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1338	GUIDED MISSILE AND SPACE VEHICLE INERT PROPULSION UNITS, SOLID FUEL; AND COMPONENTS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1340	ROCKETS, ROCKET AMMUNITION AND ROCKET COMPONENTS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1345	LAND MINES	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1346	REMOTE MUNITIONS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1350	UNDERWATER MINE AND COMPONENTS, INERT	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1351	UNDERWATER MINES AND COMPONENTS, EXPLOSIVE	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1352	UNDERWATER MINE DISPOSAL INERT DEVICES	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1353	UNDERWATER MINE DISPOSAL EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1355	TORPEDOS AND COMPONENTS, INERT	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1356	TORPEDOS AND COMPONENTS, EXPLOSIVE	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1360	DEPTH CHARGES AND COMPONENTS, INERT	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1361	DEPTH CHARGES AND COMPONENTS, EXPLOSIVE	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1365	MILITARY CHEMICAL AGENTS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1367	TACTICAL SETS, KITS, AND OUTFITS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1370	PYROTECHNICS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1375	DEMOLITION MATERIALS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1376	BULK EXPLOSIVES	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1377	CARTRIDGE AND PROPELLANT ACTUATED DEVICES AND COMPONENTS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1380	MILITARY BIOLOGICAL AGENTS	x	



13	Ammunition and Explosives	1385	SURFACE USE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1386	UNDERWATER USE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL AND SWIMMER WEAPONS SYSTEMS TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1390	FUZES AND PRIMERS	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1395	MISCELLANEOUS AMMUNITION	x	
13	Ammunition and Explosives	1398	SPECIALIZED AMMUNITION HANDLING AND SERVICING EQUIPMENT	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1410	GUIDED MISSILES	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1420	GUIDED MISSILE COMPONENTS	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1425	GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEMS, COMPLETE	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1427	GUIDED MISSILE SUBSYSTEMS	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1430	GUIDED MISSILE REMOTE CONTROL SYSTEMS	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1440	LAUNCHERS, GUIDED MISSILE	x	
14	Guided Missiles	1450	GUIDED MISSILE HANDLING AND SERVICING EQUIPMENT	x	
15	Aerospace Craft and Structural Components	1510	AIRCRAFT, FIXED WING	x	
15	Aerospace Craft and Structural Components	1520	AIRCRAFT, ROTARY WING	x	
15	Aerospace Craft and Structural Components	1540	GLIDERS	x	
15	Aerospace Craft and Structural Components	1550	UNMANNED AIRCRAFT	x	
15	Aerospace Craft and Structural Components	1555	SPACE VEHICLES	x	
15	Aerospace Craft and Structural Components	1560	AIRFRAME STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1610	AIRCRAFT PROPELLERS AND COMPONENTS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1615	HELICOPTER ROTOR BLADES, DRIVE MECHANISMS AND COMPONENTS	x	



16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1620	AIRCRAFT LANDING GEAR COMPONENTS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1630	AIRCRAFT WHEEL AND BRAKE SYSTEMS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1640	AIRCRAFT CONTROL CABLE PRODUCTS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1650	AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC, VACUUM, AND DE-ICING SYSTEM COMPONENTS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1660	AIRCRAFT AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, AND PRESSURIZING EQUIPMENT	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1670	PARACHUTES; AERIAL PICK UP, DELIVERY, RECOVERY SYSTEMS; AND CARGO TIE DOWN EQUIPMENT	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1675	SPACE VEHICLE COMPONENTS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1677	SPACE VEHICLE REMOTE CONTROL SYSTEMS	x	
16	Aerospace Craft Components and Accessories	1680	MISCELLANEOUS AIRCRAFT ACCESSORIES AND COMPONENTS	x	
17	Aerospace Craft Launching, Landing, Ground Handling and Servicing Equipment	1710	AIRCRAFT LANDING EQUIPMENT	x	
17	Aerospace Craft Launching, Landing, Ground Handling and Servicing Equipment	1720	AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING EQUIPMENT	x	
17	Aerospace Craft Launching, Landing, Ground Handling and Servicing Equipment	1725	SPACE VEHICLE LAUNCHERS	x	
17	Aerospace Craft Launching, Landing, Ground Handling and Servicing Equipment	1730	AIRCRAFT GROUND SERVICING EQUIPMENT	x	



17	Aerospace Craft Launching, Landing, Ground Handling and Servicing Equipment	1735	SPACE VEHICLE HANDLING AND SERVICING EQUIPMENT	x	
17	Aerospace Craft Launching, Landing, Ground Handling and Servicing Equipment	1740	AIRFIELD SPECIALIZED TRUCKS AND TRAILERS	x	
18	Space Vehicles	1810	SPACE VEHICLES	x	
18	Space Vehicles	1820	SPACE VEHICLE COMPONENTS	x	
18	Space Vehicles	1830	SPACE VEHICLE REMOTE CONTROL SYSTEMS	x	
18	Space Vehicles	1840	SPACE VEHICLE LAUNCHERS	x	
18	Space Vehicles	1850	SPACE VEHICLE HANDLING AND SERVICING EQUIPMENT	x	
18	Space Vehicles	1860	SPACE SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1900	FRIGATES AND CORVETTES	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1901	AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1902	CRUISERS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1903	DESTROYERS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1904	SUBMARINES	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1905	COMBAT SHIPS AND LANDING VESSELS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1906	MINELAYERS AND MINESWEEPERS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1907	LANDING CRAFT	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1908	TORPEDO BOATS AND GUN BOATS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1909	HYDROFOILS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1910	TRANSPORT VESSELS, PASSENGER AND TROOP	x	



19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1911	AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1915	CARGO AND TANKER VESSELS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1920	FISHING VESSELS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1921	TUGS AND TOWBOATS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1922	FIRE BOATS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1923	ICE BREAKERS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1924	REPAIR SHIPS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1925	SPECIAL SERVICE VESSELS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1926	LIGHTSHIPS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1927	CABLE SHIPS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1928	SALVAGE VESSELS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1929	RESCUE VESSELS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1930	BARGES AND LIGHTERS, CARGO	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1935	BARGES AND LIGHTERS, SPECIAL PURPOSE	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1940	SMALL CRAFT	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1945	PONTOONS AND FLOATING DOCKS	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon,	1950	FLOATING DRYDOCKS	x	



	Docks				
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1955	DREDGES	x	
19	Ships, Small Craft, Pontoon, Docks	1990	MISCELLANEOUS VESSELS	x	
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2010	SHIP AND BOAT PROPULSION COMPONENTS	x	
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2020	RIGGING AND RIGGING GEAR		x
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2030	DECK MACHINERY	x	
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2040	MARINE HARDWARE AND HULL ITEMS		x
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2050	BUOYS		x
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2060	COMMERCIAL FISHING EQUIPMENT		x
20	Ship and Marine Equipment	2090	MISCELLANEOUS SHIP AND MARINE EQUIPMENT	x	
22	Railway Equipment	2210	LOCOMOTIVES		x
22	Railway Equipment	2220	RAIL CARS		x
22	Railway Equipment	2230	RIGHT-OF-WAY CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT, RAILROAD		x
22	Railway Equipment	2240	LOCOMOTIVE AND RAIL CAR ACCESSORIES AND COMPONENTS		x
22	Railway Equipment	2250	TRACK MATERIAL, RAILROAD		x
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2305	GROUND EFFECT VEHICLES	x	
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2310	PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLES		x
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2320	TRUCKS AND TRUCK TRACTORS, WHEELED		x
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2330	TRAILERS		x
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2340	MOTORCYCLES, MOTOR SCOOTERS, AND BICYCLES		x
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2350	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, TRACKED	x	
23	Motor Vehicles, Cycles, Trailers	2355	COMBAT, ASSAULT, AND TACTICAL VEHICLES, WHEELED	x	
24	Tractors	2410	TRACTOR, FULL TRACKED, LOW SPEED	x	
24	Tractors	2420	TRACTORS, WHEELED		x



24	Tractors	2430	TRACTORS, FULL TRACKED, HIGH SPEED	x	
25	Vehicular Equipment Components	2510	VEHICULAR CAB, BODY, AND FRAME STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS		x
25	Vehicular Equipment Components	2520	VEHICULAR POWER TRANSMISSION COMPONENTS		x
25	Vehicular Equipment Components	2530	VEHICULAR BRAKE, STEERING, AXLE, WHEEL, AND TRACK COMPONENTS		x
25	Vehicular Equipment Components	2540	VEHICULAR FURNITURE AND ACCESSORIES		x
25	Vehicular Equipment Components	2541	WEAPONS SYSTEMS SPECIFIC VEHICULAR ACCESSORIES	x	
25	Vehicular Equipment Components	2590	MISCELLANEOUS VEHICULAR COMPONENTS	x	
26	Tires and Tubes	2610	TIRES AND TUBES, PNEUMATIC, EXCEPT AIRCRAFT		x
26	Tires and Tubes	2620	TIRES AND TUBES, PNEUMATIC, AIRCRAFT		x
26	Tires and Tubes	2630	TIRES, SOLID AND CUSHION		x
26	Tires and Tubes	2640	TIRE REBUILDING AND TIRE AND TUBE REPAIR MATERIALS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2805	GASOLINE RECIPROCATING ENGINES, EXCEPT AIRCRAFT; AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2810	GASOLINE RECIPROCATING ENGINES, AIRCRAFT PRIME MOVER; AND COMPONENTS	x	
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2815	DIESEL ENGINES AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2820	STEAM ENGINES, RECIPROCATING; AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2825	STEAM TURBINES AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2830	WATER TURBINES AND WATER WHEELS; AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2835	GAS TURBINES AND JET ENGINES; NON-AIRCRAFT PRIME MOVER, AIRCRAFT NON-PRIME MOVER, AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2840	GAS TURBINES AND JET ENGINES, AIRCRAFT, PRIME MOVING; AND COMPONENTS	x	
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2845	ROCKET ENGINES AND COMPONENTS	x	



28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2850	GASOLINE ROTARY ENGINES AND COMPONENTS		x
28	Engines and Turbines and Component	2895	MISCELLANEOUS ENGINES AND COMPONENTS	x	
29	Engine Accessories	2910	ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM COMPONENTS, NONAIRCRAFT		x
29	Engine Accessories	2915	ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM COMPONENTS, AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE PRIME MOVERS	x	
29	Engine Accessories	2920	ENGINE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM COMPONENTS, NONAIRCRAFT		x
29	Engine Accessories	2925	ENGINE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM COMPONENTS, AIRCRAFT PRIME MOVING	x	
29	Engine Accessories	2930	ENGINE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS, NONAIRCRAFT		x
29	Engine Accessories	2935	ENGINE SYSTEM COOLING COMPONENTS, AIRCRAFT PRIME MOVING	x	
29	Engine Accessories	2940	ENGINE AIR AND OIL FILTERS, STRAINERS, AND CLEANERS, NONAIRCRAFT		x
29	Engine Accessories	2945	ENGINE AIR AND OIL FILTERS, CLEANERS, AIRCRAFT PRIME MOVING	x	
29	Engine Accessories	2950	TURBOSUPERCHARGER AND COMPONENTS		x
29	Engine Accessories	2990	MISCELLANEOUS ENGINE ACCESSORIES, NONAIRCRAFT		x
29	Engine Accessories	2995	MISCELLANEOUS ENGINE ACCESSORIES, AIRCRAFT	x	
30	Mechanical Power Transmission EQPT	3010	TORQUE CONVERTERS AND SPEED CHANGERS		x
30	Mechanical Power Transmission EQPT	3020	GEARS, PULLEYS, SPROCKETS, AND TRANSMISSION CHAIN		x
30	Mechanical Power Transmission EQPT	3030	BELTING, DRIVE BELTS, FAN BELTS, AND ACCESSORIES		x
30	Mechanical Power Transmission EQPT	3040	MISCELLANEOUS POWER TRANSMISSION EQUIPMENT		x
31	Bearings	3110	BEARINGS, ANTIFRICTION, UNMOUNTED		x



31	Bearings	3120	BEARINGS, PLAIN, UNMOUNTED		x
31	Bearings	3130	BEARINGS, MOUNTED		x
32	Woodworking Machinery and EQPT	3210	SAWMILL AND PLANING MILL MACHINERY		x
32	Woodworking Machinery and EQPT	3220	WOODWORKING MACHINES		x
32	Woodworking Machinery and EQPT	3230	TOOLS AND ATTACHMENTS FOR WOODWORKING MACHINERY		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3405	SAWS AND FILING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3408	MACHINING CENTERS AND WAY-TYPE MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3410	ELECTRICAL AND ULTRASONIC EROSION MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3411	BORING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3412	BROACHING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3413	DRILLING AND TAPPING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3414	GEAR CUTTING AND FINISHING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3415	GRINDING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3416	LATHES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3417	MILLING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3418	PLANERS AND SHAPERS		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3419	MISCELLANEOUS MACHINE TOOLS		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3422	ROLLING MILLS AND DRAWING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3424	METAL HEAT TREATING AND NON-THERMAL TREATING EQUIPMENT		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3426	METAL FINISHING EQUIPMENT		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3431	ELECTRIC ARC WELDING EQUIPMENT		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3432	ELECTRIC RESISTANCE WELDING EQUIPMENT		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3433	GAS WELDING, HEAT CUTTING, AND METALIZING EQUIPMENT		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3436	WELDING POSITIONERS AND MANIPULATORS		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3438	MISCELLANEOUS WELDING EQUIPMENT		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3439	MISCELLANEOUS WELDING, SOLDERING, AND BRAZING SUPPLIES AND ACCESSORIES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3441	BENDING AND FORMING		x



			MACHINES		
34	Metalworking Machinery	3442	HYDRAULIC AND PNEUMATIC PRESSES, POWER DRIVEN		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3443	MECHANICAL PRESSES, POWER DRIVEN		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3444	MANUAL PRESSES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3445	PUNCHING AND SHEARING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3446	FORGING MACHINERY AND HAMMERS		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3447	WIRE AND METAL RIBBON FORMING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3448	RIVETING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3449	MISCELLANEOUS SECONDARY METAL FORMING AND CUTTING MACHINES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3450	MACHINE TOOLS, PORTABLE		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3455	CUTTING TOOLS FOR MACHINE TOOLS		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3456	CUTTING AND FORMING TOOLS FOR SECONDARY METALWORKING MACHINERY		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3460	MACHINE TOOL ACCESSORIES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3461	ACCESSORIES FOR SECONDARY METALWORKING MACHINERY		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3465	PRODUCTION JIGS, FIXTURES, AND TEMPLATES		x
34	Metalworking Machinery	3470	MACHINE SHOP SETS, KITS, AND OUTFITS		x
35	Service and Trade EQPT	3510	LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING EQUIPMENT		x
35	Service and Trade EQPT	3520	SHOE REPAIRING EQUIPMENT		x
35	Service and Trade EQPT	3530	INDUSTRIAL SEWING MACHINES AND MOBILE TEXTILE REPAIR SHOPS		x
35	Service and Trade EQPT	3540	WRAPPING AND PACKAGING MACHINERY		x
35	Service and Trade EQPT	3550	VENDING AND COIN OPERATED MACHINES		x
35	Service and Trade EQPT	3590	MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE AND TRADE EQUIPMENT		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3605	FOOD PRODUCTS MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3610	PRINTING, DUPLICATING, AND BOOKBINDING EQUIPMENT		x
36	Special Industry	3611	INDUSTRIAL MARKING		x



	Machinery		MACHINES		
36	Special Industry Machinery	3615	PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRIES MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3620	RUBBER AND PLASTICS WORKING MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3625	TEXTILE INDUSTRIES MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3630	CLAY AND CONCRETE PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3635	CRYSTAL AND GLASS INDUSTRIES MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3640	TOBACCO MANUFACTURING MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3645	LEATHER TANNING AND LEATHER WORKING INDUSTRIES MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3650	CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3655	GAS GENERATING AND DISPENSING SYSTEMS, FIXED OR MOBILE		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3660	INDUSTRIAL SIZE REDUCTION MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3670	SPECIALIZED SEMICONDUCTOR, MICROCIRCUIT, AND PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD MANUFACTURING MACHINERY		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3680	FOUNDRY MACHINERY, RELATED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3685	SPECIALIZED METAL CONTAINER MANUFACTURING MACHINERY AND RELATED EQUIPMENT		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3690	SPECIALIZED AMMUNITION AND ORDNANCE MACHINERY AND RELATED EQUIPMENT	x	
36	Special Industry Machinery	3693	INDUSTRIAL ASSEMBLY MACHINES		x
36	Special Industry Machinery	3694	CLEAN WORK STATIONS, CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT, AND RELATED EQUIPMENT		x



36	Special Industry Machinery	3695	MISCELLANEOUS SPECIAL INDUSTRY MACHINERY		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3710	SOIL PREPARATION EQUIPMENT		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3720	HARVESTING EQUIPMENT		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3730	DAIRY, POULTRY, AND LIVESTOCK EQUIPMENT		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3740	PEST, DISEASE, AND FROST CONTROL EQUIPMENT		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3750	GARDENING IMPLEMENTS AND TOOLS		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3760	ANIMAL DRAWN VEHICLE AND FARM TRAILER		x
37	Agricultural Machinery and EQPT	3770	SADDLERY, HARNESS, WHIPS, AND RELATED ANIMAL FURNISHINGS		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3805	EARTH MOVING AND EXCAVATING EQUIPMENT		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3810	CRANES AND CRANE-SHOVELS		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3815	CRANE AND CRANE-SHOVEL ATTACHMENTS		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3820	MINING, ROCK DRILLING, EARTH BORING, AND RELATED EQUIPMENT		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3825	ROAD CLEARING, CLEANING, AND MARKING EQUIPMENT		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3830	TRUCK AND TRACTOR ATTACHMENTS		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3835	PETROLEUM PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT		x
38	Construct/Mine/Excavate/Highway EQPT	3895	MISCELLANEOUS CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3910	CONVEYORS		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3915	MATERIALS FEEDERS		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3920	MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT, NONSELF-PROPELLED		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3930	WAREHOUSE TRUCKS AND TRACTORS, SELF-PROPELLED		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3940	BLOCKS, TACKLE, RIGGING, AND SLINGS		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3950	WINCHES, HOISTS, CRANES, AND DERRICKS		x



39	Materials Handling EQPT	3960	FREIGHT ELEVATORS		x
39	Materials Handling EQPT	3990	MISCELLANEOUS MATERIALS HANDLING EQUIPMENT		x
40	Rope, Cable, Chain, Fittings	4010	CHAIN AND WIRE ROPE		x
40	Rope, Cable, Chain, Fittings	4020	FIBER ROPE, CORDAGE, AND TWINE		x
40	Rope, Cable, Chain, Fittings	4030	FITTINGS FOR ROPE, CABLE, AND CHAIN		x
41	Refrig, Air Condit/ Circulate EQPT	4110	REFRIGERATION EQUIPMENT		x
41	Refrig, Air Condit/ Circulate EQPT	4120	AIR CONDITIONING EQUIPMENT		x
41	Refrig, Air Condit/ Circulate EQPT	4130	REFRIGERATION AND AIR CONDITIONING COMPONENTS		x
41	Refrig, Air Condit/ Circulate EQPT	4140	FANS, AIR CIRCULATORS, AND BLOWER EQUIPMENT		x
41	Refrig, Air Condit/ Circulate EQPT	4150	VORTEX TUBES AND OTHER RELATED COOLING TUBES		x
42	Fire/Rescue/Safety; Enviro Protect	4210	FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT		x
42	Fire/Rescue/Safety; Enviro Protect	4220	MARINE LIFESAVING AND DIVING EQUIPMENT		x
42	Fire/Rescue/Safety; Enviro Protect	4230	DECONTAMINATING AND IMPREGNATING EQUIPMENT		x
42	Fire/Rescue/Safety; Enviro Protect	4235	HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND CLEAN-UP EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL		x
42	Fire/Rescue/Safety; Enviro Protect	4240	SAFETY AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT		x
42	Fire/Rescue/Safety; Enviro Protect	4250	RECYCLING AND RECLAMATION EQUIPMENT		x
43	Pumps and Compressors	4310	COMPRESSORS AND VACUUM PUMPS		x
43	Pumps and Compressors	4320	POWER AND HAND PUMPS		x
43	Pumps and Compressors	4330	CENTRIFUGALS, SEPARATORS, AND PRESSURE AND VACUUM FILTERS		x
44	Furnace/Steam/Drying; NUCL Reactor	4410	INDUSTRIAL BOILERS		x
44	Furnace/Steam/Drying; NUCL Reactor	4420	HEAT EXCHANGERS AND STEAM CONDENSERS		x
44	Furnace/Steam/Drying; NUCL Reactor	4430	INDUSTRIAL FURNACES, KILNS, LEHRs, AND OVENS		x
44	Furnace/Steam/Drying; NUCL Reactor	4440	DRIERS, DEHYDRATORS, AND ANHYDRATORS		x



44	Furnace/Steam/Drying; NUCL Reactor	4460	AIR PURIFICATION EQUIPMENT		x
44	Furnace/Steam/Drying; NUCL Reactor	4470	NUCLEAR REACTORS	x	
45	Plumbing, Heating, Waste Disposal	4510	PLUMBING FIXTURES AND ACCESSORIES		x
45	Plumbing, Heating, Waste Disposal	4520	SPACE AND WATER HEATING EQUIPMENT		x
45	Plumbing, Heating, Waste Disposal	4530	FUEL BURNING EQUIPMENT UNITS		x
45	Plumbing, Heating, Waste Disposal	4540	WASTE DISPOSAL EQUIPMENT		x
46	Water Purification/ Sewage Treatment	4610	WATER PURIFICATION EQUIPMENT		x
46	Water Purification/ Sewage Treatment	4620	WATER DISTILLATION EQUIPMENT, MARINE AND INDUSTRIAL		x
46	Water Purification/ Sewage Treatment	4630	SEWAGE TREATMENT EQUIPMENT		x
47	Pipe, Tubing, Hose, and Fittings	4710	PIPE, TUBE AND RIGID TUBING		x
47	Pipe, Tubing, Hose, and Fittings	4720	HOSE AND FLEXIBLE TUBING		x
47	Pipe, Tubing, Hose, and Fittings	4730	HOSE, PIPE, TUBE, LUBRICATION, AND RAILING FITTINGS		x
48	Valves	4810	VALVES, POWERED		x
48	Valves	4820	VALVES, NONPOWERED		x
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4910	MOTOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SHOP SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT		x
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4920	AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SHOP SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT		x
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4921	TORPEDO MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4923	DEPTH CHARGES AND UNDERWATER MINES MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4925	AMMUNITION MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4927	ROCKET MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	



49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4930	LUBRICATION AND FUEL DISPENSING EQUIPMENT		x
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4931	FIRE CONTROL MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SHOP SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4933	WEAPONS MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SHOP SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4935	GUIDED MISSILE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4940	MISCELLANEOUS MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SHOP SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT		x
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4960	SPACE VEHICLE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND CHECKOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT	x	
49	Maint/Repair Shop EQPT	4970	MULTIPLE GUIDED WEAPONS, SPECIALIZED MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR SHOP EQUIPMENT	x	
51	Hand Tools	5110	HAND TOOLS, EDGED, NONPOWERED		x
51	Hand Tools	5120	HAND TOOLS, NONEDGED, NONPOWERED		x
51	Hand Tools	5130	HAND TOOLS, POWER DRIVEN		x
51	Hand Tools	5133	DRILL BITS, COUNTERBORES, AND COUNTERSINKS: HAND AND MACHINE		x
51	Hand Tools	5136	TAPS, DIES, AND COLLETS; HAND AND MACHINE		x
51	Hand Tools	5140	TOOL AND HARDWARE BOXES		x
51	Hand Tools	5180	SETS, KITS, AND OUTFITS OF HAND TOOLS		x
52	Measuring Tools	5210	MEASURING TOOLS, CRAFTSMEN'S		x
52	Measuring Tools	5220	INSPECTION GAGES AND PRECISION LAYOUT TOOLS		x
52	Measuring Tools	5280	SETS, KITS, AND OUTFITS OF MEASURING TOOLS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5305	SCREWS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5306	BOLTS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5307	STUDS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5310	NUTS AND WASHERS		x
53	Hardware and	5315	NAILS, MACHINE		x



	Abrasives		KEYS, AND PINS		
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5320	RIVETS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5325	FASTENING DEVICES		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5330	PACKING AND GASKET MATERIALS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5331	O-RING		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5335	METAL SCREENING		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5340	HARDWARE, COMMERCIAL		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5341	BRACKETS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5342	HARDWARE, WEAPON SYSTEM	x	
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5345	DISKS AND STONES, ABRASIVE		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5350	ABRASIVE MATERIALS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5355	KNOBS AND POINTERS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5360	COIL, FLAT, LEAF, AND WIRE SPRINGS		x
53	Hardware and Abrasives	5365	BUSHINGS, RINGS, SHIMS, AND SPACERS		x
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5410	PREFABRICATED AND PORTABLE BUILDINGS		x
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5411	RIGID WALL SHELTERS	x	
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5419	COLLECTIVE MODULAR SUPPORT SYSTEM	x	
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5420	BRIDGES, FIXED AND FLOATING		x
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5430	STORAGE TANKS		x
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5440	SCAFFOLDING EQUIPMENT AND CONCRETE FORMS		x
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5445	PREFABRICATED TOWER STRUCTURES		x
54	Prefab Structures/ Scaffolding	5450	MISCELLANEOUS PREFABRICATED STRUCTURES		x
55	Lumber, Millwork, Plywood, Veneer	5510	LUMBER AND RELATED BASIC WOOD MATERIALS		x
55	Lumber, Millwork, Plywood, Veneer	5520	MILLWORK		x
55	Lumber, Millwork, Plywood, Veneer	5530	PLYWOOD AND VENEER		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5610	MINERAL CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, BULK		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5620	TILE, BRICK AND BLOCK		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5630	PIPE AND CONDUIT, NONMETALLIC		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5640	WALLBOARD, BUILDING PAPER, AND THERMAL		x



			INSULATION MATERIALS		
56	Construction and Building Material	5650	ROOFING AND SIDING MATERIALS		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5660	FENCING, FENCES, GATES AND COMPONENTS		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5670	BUILDING COMPONENTS, PREFABRICATED		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5675	NONWOOD CONSTRUCTION LUMBER AND RELATED MATERIALS		x
56	Construction and Building Material	5680	MISCELLANEOUS CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5805	TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH EQUIPMENT		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5810	COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5811	OTHER CRYPTOLOGIC EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5815	TELETYPE AND FACSIMILE EQUIPMENT		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5820	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5821	RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5825	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5826	RADIO NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5830	INTERCOMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS, EXCEPT AIRBORNE		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5831	INTERCOMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS, AIRBORNE	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5835	SOUND RECORDING AND REPRODUCING EQUIPMENT		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5836	VIDEO RECORDING AND REPRODUCING EQUIPMENT		x
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5840	RADAR EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT AIRBORNE	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5841	RADAR EQUIPMENT, AIRBORNE	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5845	UNDERWATER SOUND EQUIPMENT	x	



58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5850	VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE LIGHT COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5855	NIGHT VISION EQUIPMENT, EMITTED AND REFLECTED RADIATION	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5860	STIMULATED COHERENT RADIATION DEVICES, COMPONENTS, AND ACCESSORIES	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5865	ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES, COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES AND QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY EQUIPMENT	x	
58	Comm/Detect/Coherent Radiation	5895	MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5905	RESISTORS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5910	CAPACITORS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5915	FILTERS AND NETWORKS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5920	FUSES, ARRESTORS, ABSORBERS, AND PROTECTORS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5925	CIRCUIT BREAKERS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5930	SWITCHES		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5935	CONNECTORS, ELECTRICAL		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5940	LUGS, TERMINALS, AND TERMINAL STRIPS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5945	RELAYS AND SOLENOIDS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5950	COILS AND TRANSFORMERS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5955	OSCILLATORS AND PIEZOELECTRIC CRYSTALS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5960	ELECTRON TUBES AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5961	SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5962	MICROCIRCUITS, ELECTRONIC		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5963	ELECTRONIC MODULES		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5965	HEADSETS, HANDSETS, MICROPHONES AND SPEAKERS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5970	ELECTRICAL INSULATORS AND INSULATING MATERIALS		x



59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5975	ELECTRICAL HARDWARE AND SUPPLIES		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5977	ELECTRICAL CONTACT BRUSHES AND ELECTRODES		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5980	OPTOELECTRONIC DEVICES AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5985	ANTENNAS, WAVEGUIDES, AND RELATED EQUIPMENT		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5990	SYNCHROS AND RESOLVERS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5995	CABLE, CORD, AND WIRE ASSEMBLIES: COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT	x	
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5996	AMPLIFIERS		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5998	ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLIES, BOARDS, CARDS, AND ASSOCIATED HARDWARE		x
59	Electrical/Electronic EQPT COMPNTS	5999	MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6005	ROTARY JOINTS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6005	COUPLERS, SPLITTERS, AND MIXERS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6006	ATTENUATORS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6007	FILTERS AND NETWORKS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6008	OPTICAL MULTIPLE/ DEMULTIPLEXERS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6010	FIBER OPTIC CONDUCTORS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6015	FIBER OPTIC CABLES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6020	FIBER OPTIC CABLE ASSEMBLIES AND HARNESSSES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6021	FIBER OPTIC SWITCHES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6025	FIBER OPTIC TRANSMITTERS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6026	FIBER OPTIC RECEIVERS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6029	FIBER OPTIC REPEATERS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6030	FIBER OPTIC DEVICES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6031	INTEGRATED OPTICAL CIRCUITS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6032	FIBER OPTIC LIGHT SOURCES AND PHOTO DETECTORS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6033	FIBER OPTIC PHOTO DETECTORS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6034	FIBER OPTIC MOD/ DEMODULATORS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6035	FIBER OPTIC LIGHT TRANSFER AND IMAGE TRANSFER DEVICES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6040	FIBER OPTIC SENSORS		x



60	Fiber Optic	6050	FIBER OPTIC PASSIVE DEVICES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6060	FIBER OPTIC INTERCONNECTORS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6070	FIBER OPTIC ACCESSORIES AND SUPPLIES		x
60	Fiber Optic	6080	FIBER OPTIC KITS AND SETS		x
60	Fiber Optic	6099	MISCELLANEOUS FIBER OPTIC COMPONENTS		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6105	MOTORS, ELECTRICAL		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6110	ELECTRICAL CONTROL EQUIPMENT		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6115	GENERATORS AND GENERATOR SETS, ELECTRICAL		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6116	FUEL CELL POWER UNITS, COMPONENTS, AND ACCESSORIES		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6117	SOLAR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6120	TRANSFORMERS: DISTRIBUTION AND POWER STATION		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6125	CONVERTERS, ELECTRICAL, ROTATING		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6130	CONVERTERS, ELECTRICAL, NONROTATING		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6135	BATTERIES, NONRECHARGEABLE		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6140	BATTERIES, RECHARGEABLE		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6145	WIRE AND CABLE, ELECTRICAL		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6150	MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRIC POWER AND DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT		x
61	Electric Wire, Power Distrib EQPT	6160	MISCELLANEOUS BATTERY RETAINING FIXTURES, LINERS AND ANCILLARY ITEMS		x
62	Lighting Fixtures, Lamps	6210	INDOOR AND OUTDOOR ELECTRIC LIGHTING FIXTURES		x
62	Lighting Fixtures, Lamps	6220	ELECTRIC VEHICULAR LIGHTS AND FIXTURES		x
62	Lighting Fixtures, Lamps	6230	ELECTRIC PORTABLE AND HAND LIGHTING EQUIPMENT		x
62	Lighting Fixtures, Lamps	6240	ELECTRIC LAMPS		x
62	Lighting Fixtures, Lamps	6250	BALLASTS, LAMP HOLDERS, AND STARTERS		x
62	Lighting Fixtures, Lamps	6260	NONELECTRICAL LIGHTING FIXTURES		x
63	Alarm, Signal, Security Detection	6310	TRAFFIC AND TRANSIT SIGNAL		x



			SYSTEMS		
63	Alarm, Signal, Security Detection	6320	SHIPBOARD ALARM AND SIGNAL SYSTEMS	x	
63	Alarm, Signal, Security Detection	6330	RAILROAD SIGNAL AND WARNING DEVICES		x
63	Alarm, Signal, Security Detection	6340	AIRCRAFT ALARM AND SIGNAL SYSTEMS	x	
63	Alarm, Signal, Security Detection	6350	MISCELLANEOUS ALARM, SIGNAL, AND SECURITY DETECTION SYSTEMS		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6505	DRUGS AND BIOLOGICALS		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6506	BLOOD AND BLOOD PRODUCTS		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6507	BLOOD DERIVATIVES		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6508	MEDICATED COSMETICS AND TOILETRIES		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6509	DRUGS AND BIOLOGICALS, VETERINARY USE		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6510	SURGICAL DRESSING MATERIALS		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6515	MEDICAL AND SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6520	DENTAL INSTRUMENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6525	IMAGING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES: MEDICAL, DENTAL, VETERINARY		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6530	HOSPITAL FURNITURE, EQUIPMENT, UTENSILS, AND SUPPLIES		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6532	HOSPITAL AND SURGICAL CLOTHING AND RELATED SPECIAL PURPOSE ITEMS		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6540	OPHTHALMIC INSTRUMENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUPPLIES		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6545	REPLENISHABLE FIELD MEDICAL SETS, KITS, AND OUTFITS	x	
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6550	IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC SUBSTANCES, REAGENTS, TEST KITS AND SETS		x
65	Medical/Dental/Veterinary EQPT/SUPP	6555	HUMAN TISSUE AND CADAVERS	x	



66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6605	NAVIGATIONAL INSTRUMENTS	x	
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6610	FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS	x	
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6615	AUTOMATIC PILOT MECHANISMS AND AIRBORNE GYRO COMPONENTS	x	
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6620	ENGINE INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6625	ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC PROPERTIES MEASURING AND TESTING INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6630	CHEMICAL ANALYSIS INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6632	ANALYSIS INSTRUMENTS, MEDICAL LABORATORY USE		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6635	PHYSICAL PROPERTIES TESTING AND INSPECTION		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6636	ENVIRONMENTAL CHAMBERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6640	LABORATORY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6645	TIME MEASURING INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6650	OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS, TEST EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND ACCESSORIES		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6655	GEOPHYSICAL INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6660	METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS AND APPARATUS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6665	HAZARD-DETECTING INSTRUMENTS AND APPARATUS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6670	SCALES AND BALANCES		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6675	DRAFTING, SURVEYING, AND MAPPING INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6680	LIQUID AND GAS FLOW, LIQUID LEVEL, AND MECHANICAL MOTION MEASURING INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6685	PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND HUMIDITY MEASURING AND CONTROLLING INSTRUMENTS		x
66	Instruments and Laboratory EQPT	6695	COMBINATION AND MISCELLANEOUS		x



			INSTRUMENTS		
67	Photographic EQPT	6710	CAMERAS, MOTION PICTURE		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6720	CAMERAS, STILL PICTURE		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6730	PHOTOGRAPHIC PROJECTION EQUIPMENT		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6740	PHOTOGRAPHIC DEVELOPING AND FINISHING EQUIPMENT		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6750	PHOTOGRAPHIC SUPPLIES		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6760	PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6770	FILM, PROCESSED		x
67	Photographic EQPT	6780	PHOTOGRAPHIC SETS, KITS, AND OUTFITS		x
68	Chemicals and Chemical Products	6810	CHEMICALS		x
68	Chemicals and Chemical Products	6820	DYES		x
68	Chemicals and Chemical Products	6830	GASES: COMPRESSED AND LIQUEFIED		x
68	Chemicals and Chemical Products	6835	MEDICAL GASES		x
68	Chemicals and Chemical Products	6840	PEST CONTROL AGENTS AND DISINFECTANTS		x
68	Chemicals and Chemical Products	6850	MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL SPECIALTIES		x
69	Training Aids and Devices	6910	TRAINING AIDS		x
69	Training Aids and Devices	6920	ARMAMENT TRAINING DEVICES	x	
69	Training Aids and Devices	6930	OPERATION TRAINING DEVICES		x
69	Training Aids and Devices	6940	COMMUNICATION TRAINING DEVICES	x	
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7010	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7020	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT (CPU, COMPUTER), ANALOG		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7021	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT (CPU, COMPUTER), DIGITAL		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7022	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT (CPU, COMPUTER), HYBRID		x



70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7025	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INPUT/OUTPUT AND STORAGE DEVICES		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7030	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SOFTWARE		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7035	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7040	PUNCHED CARD EQUIPMENT		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7042	MINI AND MICRO COMPUTER CONTROL DEVICES		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7045	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIES		x
70	Information Technology Equipment (INCLD Firmware) Software, Supplies and Support Equipment	7050	INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS		x
71	Furniture	7105	HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE		x
71	Furniture	7110	OFFICE FURNITURE		x
71	Furniture	7125	CABINETS, LOCKERS, BINS, AND SHELVING		x
71	Furniture	7195	MISCELLANEOUS FURNITURE AND FIXTURES		x
72	Household/Commerce Furnish/Appliance	7210	HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS		x
72	Household/Commerce Furnish/Appliance	7220	FLOOR COVERINGS		x
72	Household/Commerce Furnish/Appliance	7230	DRAPERIES, AWNINGS, AND SHADES		x
72	Household/Commerce Furnish/Appliance	7240	HOUSEHOLD AND COMMERCIAL UTILITY CONTAINERS		x
72	Household/Commerce Furnish/Appliance	7290	MISCELLANEOUS HOUSEHOLD AND COMMERCIAL FURNISHINGS AND APPLIANCES		x
73	Food Preparation/ Serving EQPT	7310	FOOD COOKING, BAKING, AND SERVING EQUIPMENT		x
73	Food Preparation/ Serving EQPT	7320	KITCHEN EQUIPMENT AND APPLIANCES		x



73	Food Preparation/ Serving EQPT	7330	KITCHEN HAND TOOLS AND UTENSILS		x
73	Food Preparation/ Serving EQPT	7340	CUTLERY AND FLATWARE		x
73	Food Preparation/ Serving EQPT	7350	TABLEWARE		x
73	Food Preparation/ Serving EQPT	7360	SETS, KITS, OUTFITS AND MODULES, FOOD PREPERATION AND SERVING		x
74	Office Mach/Text Process/ VISIB Rec	7420	ACCOUNTING AND CALCULATING MACHINES		x
74	Office Mach/Text Process/ VISIB Rec	7430	TYPEWRITERS AND OFFICE TYPE COMPOSING MACHINES		x
74	Office Mach/Text Process/ VISIB Rec	7435	OFFICE INFORMATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT		x
74	Office Mach/Text Process/ VISIB Rec	7450	OFFICE TYPE SOUND RECORDING AND REPRODUCING MACHINES		x
74	Office Mach/Text Process/ VISIB Rec	7460	VISIBLE RECORD EQUIPMENT		x
74	Office Mach/Text Process/ VISIB Rec	7490	MISCELLANEOUS OFFICE MACHINES		x
75	Office Supplies and Devices	7510	OFFICE SUPPLIES		x
75	Office Supplies and Devices	7520	OFFICE DEVICES AND ACCESSORIES		x
75	Office Supplies and Devices	7530	STATIONERY AND RECORD FORMS		x
75	Office Supplies and Devices	7540	STANDARD FORMS		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7610	BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7630	NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7640	MAPS, ATLASES, CHARTS, AND GLOBES		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7641	AERONAUTICAL MAPS, CHARTS AND GEODETIC PRODUCTS	x	
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7642	HYDROGRAPHIC MAPS, CHARTS AND GEODETIC PRODUCTS	x	
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7643	TOPOGRAPHIC MAPS, CHARTS AND GEODETIC PRODUCTS		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7644	DIGITAL MAPS, CHARTS AND GEODETIC PRODUCTS		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7650	DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS		x



76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7660	SHEET AND BOOK MUSIC		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7670	MICROFILM, PROCESSED		x
76	Books, Maps, Other Publications	7690	MISCELLANEOUS PRINTED MATTER		x
77	Musical INST/ Phonograph/Home Radio	7710	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS		x
77	Musical INST/ Phonograph/Home Radio	7720	MUSICAL INSTRUMENT PARTS AND ACCESSORIES		x
77	Musical INST/ Phonograph/Home Radio	7730	PHONOGRAPHS, RADIOS, AND TELEVISION SETS: HOME TYPE		x
77	Musical INST/ Phonograph/Home Radio	7735	PARTS AND ACCESSORIES OF PHONOGRAPHS, RADIOS, AND TELEVISION SET: HOME TYPE		x
77	Musical INST/ Phonograph/Home Radio	7740	PHONOGRAPH RECORDS		x
78	Recreational/Athletic EQPT	7810	ATHLETIC AND SPORTING EQUIPMENT		x
78	Recreational/Athletic EQPT	7820	GAMES, TOYS, AND WHEELED GOODS		x
78	Recreational/Athletic EQPT	7830	RECREATIONAL AND GYMNASIAC EQUIPMENT		x
79	Cleaning EQPT and Supplies	7910	FLOOR POLISHERS AND VACUUM CLEANING EQUIPMENT		x
79	Cleaning EQPT and Supplies	7920	BROOMS, BRUSHES, MOPS, AND SPONGES		x
79	Cleaning EQPT and Supplies	7930	CLEANING AND POLISHING COMPOUNDS AND PREPARATIONS		x
80	Brushes, Paints, Sealers, Adhesives	8010	PAINTS, DOPES, VARNISHES, AND RELATED PRODUCTS		x
80	Brushes, Paints, Sealers, Adhesives	8020	PAINT AND ARTISTS' BRUSHES		x
80	Brushes, Paints, Sealers, Adhesives	8030	PRESERVATIVE AND SEALING COMPOUNDS		x
80	Brushes, Paints, Sealers, Adhesives	8040	ADHESIVES		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packing Suppl	8105	BAGS AND SACKS		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packing Suppl	8110	DRUMS AND CANS		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packing Suppl	8115	BOXES, CARTONS, AND CRATES		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packing Suppl	8120	COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL GAS CYLINDERS		x



81	Containers/Packaging/ Packi ng Suppl	8125	BOTTLES AND JARS		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packi ng Suppl	8130	REELS AND SPOOLS		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packi ng Suppl	8135	PACKAGING AND PACKING BULK MATERIALS		x
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packi ng Suppl	8140	AMMUNITION AND NUCLEAR ORDNANCE BOXES, PACKAGES AND SPECIAL CONTAINERS	x	
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packi ng Suppl	8145	SPECIALIZED SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINERS	x	
81	Containers/Packaging/ Packi ng Suppl	8150	FREIGHT CONTAINERS		x
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8305	TEXTILE FABRICS	x	
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8310	YARN AND THREAD	x	
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8315	NOTIONS AND APPAREL FINDINGS	x	
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8320	PADDING AND STUFFING MATERIALS	x	
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8325	FUR MATERIALS		x
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8330	LEATHER		x
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8335	SHOE FINDINGS AND SOLING MATERIALS		x
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8340	TENTS AND TARPAULINS	x	
83	Textile/Leather/Fur; Tent; Flag	8345	FLAGS AND PENNANTS	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8405	OUTERWEAR, MEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8410	OUTERWEAR, WOMEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8415	CLOTHING, SPECIAL PURPOSE	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8420	UNDERWEAR AND NIGHTWEAR, MEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8425	UNDERWEAR AND NIGHTWEAR, WOMEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and	8430	FOOTWEAR, MEN'S	x	



	Jewelry				
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8435	FOOTWEAR, WOMEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8440	HOSIERY, HANDWEAR, AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, MEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8445	HOSIERY, HANDWEAR, AND CLOTHING ACCESSORIES, WOMEN'S	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8450	CHILDREN'S AND INFANTS' APPAREL AND ACCESSORIES	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8455	BADGES AND INSIGNIA		x
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8457	JEWELRY		x
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8460	LUGGAGE		x
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8465	INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8470	ARMOR, PERSONAL	x	
84	Clothing, Individual Equipment, Insignia, and Jewelry	8475	SPECIALIZED FLIGHT CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES	x	
85	Toiletries	8510	PERFUMES, TOILET PREPARATIONS, AND POWDERS		x
85	Toiletries	8520	TOILET SOAP, SHAVING PREPARATIONS, AND DENTIFRICES		x
85	Toiletries	8530	PERSONAL TOILETRY ARTICLES		x
85	Toiletries	8540	TOILETRY PAPER PRODUCTS		x
87	Agricultural Supplies	8710	FORAGE AND FEED		x
87	Agricultural Supplies	8720	FERTILIZERS		x



87	Agricultural Supplies	8730	SEEDS AND NURSERY STOCK		x
88	Live Animals	8810	LIVE ANIMALS, RAISED FOR FOOD		x
88	Live Animals	8820	LIVE ANIMALS, NOT RAISED FOR FOOD		x
89	Subsistence	8900	PERISHABLE SUBSISTENCE \$10K TO \$25K		x
89	Subsistence	8905	MEAT, POULTRY, AND FISH		x
89	Subsistence	8910	DAIRY FOODS AND EGGS		x
89	Subsistence	8915	FRUITS AND VEGETABLES		x
89	Subsistence	8920	BAKERY AND CEREAL PRODUCTS		x
89	Subsistence	8925	SUGAR, CONFECTIONERY, AND NUTS		x
89	Subsistence	8930	JAMS, JELLIES, AND PRESERVES		x
89	Subsistence	8935	SOUPS AND BOUILLONS		x
89	Subsistence	8940	SPECIAL DIETARY FOODS AND FOOD SPECIALTY PREPARATIONS		x
89	Subsistence	8945	FOODS, OILS AND FATS		x
89	Subsistence	8950	CONDIMENTS AND RELATED PRODUCTS		x
89	Subsistence	8955	COFFEE, TEA, AND COCOA		x
89	Subsistence	8960	BEVERAGES, NONALCHOLIC		x
89	Subsistence	8965	BEVERAGES, ALCOHOLIC	x	
89	Subsistence	8970	COMPOSITE FOOD PACKAGES		x
89	Subsistence	8975	TOBACCO PRODUCTS	x	
89	Subsistence	8999	FOOD ITEMS FOR RESALE		x
91	Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, Waxes	9110	FUELS, SOLID		x
91	Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, Waxes	9130	LIQUID PROPELLANTS AND FUELS, PETROLEUM BASE		x
91	Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, Waxes	9135	LIQUID PROPELLANT FUELS AND OXIDIZERS, CHEMICAL BASE	x	
91	Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, Waxes	9140	FUEL OILS		x
91	Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, Waxes	9150	OILS AND GREASES: CUTTING, LUBRICATING, AND HYDRAULIC		x
91	Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, Waxes	9160	MISCELLANEOUS WAXES, OILS, AND FATS		x
93	Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials	9310	PAPER AND PAPERBOARD		x
93	Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials	9320	RUBBER FABRICATED MATERIALS		x
93	Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials	9330	PLASTICS FABRICATED MATERIALS		x
93	Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials	9340	GLASS FABRICATED MATERIALS		x



93	Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials	9350	REFRACTORIES AND FIRE SURFACING MATERIALS		x
93	Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials	9390	MISCELLANEOUS FABRICATED NONMETALLIC MATERIALS		x
94	Nonmetallic Crude Materials	9410	CRUDE GRADES OF PLANT MATERIALS		x
94	Nonmetallic Crude Materials	9420	FIBERS: VEGETABLE, ANIMAL, AND SYNTHETIC	x	
94	Nonmetallic Crude Materials	9430	MISCELLANEOUS CRUDE ANIMAL PRODUCTS, INEDIBLE		x
94	Nonmetallic Crude Materials	9440	MISCELLANEOUS CRUDE AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY PRODUCTS		x
94	Nonmetallic Crude Materials	9450	NONMETALLIC SCRAP, EXCEPT TEXTILE		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9505	WIRE, NONELECTRICAL		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9510	BARS AND RODS		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9515	PLATE, SHEET, STRIP, FOIL, AND LEAF		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9520	STRUCTURAL SHAPES		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9525	WIRE, NONELECTRICAL, NONFERROUS BASE METAL		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9530	BARS AND RODS, NONFERROUS BASE METAL		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9535	PLATE, SHEET, STRIP, AND FOIL; NONFERROUS BASE METAL		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9540	STRUCTURAL SHAPES, NONFERROUS BASE METAL		x
95	Metal Bars, Sheets, Shapes	9545	PLATE, SHEET, STRIP, FOIL, AND WIRE: PRECIOUS METAL		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9610	ORES		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9620	MINERALS, NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9630	ADDITIVE METAL MATERIALS		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9640	IRON AND STEEL PRIMARY AND SEMIFINISHED PRODUCTS		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9650	NONFERROUS BASE METAL REFINERY AND INTERMEDIATE FORMS		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9660	PRECIOUS METALS PRIMARY FORMS	x	



96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9670	IRON AND STEEL SCRAP		x
96	Ores, Minerals and Primary Products	9680	NONFERROUS SCRAP	x	
99	Miscellaneous	9905	SIGNS, ADVERTISING DISPLAYS, AND IDENTIFICATION PLATES		x
99	Miscellaneous	9910	JEWELRY		x
99	Miscellaneous	9915	COLLECTORS' AND/OR HISTORICAL ITEMS		x
99	Miscellaneous	9920	SMOKERS' ARTICLES AND MATCHES		x
99	Miscellaneous	9925	ECCLESIASTICAL EQUIPMENT, FURNISHINGS, AND SUPPLIES		x
99	Miscellaneous	9930	MEMORIALS; CEMETERIAL AND MORTUARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES		x
99	Miscellaneous	9998	NON-FOOD ITEMS FOR RESALE		x
99	Miscellaneous	9999	MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS	x	



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